Well, IMHO, there is no way to do ontology that doesn't follow from consciousness (or experience), for Kantian reasons. One either does it from consciousness or not at all. Ontologies that do not proceed from that position are metaphysics, which is, as I think Kant correctly demonstrated, impossible. (Unless you want to be a subjective or absolute idealist and assert that there is nothing outside consciousness, as Hegel did -- and I think BTW that all empiricism and metaphysical materialism is really a form of idealism, even if empiricists and materialists don't realize it.)
If one starts basing ones ontology on concepts that are derived from experience, like math or space (I am using "derived from experience" here in the Husserlian sense, not in the sense of empiricism), you have the problem of how to justify using these second-order, derivative concepts as your basis.
--- On Tue, 7/28/09, Chuck Grimes <cgrimes at rawbw.com> wrote:
> --------
>
> Two things maybe more. You are approaching the concept of
> space, as a
> conscieous experience or as an artifact of consceiousness,
> or a
> conscieous phenomenon. Therefore your ontology follows
> from
> conscieousness.
> >