[lbo-talk] The Brave New World of High Frequency Trading

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Sat Jul 25 10:12:41 PDT 2009


[A long-standing obsession of Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge broken down for us non-traders.]

[Part of what makes it more fun is that it seems quite possible that many people think (a) this is the sort of program Sergey Aleynikov wrote for Goldman, which is why they were so upset about it being stolen, and (b) this contributed substantially to GS's high earnings.]

<begin blog post>

http://market-ticker.denninger.net/archives/1259-High-Frequency-Trading-Is-A-Scam.html

High Frequency Trading Is A Scam

The Market Ticker

Friday, July 24. 2009

Posted by Karl Denninger in Regulatory at 08:22

High Frequency Trading Is A Scam

The NY Times has blown the cover off the dark art known as "HFT", or

"High-Frequency Trading", perhaps without knowing it.

It was July 15, and Intel, the computer chip giant, had reporting

robust earnings the night before. Some investors, smelling

opportunity, set out to buy shares in the semiconductor company

Broadcom. (Their activities were described by an investor at a major

Wall Street firm who spoke on the condition of anonymity to protect

his job.) The slower traders faced a quandary: If they sought to buy

a large number of shares at once, they would tip their hand and risk

driving up Broadcom's price. So, as is often the case on Wall

Street, they divided their orders into dozens of small batches,

hoping to cover their tracks. One second after the market opened,

shares of Broadcom started changing hands at $26.20.

The slower traders began issuing buy orders. But rather than being

shown to all potential sellers at the same time, some of those

orders were most likely routed to a collection of high-frequency

traders for just 30 milliseconds -- 0.03 seconds -- in what are

known as flash orders. While markets are supposed to ensure

transparency by showing orders to everyone simultaneously, a

loophole in regulations allows marketplaces like Nasdaq to show

traders some orders ahead of everyone else in exchange for a fee.

In less than half a second, high-frequency traders gained a valuable

insight: the hunger for Broadcom was growing. Their computers began

buying up Broadcom shares and then reselling them to the slower

investors at higher prices. The overall price of Broadcom began to

rise.

Soon, thousands of orders began flooding the markets as

high-frequency software went into high gear. Automatic programs

began issuing and canceling tiny orders within milliseconds to

determine how much the slower traders were willing to pay. The

high-frequency computers quickly determined that some investors'

upper limit was $26.40. The price shot to $26.39, and high-frequency

programs began offering to sell hundreds of thousands of shares.

But then the NY Times gets the bottom line wrong:

The result is that the slower-moving investors paid $1.4 million for

about 56,000 shares, or $7,800 more than if they had been able to

move as quickly as the high-frequency traders.

No. The disadvantage was not speed. The disadvantage was that the

"algos" had engaged in something other than what their claimed purpose

is in the marketplace - that is, instead of providing liquidity, they

intentionally probed the market with tiny orders that were immediately

canceled in a scheme to gain an illegal view into the other side's

willingness to pay.

Let me explain.

Let's say that there is a buyer willing to buy 100,000 shares of BRCM

with a limit price of $26.40. That is, the buyer will accept any price

up to $26.40.

But the market at this particular moment in time is at $26.10, or

thirty cents lower.

So the computers, having detected via their "flash orders" (which ought

to be illegal) that there is a desire for Broadcom shares, start to

issue tiny (typically 100 share lots) "immediate or cancel" orders -

IOCs - to sell at $26.20. If that order is "eaten" the computer then

issues an order at $26.25, then $26.30, then $26.35, then $26.40. When

it tries $26.45 it gets no bite and the order is immediately canceled.

Now the flush of supply comes at, big coincidence, $26.39, and the

claim is made that the market has become "more efficient."

Nonsense; there was no "real seller" at any of these prices! This

pattern of offering was intended to do one and only one thing -

manipulate the market by discovering what is supposed to be a hidden

piece of information - the other side's limit price!

With normal order queues and flows the person with the limit order

would see the offer at $26.20 and might drop his limit. But the

computers are so fast that unless you own one of the same speed you

have no chance to do this - your order is immediately "raped" at the

full limit price! You got screwed, as the fill price is in fact 30

cents a share away from where the market actually is.

A couple of years ago if you entered a limit order for $26.40 with the

market at $26.10 odds are excellent that most of your order would have

filled down near where the market was when you entered the order -

$26.10. Today, odds are excellent that most of your order will fill at

$26.39, and the HFT firms will claim this is an "efficient market."

The truth is that you got screwed for 29 cents per share which was

quite literally stolen by the HFT firms that probed your book before

you could detect the activity, determined your maximum price, and then

sold to you as close to your maximum price as was possible.

If you're wondering how this ramp job happened in the last week and a

half, you just discovered the answer. When there are limit orders

beyond the market outstanding against a market that is moving higher

the presence of these programs will guarantee huge profits to the banks

running them and they also guarantee both that the retail buyers will

get screwed as the market will move MUCH faster to the upside than it

otherwise would.

Likewise when the market is moving downward with conviction we will see

the opposite - the "sell stops" will also be raped, the investor will

also get screwed, and again the HFT firms will make an outsize profit.

These programs were put in place and are allowed under the claim that

they "improve liquidity." Hogwash. They have turned the market into a

rigged game where institutional orders (that's you, Mr. and Mrs. Joe

Public, when you buy or sell mutual funds!) are routinely screwed for

the benefit of a few major international banks.

If you're wondering how Goldman Sachs and other "big banks and hedge

funds" made all their money this last quarter, now you know.

<end blog post>

That last sentence refers to the fact that not only is 73% (!) of all volume on the NYSE now HFT, but the same strategy is being applied to lots of other markets (futures, options, etc.) Tyler Durden has some back of the envelope calculations where he concludes that *all and then some* of Goldman's record $3.44B profit last quarter could be coming from this super grift:

http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/07/goldmans-4-billion-high-frequency.html

He also provides further details for those interested. Two other things in particular that he touches on are:

1) In addition to stealing money from our mutual funds, with what seems like what should be an illegal technique, if HFT is 3/4 of market volume, then without question it's moving the market. And the big run-up of 2009 may be just the newest Ponzi game, set to burst spectacularly when this mechanism goes into reverse.

2) In re that amazing figure of the proportion of NYSE trading that is HFT -- We used to know it exactly until a month ago when the SEC suddenly stopped providing the data without providing any reason. Which Tyler Durden considers another blatant act by Government Sachs to stop people like him from exposing them.

And as Jordan pointed out to me when it happened, you could say the same of the nabbing of GS's computer guy by the FBI. What exactly what it that made that a federal case? Besides that GS was incommoded?

Of course, if this really was the source of such a huge part of their earnings, you could imagine why they were so agitated.

I must admit, that although Tyler Durden is way better at math than me, I tend to think that at least some of GS's earnings have to have come from having 2 of their major competitors (Bear Stearns and Lehman) put to sleep in the last year, and the general fear in the markets, which widens spreads. Surely those things must have contributed to earnings, and I would think substantially.

Although that observation bring up one last thing on the Government Sachs beat: that those two competitors died when the government said it was absolutely "powerless" to them to commercial banks and save them. Until 2 weeks after Lehman desmise it found it could in GS's case.

It's probably just a coincidence. They might have died in a different order, and it's probably the view of the abyss that opened after Lehman that changed the government's mind.

But certainly lots more fun grist for agita!

Michael



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