1) From a philosophical/epistemological point of view the problems raised in "More Light Than Heat" are extremely interesting. Mirowski's findings cast serious doubt on the work of many prominent figures, the most notable being Foucault. Foucault's "foundational" works ("The Order of Things" and "The Archaeology of Knowledge") attempt to put forward a historicist theory of knowledge. He does this by distilling the "epistemes" which govern knowledge production at various points in time. Yet Mirowski seems to show that the most important element in knowledge formation is not the quasi-grammatical rules which Foucault digs up - but metaphors borrowed from the "hard" sciences (mostly physics, it would seem). In addition to this Foucault's own discourse, channeling Nietzsche, borrows heavily from the physical sciences (notions of "power", but also those of "resistance"). Mirowski's findings seem to raise some pretty serious questions about Foucault's work.
^^^^^ CB: I believe you are saying Mirowski shows that social science borrows metaphors from the "hard"sciences ? "Soft" science borrows metaphors from "hard" science ?
Notice that the "hard" sciences "borrow" centrally a metaphor from the old "social science" , jurisprudence, in making natural "laws" an important part of their theoretical systems. As you say in your number 3:
"It is a reasoning that seems to project onto society the idea that this society obeys laws similar to those of (19th century) energy physics and, more recently, the internal workings of a computer. If these problems are real then how do we avoid engaging in this kind of reasoning? "
The hard science notion that energy follows laws is a metaphor borrowed from law, which is something of a "soft" science.
^^^^^ -clip-
3) From a political point of view Mirowski's work, especially "Cyborg Dreams", calls into question our use of quasi-scientific language in order to organise our systems of production, distribution and consumption. These questions inevitably raise the ghost of the Frankfurt School and their old notion of "instrumental rationality". Is all this "social physics" really that desirable a way of running society? Even Marx engaged in this sort of reasoning. It is a reasoning that seems to project onto society the idea that this society obeys laws similar to those of (19th century) energy physics and, more recently, the internal workings of a computer. If these problems are real then how do we avoid engaging in this kind of reasoning?
^^^^ CB: As to Marxists treating economics as a hard science, Marx does famously claim (see passage quoted infra) that economics ( political economy) can be rendered as precisely as natural science. However, Marx does not consider the laws of political economy to be the actual laws of physics, but a different set of "hard" laws. In the language of epistemology, Marx does not hold the position that political economy can be _reduced_ to physics. I believe a social physicist would say poltical economy can be reduced to physics. Also, Marx of course claims there are different group of "laws" in political economy than the ones modern day economists advocate. I believe you indicate Mirowski criticizes the modern economists as social physcists.
Also , Engels claims (below quoted) that the difference between what today is termed natural and social sciences is that the former has no agents with conscious aims, but the latter does. .
"In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. "- Marx
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm
"In one point, however, the history of the development of society proves to be essentially different from that of nature. In nature — in so far as we ignore man’s reaction upon nature — there are only blind, unconscious agencies acting upon one another, out of whose interplay the general law comes into operation. Nothing of all that happens — whether in the innumerable apparent accidents observable upon the surface, or in the ultimate results which confirm the regularity inherent in these accidents — happens as a consciously desired aim. In the history of society, on the contrary, the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim. But this distinction, important as it is for historical investigation, particularly of single epochs and events, cannot alter the fact that the course of history is governed by inner general laws. For here, also, on the whole, in spite of the consciously desired aims of all individuals, accident apparently reigns on the surface. That which is willed happens but rarely; in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or these ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realization, or the means of attaining them are insufficient. thus the conflicts of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produce a state of affairs entirely analogous to that prevailing in the realm of unconscious nature. The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from these actions are not intended; or when they do seem to correspond to the end intended, they ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended. Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws, and it is only a matter of discovering these laws." -Engels http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm