[most of long quote snipped]
>> “This is Foucault’s point and, in a way, his supplement to Hegel,
>> when he asks, as he does, ‘What can I become, given the
>> contemporary order of being?’ He understands that this ‘order’
>> conditions the possibility of his becoming, and that a regime of
>> truth, in his words, constrains what will and will not constitute
>> the truth of his self, the truth that he offers about himself, the
>> truth by which he might be known and become recognizably human, the
>> account he might give of himself.” pp. 23-4
>>
>> This necessarily implies "solipsism of the present moment." Any
>> claim (such as these claims themselves) that goes beyond this is
>> self-contradictory, so the idea that there are post-foundationalist
>> foundations on which to base rationally "rejecting certain beliefs
>> and accepting others" is mistaken. The "post-foundationalist
>> epistemologies" claiming to do this are necessarily
>> self-contradictory.
The long passage you quote has nothing to do with your argument. How you get from that quote to the para about the "solipsism of the present moment" baffles me. There is nothing self-contradictory about Butler's position here, your repeated claims notwithstanding.
Miles