One question to consider is this: say a state nationalizes a large swath of the economy but maintains some basic property rights and doesn't entirely expropriate the bourgeoisie. Is that state *still* the executive organ of the property holding classes? Because this is precisely the sort of situation which prevailed for instance in Egypt under Nasser, in Libya until a few years ago, in Nyerere's Tanzania, and so on. It's hard to argue that having the state nationalize the commanding heights of the economy is in the interest of the property holding classes. It isn't as if these countries were under eminent threat of socialist revolution, and the political elites were simply making last ditch concessions to the proletariat. On the contrary, the political classes were *leading* the economic changes. =========================================== The wealthiest and most influential families in these societies were split between those who acted as agents of Western imperialism and those who favoured national independence and state-led economic development - or, as development theorists and others were wont to describe it, the propertied classes were split between the "comprador bourgeoisie" and the "national bourgeoisie". The nationalist factions rose to power following World War II, which destroyed the empires of Britain, France, Germany, and Japan.
They were typically hostile to mass movements from below other than those they initiated and controlled, and repressed left-wing, trade union, and peasant organizers in much the same manner as the imperialist powers and their local agents had done before them. At the same time, they often described themselves as "socialists" or "social democrats", which was not inconsistent with such repression; welcomed Soviet and Chinese support against the West, maneuvering between the two camps as part of the "non-aligned" movement; and favoured state-led growth as the only means of development in the immediate aftermath of colonial domination, often because they had no other recourse following the refusal of Western governments and banks to cooperate with them. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, for example, only when the US and Britain withdrew their offers to finance the Aswan High Dam.
Following the end of the Cold War, these states engaged in widespread privatization and deregulation of their economies in a bid to attract Western investment and integrate themselves more fully into the capitalist world economy.
The postcolonial histories of Egypt, Libya, and Tanzania, the examples you cite above, wholly conform to this pattern.