Admittedly without consulting the literature, I would still expect to find that the divisions in State and Defence turned less on humanitarian concerns than on strategic considerations having to do with the Soviets acquiring influence with the Arab states. The pro-Zionist side, which Truman was part of, probably countered that a failure to support partition would increase Soviet influence within the Hebrew-speaking settler colony if the Soviet bloc were the sole source of diplmatic and military support for the nascent Jewish state. A substantial part of the Yishuv was already sympathetic to the USSR on ideological grounds and for sheltering Jews fleeing the genocidal Nazi advance into Eastern Europe.
But the larger point remains that the debates and decisions taken by the Truman and subsequent administrations were autonomous ones, and only incidentally affected by representations from the organized Zionist lobby. And they were essentially tactical ones, which did not affect a consisitent policy of support for Israel against the Palestinian Arabs and neighbouring Arab states. This was especially the case after 1967, but even the pressure exerted on the Israelis in 1956 by the Eisenhower adminstration occured within the context of strategic support for Israel against the Egyptians under Nasser, atill viewed as a hostile power inimical to Western interests.
On 2010-08-11, at 9:26 AM, Michael Pollak wrote:
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> On Wed, 11 Aug 2010, Marv Gandall wrote:
>
>> My own view, which is far more widely shared, is is that the Truman administration well understood how what its responsibiities were, and debated and designed US policy with a view to advancing the interests of US capitalism. Its policies in Palestine and elsewhere were shaped at the time by the postwar collapse of the British and French empires and the rise of third world nationalist movements supported by the Soviet Union which threatened unfettered Western control of colonial and semi-colonial markets and resources, most notably the oil reserves of the Mideast. The Zionist social democratic leadership in Palestine was able to offer itself to the West as the custodian of its values and interests in the region, and has since then proved an invaluable ally crushing and containing left-nationalist and Islamist regimes and movements hostile to Western imperialism.
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> Marv, you're projecting backwards here. The majority of State and Defense were against recognizing Israel precisely because it would endanger US interests. General Marshall, the Secretary of State, had to be talked out of resigning over it. It was a very close run thing. I personally believe Truman finally did it largely on sentimental, logistic and humanitarian grounds having to do with what to do with DPs in Europe. He felt personally betrayed when Israel didn't take back the Palestinian refugees, since accepting refugees was the whole point of it to him. After that, relations between the US and Israel were quite cool for a couple of decades. It wasn't seen as a strategic pillar by anyone in the US establishment until Nixon's time.
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> Michael
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