On 11/16/2010 2:07 AM, Michael Pollak wrote:
>
> On Wed, 10 Nov 2010, SA wrote:
>
>> In nuclear strategy, Paul Nitze used to propound the doctrine of
>> "escalation dominance." If a crisis escalates, and each side fires
>> its weapons, the chain of escalation will eventually reach a rung
>> where one side runs out of weapons. That side will find itself
>> disarmed and lose catastrophically. Knowing this in advance, it will
>> seek to avoid confrontation from the beginning, and will always
>> preemptively concede. I think the Democrats are in the position of
>> the side with fewer weapons. For example, based on the poll I cited,
>> the population seems to contain at least twice as many
>> anti-compromise Republicans as anti-compromise Democrats. In that
>> situation, it may well be prudent for Democrats to concede in advance.
>
> Is it possible that escalation dominance as you sketch is simply the
> consequence, stretched on in time and in detail, of the original
> problem with the Dems: that they don't boil down their programme into
> a few strong resonant principles? But rather prefer a laundry list of
> details?
>
> That is to say, perhaps the side with clearer principles is more
> willing to make a stand for them because it is clearer what they are
> making a stand for? And vice versa?
The problem runs deeper than that. A clear set of principles certainly represents an addition to your side's arsenal. The problem is, how do you propagate the principles? Propagating deep principles is risky, which is why the stereotypical calculating politician doesn't use principled arguments. The more principled -- the more "philosophical" -- the level of argument, the more deeply the argument resonates *when it succeeds*. But at the same time, it utterly repels people when it fails. As a result, it becomes very important *who*, precisely, is supposed to be doing the propagating. An elected politician facing the next election can't be the one to start introducing a set of novel-sounding philosophical principles into a national debate, or he will lose *badly*.
The famous rule-proving exception is Barry Goldwater. From the very beginning, Goldwater told people around him that he expected to lose the 1964 election, but his goal was to lose by less than five points. If he could lose in a close race, he believed, he would have succeeded in advancing the conservative cause by injecting a new set of principles into American politics that others could build on later -- which is exactly what he ended up doing (even though he lost by a lot more than five points). One thing social scientists discovered after 1964 is that that election permanently increased the level of "ideological constraint" in the electorate. In other words, after 1964, all of a sudden in survey data the individual-level correlations between conservative views on economic, racial, and foreign policy issues -- which had previously been virtually nil -- were now, persistently, much higher. Principles were propagated.
The problem, of course, is that, first, it's extremely rare to find a politician willing to lose an election. More importantly, it's extremely rare for a party to be willing to nominate someone who will lose an election. It took a major grassroots movement to knowingly nominate a losing ideologue over the vehement objections of powerful party regulars. So the ultimate answer is that, practically speaking, "the Democrats" can't be the ones to enunciate a set of clear principles, at least within the bounds of normal politics. Somebody else would have to do it first.
SA