> On the other hand, one could mention any number of US clients where
> savagely violent (as well nonviolent, of course) mechanisms are an
> integral feature of the political system: Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
> Israel, Colombia, etc.
This (Chomskyan) point is true, but also irrelevant. And its endless rehearsal I'm sure serves some purpose but it has nothing to do with what the Iranians in the streets are talking about. The obsession with making sure everyone knows that the U.S. supports brutal client states, wants pliant governments everywhere, is hypocrital, etc.,--things everyone, especially the subscribers to this list, already knows--seems to me to be the leftist version of the mainstream shtick about the Twitter revolution: the determination to insert the West into the situation. As if Iranians are incapable of politics without western encouragement/support/obstruction.
But if you want to insist on viewing the events in Iran through a geopolitical lens: Why in 2009 would the U.S. care whether Mousavi or Ahmedinejad is president? If the Khatami-Ahmedinejad years have taught us anything it's that, economically speaking, there is continuity, not difference, between the "reformers" and the "hardliners." Obama's historical task, it seems to me, is to accept this continuity and respond appropriately. So the "revelation" that the U.S. is trying to influence the events there doesn't convey that it is choosing one side or the other; instead it's a signal that it desires and will work for stability in Iran, not revolution. U.S. influence, at this point, can only act to stabilize Iran, and with an actual revolution in the offing, that's the most important goal.