> This is quite interesting and relevant. I knew that some privatisation
> was going on. I was under the impression that some of the privatisation
> was in effect giving state assets to the Revolutionary Guard so as to
> increase their power and debts to Ahmadinejad.
Not just that, because it was happening before Imadickinajar. Its peculiar role has a longer history. Initially, they were in control of a lot of post-war reconstruction projects via their engineering arm. Since they patrol the borders, smuggling operations sprung up to smuggle in contraband -- from booze, to foreign DVDs, to home appliances. The problem with the latter is that cheap goods flood the market, making it difficult for domestic industries to compete. The enrichment of the leadership ranks of the IRGC, though, began around 2000:
"Since around 2000, the IRGC's hand has extended into new and far more lucrative sectors of the economy. Most significantly, it has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects. The government awards some of the no-bid contracts directly to the Guard's engineering arm, Khatam Al-Anbia. Other times, the link is more indirect: "Sometimes you see newly established firms, indirectly owned by IRGC members, receiving the contracts," says a director of a major engineering firm on condition of anonymity.
Today, many of the firms that would once have been awarded government contracts are working as subcontractors to Guard-owned enterprises. In 2006 alone, Khatam Al-Anbia received a $2.09 billion contract to develop phases of a natural gas field known as South Pars, as well as a $1.2 billion contract to build a line of the Tehran metro, and a $1.3 billion contract to build a pipeline linking Iran to Pakistan.
The wealth accrued by high-ranking members of the IRGC by such contracts has raised concerns within the Iranian establishment, chiefly because it threatens to provoke the resentment of the organization's young, working-class rank and file. In 2001, three-quarters of Guard members voted for moderate President Mohammad Khatami, suggesting its majority have more in common with ordinary Iranians chafing under a poor economy, than with the hard-line newly rich leadership clique. In working-class districts of south Tehran, the discrepancy is visible among members of the Basij, a voluntary paramilitary organization that overlaps with the IRGC's membership. The sons of some elite IRGC commanders carry the latest mobile phones, attend top universities, and are as Internet savvy as teenagers in the West. The foot soldiers of the Basij, in contrast, often cobble together work as motorcycle messengers in the smoggy avenues around the Tehran bazaar, earning close to nothing."
"let's be civil and nice, but not to the point of obeying the rules of debate as defined by liberal blackmail (in which, discomfort caused by a challenge is seen as some vague form of harassment)."
-- Dwayne Monroe, 11/19/08
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