> What we are dealing with is the difficulty, in mass movements for
> substantial change of a staus quo, of coing to terms with the fact that
> the 'troops' to bring about such a change will never be able to agree in
> advance as to the _alternativ_ to the present that they fight for. This
> need to unite radically different "values" in the struggle provides a
> false impression of "incoherence" both to many/most of those actively
> engaged _and_ (more agonzinly perhaps) to those not engaged who can
> safely insist on "coherence" because they are not faced with the
> necessity to organize demonstrations, etc that bring together peole
> whose positions on "alterrnatives" are muutally incoherent.
>
> My oft repeated (and equqally often totally misunderstood) statement
> that we address ourselves to thos who alaready agree with us is grounded
> in this unavoidable internal incohrence of any mass movement (which is
> always an unruly coaltion). Hence I assume that "those who already agree
> with us" do so at a auite generla and sloppy level, and that that
> "agreement" will conceal sharp disagreements - some of which can be
> worked out over relatively short periods of time, other s which can be
> worked out only when (if ever) "we" have state power.
Marx, in contrast, makes rationally based agreement about ends, an agreement made possible by individuals having attained the requisite degree of "integral development", a necessary feature and outcome of a successful "revolutionary practice".
Thus, in the letter to Ruge portraying the "critic" is as able by means of critique to "develop the true reality as its ['existing reality's'] obligation and final goal", it's implicitly claimed that such a critique presupposes that the individuals to whom it's addressed have attained the degree of "integral development" realised in "the political state – in all its modern forms".
This, "even where it is not yet consciously imbued with socialist demands, contains the demands of reason." However, it "assumes that reason has been realised. But precisely because of that it everywhere becomes involved in the contradiction between its ideal function and its real prerequisites."
What critique must do here is "merely show the world what it is really fighting for", i.e. "true reality" as the true "demands of reason".
To be open to this demonstration of the "true reality" that would exist where "reason has been realised", i.e. to be open to theory that "demonstrates ad hominem", individuals must have already attained the degree of "integral development" required for the realisation of the particular alienated form of "the demands of reason" constitutive of "the political state – in all its modern forms".
Marx later moved from a critique of the political state to a critique of political economy, but these ideas of critique as developing "the true reality" as the "obligation and final goal" of "existing reality" and as requiring on the part of those to whom it is addressed the requisite degree of "integral development" remained.
"The reform of consciousness consists only in making the world aware of its own consciousness, in awakening it out of its dream about itself, in explaining to it the meaning of its own actions. Our whole object can only be – as is also the case in Feuerbach’s criticism of religion – to give religious and philosophical questions the form corresponding to man who has become conscious of himself.
"Hence, our motto must be: reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but by analysing the mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself, whether it manifests itself in a religious or a political form. It will then become evident that the world has long dreamed of possessing something of which it has only to be conscious in order to possess it in reality. It will become evident that it is not a question of drawing a great mental dividing line between past and future, but of realising the thoughts of the past. Lastly, it will become evident that mankind is not beginning a new work, but is consciously carrying into effect its old work." http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_09.htm
One "value" on which there must be agreement is ethical. This determines how we would produce if "we had carried out production as human beings", i.e. as the actualization of "self-conscious reason".
"Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature. 3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and therefore would become recognised and felt by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love. 4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realised my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature.
"Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.
"This relationship would moreover be reciprocal; what occurs on my side has also to occur on yours." http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/james-mill/
Ted