But what Mirowski is arguing is more than simply that some of the founders of neo-classicism borrowed a few physics metaphors. If Mirowski is correct then many of the mathematical instruments wielded by neo-classicists were taken over from the nascent field of energy physics.
In energy physics the use of these instruments eventually led to the over-turning of the fundamental precepts of energy physics itself - quantum theory and relativity theory led to scientists having to launch their fields into full formalisation. Mirowski argues that, for the most part, the economists couldn't keep up. While the physicists always kept in mind where, so to speak, at what point their equations met the "real world", the economists were not as sharp on this point.
Mirowski goes on to argue in his second major book (Machine Dreams) that while some economists held firmly onto the old physics model many began to find problems with it. They turned to the nascent science of cybernetics. This is where the marginal theory falls off and something resembling the ordinal theory arises - I'll come to this in a moment.
In cybernetics we have the intersection of energy science and information science - in fact the two phenomena are equated. Energy and information become one and the same thing. I'll stop here for the moment; but I must reiterate: it wasn't just a few metaphors that the economists borrowed - it was a whole method of reasoning, a whole Weltanschauung. I'm actually working on an essay at the moment to try and show that the economists were not alone. The Weltanschaung of two very popular social sciences are also based on the energy physics view of the world: namely, post-structuralism and Freudian psychoanalysis.
>
> Have you read Samuel Hollander’s critique in the Cambridge Journal of
> Economics (1989)? He points out that Mirowski himself has to exclude a
> few founding fathers of neoclassicism, like Menger, because they don’t
> fit the case, and for those he does include, like Walras, it’s an
> enormous stretch from the odd stray metaphor to say that new energy
> physics dominated their whole conception of economics:
>
> “Mirowski’s perspective is an extraordinarily narrow one. The mere
> reference by writers to a physics metaphor (without even being certain
> that energetic is involved) suggests to him that mid-nineteenth
> century physics is the sole significant source of neoclassicism. And
> this despite his ample concessionsthat the originators of the 1870s
> had no idea of what the physics metaphor implied. All other
> considerations relating to the link between economics and science,
> including those relevant for the general equilibrium model, are set at
> naught.” [p. 469]
>
Menger is actually dealt with in the book - albeit quite briefly. Its true that Menger didn't appeal to the nascent scientism of his day - he painted himself as something of a liberal (neo-liberal?) political theorist. Does this make Menger et all more honest and more self-aware about what they were doing? I'm not sure if it did. I think that Menger's critiques of the Historicist School are a sort of progenitor to logical positivism (specifically Popper). To get into this would be a bit much for the present discussion - can you say: philosophy of science?
Again, I have to reitirate that for the others like Walras, it wasn't simply the odd stray metaphor - it was a whole way of viewing the world, a whole way of deploying mathematical reasoning to uncover the determinants of human motivation. As Mirowski points out, many of these men trained as engineers and the like and that shaped their world-view to an extraordinary extent. (I mentioned Freud above - his world-view was also formed vis-a-vis the energetics movement; his teachers of medicine were followers of Helmholtz - but enough of that). These were theories that were forged amid a buzz of science trying to reduce everything to energetics - just as later economics was to take the cyborg Weltanschaung on board while the intellectual world buzzed with computer and informational metaphors. This was not just a few stray metaphors, it was a whole way of looking at the world - and it ran far deeper than economics...
>
> I think Mirowski’s thesis appeals because it allows someone who would
> criticise economics tout court to write as if economics depends upon
> an extreme scientism. But that’s a straw economics. In fact economics
> is self-consciously a social science and you’d be very hard pressed to
> find many actual economists who would argue the economic domain is
> like the physical, or can be studied with the methods of physics. We
> can debate the scientific status of social science, but it’s not
> nearly as easy to refute as it would be were it claiming to be the
> same kind of science as physics.
>
This is not why Mirowski's thesis appeals to me at all. Mirowski's thesis is similar to Foucault's in The Order of Things (although I would say more succinct). What it shows is that the way we understand our social world is firmly tied to the scientific theories and technological innovations of our day. To recognise this is actually quite amazing. As I said I'm doing an essay on Freudian psychoanalysis at the moment and its fascinating to track this in his work - its literally everywhere. Its not surprising that now brain theorists are, like economists, turning to information science as the new model of man, but are we any better off for it? I would argue not. Mirowski's work gives you a remarkable sense of irony in this regard, its rather liberating. As I said in my first post, these "sciences" turn out to be extremely similar to the floating sign-systems of tribal societies.
I will say one thing slightly less relativistic though: if man were ever to take the means of production, distribution and consumption consciously into his own hands, Mirowski's work shows that this would have to be done in quite a remarkable manner. He would have to create his own system of signs out of those that already exist - but he would be allowed to tailor reality to them rather than vice versa. Man is still obsessed with the worship of material reality and technology - only when he realises that this is not necessary, because these are his own constructions, only then will he be free.
>
> As for the ‘quantification of human desire’ with marginal utility
> theory – neoclassical economics hasn’t relied on a quantification of
> utility for almost a hundred years. Google ‘ordinal utility’ and
> ‘revealed preference’.
>
>
As I said above, ordinal utility is now deeply tied to cybernetic-based
reasoning. You won't hear those two words without terms like "closed-system"
and "open-system" and "feedback-loop" and the like cropping up close behind.
These are still attempts to quantify human desire, in some shape or form -
even if they do so post factum. They're probably an advance on the old
marginal theory, but they're not a break with the old modes of reasoning.
I'll be rather elliptical here, because I think when talking about these
sorts of issues such is necessary.
Ordinal utility theory marks a shift discernible in many social sciences from notions of teleology to notions of teleonomy - I would argue that this is inspired by cybernetics. Now, the big philosophical joke about teleonomy is that it's really just teleology wearing a more modern looking mask. Teleonomy is basically what occurs when a scientist looks at the notion of teleology and says: "No, this cannot be true, but if I reject it my world descends into chaos - thus I will pretend as if it exists". Kant realised this a long time ago, so did Hume - we've been a long time catching up.
As I said, ordinal theory is an advance, certainly - but it is not a break with the old method of reasoning.