[lbo-talk] Gaza

Charles Turner vze26m98 at optonline.net
Wed Jan 7 03:36:12 PST 2009


On Tue, 06 Jan 2009 20:19:21 -0800, Chuck Grimes wrote:
> In any event, the bottom line application for today is to understand
> what Israel is doing in Gaza. Juan Cole noted in an earlier blog entry
> that Israel had switched from macro-wars to mini-wars. So, Israel is
> destroying Gaza's Hamas led government and infrastructure. That's why
> it is bombing government buildings, mosques, schools, hospitals, and
> utilities, well and UN facilities.
>
> In order to provide itself with political cover Israel is treating
> these targets as targets of opportunity. If IDF intelligence can
> provide some figleaf, then the IDF will destroy that target and
> various apartment buildings that offer themselves as similar
> targets. What this apparently collateral damage does, is cover up the
> deliberateness of going straight for these infrastructure targets, as
> infrastructure alone. There is a sort of legalistic technicality in
> operation here, since destroying civilian infrastructure by an
> occupation army is a war crime.


> The military similarity between Gaza and the southern Lebanon invasion
> in 2006(?) must be evident. The parallel is, go after Hezbollah and
> try to destory its material and human infrastructure, while punishing
> Beirut in hopes of destablizing Lebanon.

If you give any creedence to Mark Perry's analysis, this is partly intentional, and partly a result of their failure to actually inflict damage on Hamas:

<http://conflictsforum.org/2006/how-hezbollah-defeated-israel/>

"The Israeli military’s plans called for an early and sustained bombardment of Lebanon’s major highways and ports in addition to its plans to destroy Hezbollah military and political assets. The Israeli government made no secret of its intent - to undercut Hezbollah’s support in the Christian, Sunni and Druze communities. That idea, to punish Lebanon for harboring Hezbollah and so turn the people against the militia, had been a part of Israel’s plan since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.

While IDF officials confidently and publicly announced success in their offensive, their commanders recommended that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert approve increased air sorties against potential Hezbollah caches in marginal target areas at the end of the first week of the bombing. Olmert approved these attacks, while knowing that in making such a request his senior officers had all but admitted that their initial assessment of the damage inflicted on Hezbollah was exaggerated.

...

The “target stretching” escalated throughout the conflict; frustrated by their inability to identify and destroy major Hezbollah military assets, the IAF began targeting schools, community centers and mosques - under the belief that their inability to identify and interdict Hezbollah bunkers signaled Hezbollah’s willingness to hide their major assets inside civilian centers."



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