Ynet had an article about it http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3774217,00.html , and in the last section of the article, they quoted from a counter study of the fatalities done by The Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center
I quote from this article here:
"Opposing report: No indiscriminate fire The Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center published a variant statistics that reinforce the figures issued by the IDF. The ICT study claims that the demographic distribution of the Palestinian casualties nullifies any claims that the IDF indiscriminately attacked targets during the operation. The study relies on the report published in March by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights in Gaza that claims that 1,434 Palestinians were killed during Operation Cast Lead. According to this data set, 235 of those killed were combatants, 239 were policemen, and 960 were civilians. Of the 960 civilians, 121 were women, 288 were minors under the age of 18, and 551 were men. The Palestinians organization claimed that all 239 policemen were non-combatants. However, the ICT study found that many of them were indeed members of Hamas' military arm and were involved directly or indirectly in the fighting. The study found that of the 960 civilian casualties, 518 of them could not be positively identified as being non-affiliated with a militant group. The ICT researchers claimed that analysis of the demographic distribution of the Palestinian casualties shows that the demographic profile of the 518 unaffiliated casualties is identical to the demographic profile of the combatants. In other words, most were men of fighting age. The study asserts that if there had been random, indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations and the distribution of the casualties' demographics was likewise as random, then there would be an even demographic split, with 50% of the casualties being men and 50% of the casualties being women. However, in actuality, 78% of those killed were men and only 22% were women. "In regards to children, the median age in Gaza is 17. Therefore, we could expect that among all the casualties, 50% of casualties would be below this age and 50% would be above this age. However, what we see in actuality is that 70% of those killed were adults," claimed the study researchers. B'Tselem responded to the ICT report: "The gaps stem from their perception that every casualty that fits the profile of a Hamas combatant is indeed a Hamas combatant. The average age of a Hamas combatant who was killed is in fact 24, however, this does not mean that every 24-year-old man walking around Gaza is a legitimate target with blood on his hands. Many of them did not participate in the fighting. Even the IDF doesn't claim that it is permissible to target an unarmed person only because he fits a certain gender and age category and is doing something harmless like climbing on top of a roof to fix a water boiler or going out on the street to drink coffee." "
The interesting bit I found is that in the talkback section after the article, Don Radlauer, the head researcher of the The Institute for Counter-Terrorism gave a reply to what he thought was wrong with B'Tselem's reply to him in the article. And am I wrong or is he saying that B'Tselem is mistaken because every military age Palestinian that pokes their head out or is in any sort of public place can be considered a legitimate and justified target? And therefore even if it can be determined that many of these men who were killed were not directly combatants, they still can not be considered illegitimate targets? So, B'Tselem, even if you are right you are wrong...?
Here is Don Radlauer's talkback comment:
As the lead researcher in ICT's study of "Operation Cast Lead" fatalities, I would like to respond to the points raised by B'Tselem - particularly to the objections mentioned in the last paragraph of this article:
1) We are not saying that someone is a combatant simply because he's male and of "combatant age". But since the laws of war are based fundamentally on the perceptions of soldiers in the field and their right to defend themselves while attacking legitimate targets, it is perfectly legitimate for IDF soldiers to have killed or injured young men, either individually or in groups, who they believed posed a threat - since there was no obvious and safe way, under the prevailing circumstances of Operation Cast Lead, to distinguish non-uniformed combatants from demographically-similar noncombatants. B'Tselem is thus making a "straw man" argument, refuting a claim that we are not making. Nowhere did we claim that all "demographically combatant-like" fatalities were genuine combatants, and in fact we have explicitly stated otherwise: that there is no doubt that IDF soldiers specifically targeted at least some male noncombatants, although we cannot say how many. To the extent that such targeting was based on soldiers' judgement that these young men appeared dangerous, no legal or moral blame accrues to the IDF for these killings; any blame accrues to Hamas and other Palestinian combatants, who chose to fight in an urban setting without conforming to the legal requirement to wear uniforms and carry weapons openly. By disguising combatants as civilians, Hamas effectively makes civilians (at least those demographically "combatant-like") into legitimate objects of suspicion and likely targets.
2) It is also important to note that our demographic calculation of the number of "civilian-like" noncombatant fatalities is based on the assumption that, given the reported number of girls, boys, and adult women killed, a corresponding number of adult men would be killed as well - making up a "civilian-like" population of non-targeted victims with demographics similar to the overall demographics of the Gaza Strip. This population would be expected to include roughly 100 to 150 adult males; and given the young median age of the Gaza Strip's population, it would be expected that these non-targeted adult male victims would have a relatively young median age as well (presumably somewhere between 24 and 30). Accordingly, the fact that some young men were killed even though they were obviously not engaged in combat does not in and of itself contradict our findings; we would expect to see a fair number of such victims among a civilian-victim population of 400 to 550.
3) The fact that someone was killed while in fact "doing something harmless like climbing on top of a roof to fix a water boiler or going out on the street to drink coffee" does not automatically imply guilt on the part of the IDF for his death. In hindsight, it is possible to determine - in at least some cases - that a particular victim was engaged in innocent activity; but in the midst of urban combat, soldiers cannot afford to wait until they are certain that a particular potential target is in fact a combatant. Particularly in an environment where genuine combatants routinely dress and behave like noncombatants, and where Hamas had for months in advance bragged about the "nasty surprises" in store for the IDF if it invaded the Gaza Strip, it is completely inappropriate to hold the IDF to such unrealistic, hindsight-based standards.
4) It is, of course, entirely possible - and even likely - that some IDF soldiers fired on some Palestinians even when it was clear to them that the latter did not present any threat. Such "retail" war crimes are, sadly, a universal feature of combat - particularly in urban settings against irregular forces. It is worth noting in this regard that the IDF is currently investigating a number of accusations of such improper killings - partcularly cases of "white flag" killings - and we very much hope that the IDF imposes severe punishment on any soldier found to have committed such a crime. It is important to note in this context that such "retail" war crimes cannot normally be detected by statistical analysis, unless they have occurred in unusually large numbers; in this case, complicity or negligence on the part of higher command is likely. The fatality statistics of Operation Cast Lead, however, do not give any indication of such a systematic trend towards "retail" war crimes. Lacking such a statistical indication, only detailed investigation of individual incidents - with specific reference to how and why individual soldiers and officers decided to open fire on particular targets - can determine whether, where, and when war crimes occurred; and only if the IDF fails properly to conduct such investigations and impose appropriate punishments on soldiers and officers found guilty of illegal or improper actions is the IDF or the Israeli government implicated in war crimes.
-Don Radlauer Associate, The Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)
DonRadlauer at gmail.com <MAILTO:DonRadlauer at gmail.com>