[lbo-talk] Wise: Are High Agricultural Prices Good or Bad for Poverty?

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Sun Nov 21 03:19:20 PST 2010


[Good, it seems, at least in India, which is quite a big case. And good even for urban poor. Counterintuitive and interesting.]

http://triplecrisis.com/are-high-agricultural-prices-good-or-bad-for-poverty/

November 19, 2010

Triple Crisis [Group Econoblog]

Are High Agricultural Prices Good or Bad for Poverty?

Timothy A. Wise

Dani Rodrik is back, and he reignites an old debate with his recent

blog post. He asks if high food prices are good or bad for poverty, and

answers, "It depends on whether the poor are selling or buying, of

course." Citing a recent paper by Jacob Swinnen, he goes on, "High food

prices benefit poor farmers who are net food sellers, and hurt poor

food consumers in urban areas. Low food prices have the opposite

effects. In each case, the net effect on poverty depends on the balance

between these two effects."

Seems obvious, but not so fast: What if the poor also work for wages

and agricultural prices affect labor markets? Sandra Polaski and others

have shown that when one incorporates labor market effects of high vs.

low agricultural prices, high prices will clearly be better for many

developing countries.

In her Carnegie Endowment report, "India's Trade Policy Choices," she

and her co-authors use their innovative model to examine the effects of

price increases and decreases for international prices for rice and

wheat, both grown and consumed by Indian farmers. Their model is

innovative because it incorporates labor market effects of policy

reforms in ways that most other prevailing models - including the World

Bank models cited by Rodrik in his earlier posts on the issue - do not.

They punch a major hole in the "net buyer/net seller" analysis of food

prices.

Carnegie finds that higher rice prices have positive overall poverty

impacts, and lower prices have significant negative impacts on poverty,

and that this is true even among many groups of urban consumers. Based

on their modeling of a 25% decrease in world rice prices, they find:

"Seventy-eight percent of households would experience real income

losses from such a price change, and the distributional impact would be

regressive, with the poorest households losing the most." (p. viii)

In their chapter explaining their agricultural modeling, they explain

why even the urban poor - net buyers all of them - experience losses

from lower agricultural prices: "The likely channel through which the

decrease in the price of rice affects poor urban households is the

labor market. The drop in rice prices reduces demand for labor in rice

production sharply, by almost 12 percent in the case of a 50 percent

decline, and reduces overall demand for labor in the agricultural

sector. Displaced rural laborers spill over into urban unskilled labor

markets.... The incomes of illiterate workers in urban areas, typically

the least skilled, decline." (p. 29)

They conclude: "Adverse agricultural price shocks can have negative

effects on poor urban households through labor market transmission,

which can offset the gains they might realize as net consumers of

agricultural products."

Conversely, they find that when rice prices go up the overall impact is

progressive. The demand for unskilled labor in agriculture goes up,

which raises incomes, and raises wages not just in agriculture but

generally across unskilled labor markets. The rural poor are the clear

winners, earning higher prices for their crops and higher wages (or

incomes) from their labor, even if they are net buyers of food. Some of

the urban poor end up worse off, but some of their fellow net food

buyers end up better off in spite of higher food prices. They are

earning more for their labor.

Carnegie recognizes that this will play out differently from country to

country, but the report's conclusions for India are unequivocal: high

prices for agricultural commodities are progressive and certainly

preferable to low agricultural prices which hurt the poor the most.

George Dyer showed the same thing in some of his modeling related to

higher corn prices in Mexico. Dyer modeled higher corn prices, looking

only at rural areas, to examine the effects on net sellers and net

buyers in rural Mexico. He found that the main source of income gains

in rural Mexico came not from crop sales but from higher wage income.

The negative effect of high prices on net food buyers was cushioned in

the case of subsistence farmers, by higher wage income and some

increase in their own production. (See my summary and reference, p 27.)

The models most commonly used (e.g., GTAP) often fail to capture these

distinctions because they impose fixed constraints on employment.

Carnegie, in its various Doha studies, showed just how important that

can be. In the case of agriculture, it turns out to be critical,

precisely because the rural and urban poor both depend on wage income,

agricultural employment is significant and is strongly impacted by

prices, and agricultural labor markets have an impact on urban labor

markets.

What is perhaps most telling about the price increases of recent years

is the negative impact of their extreme volatility. Both high and low

prices have winners and losers, but volatility hurts everyone except

the traders and speculators. Stable and remunerative prices should be

the goal. That is what will attract investment into agriculture and

bring long-term benefits beyond the short-run effects.



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