[lbo-talk] Cohen: Hang a doomsday security around bankers' necks

Wojtek S wsoko52 at gmail.com
Fri Oct 8 06:55:08 PDT 2010


[WS:] Is it not possible to sue corporate execs personally and go after their private assets in cases of mal- or misfeasance? They did that with old Bernie Madoff, no? All you need to do is a government willing to do it, and perhaps legislation making it easier to prove malfeasance or misfeasance - something that can be easily accomplished if there is political will. If Obama administration does not do it, it is a political decision to go lightly on corporate criminals, which is a law enforcement issue, not the law per se.

Wojtek

On Fri, Oct 8, 2010 at 7:37 AM, Michael Pollak <mpollak at panix.com> wrote:
>
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/make-wall-street-risk-it-all
>
>   October 8, 2010
>   New York Times
>
>   Make Wall Street Risk It All
>   By WILLIAM D. COHAN
>
>  <snip>
>
>   SINCE neither Goldman's example nor Dodd-Frank and Basel III will
>   change Wall Street's behavior, we have to find a new mechanism. To my
>   mind, its central feature should be that each of the top 100 executives
>   at Wall Street's remaining "systemically important" firms be personally
>   liable for the risks they take. Not just their unexercised stock
>   options or restricted stock, but every asset they have in their
>   possession: from their cars to their fancy homes to their bulging bank
>   accounts.
>
>   The days of privatizing the profits for Wall Street and socializing the
>   risks must end. As radical as this sounds, in truth it would be no
>   different from when -- before 1970 -- Wall Street was a series of
>   private partnerships.
>
>   We can't turn back the clock: Wall Street's big firms will never again
>   be private partnerships. Instead, I propose that each large Wall Street
>   firm create a new security that represents -- and is secured by -- the
>   entire net worth of its 100 top executives. This security would be
>   subordinated to all other creditors as well as to all preferred and
>   common shareholders; in other words, if a firm goes bankrupt, this
>   security is the first to be wiped out.
>
>   Had such a security existed at the time of the collapse of Lehman
>   Brothers, the net worth of the top 100 Lehman executives -- no doubt
>   totaling several billion dollars -- would have been collected after
>   liquidating everything they owned and paid to Lehman creditors, who
>   under the current system will be lucky if they get back 10 cents on the
>   dollar.
>
>   Wall Street's first reaction to this idea -- aside from profanities --
>   will be that it cannot possibly be done. Or that it would somehow
>   threaten the sanctity of our capital markets.
>
>   But, in fact, it can and should be done. Indeed, Wall Street has all
>   the intellectual capital it needs in its own archives to construct such
>   a security: in the old partnership days every partner signed an
>   agreement requiring him (and rarely her) to put his net worth on the
>   line every day. Surely, clever Wall Street lawyers can draft a
>   21st-century version of the old partnership agreement.
>
>   What's more, Wall Street should take the initiative to do this
>   unprompted. As John Whitehead warned, the banks' failure to show
>   responsibility will only invite more government intervention.
>
>   If, however, the firms balk, the S.E.C. should require this sort of
>   accountability from the senior managements as part of its new
>   regulations governing Wall Street compensation. Or Congress should take
>   advantage of the still-brewing outrage against Wall Street to force the
>   creation of such a security.
>
>   Pretty harsh, right? Maybe, but Wall Street deserves no sympathy. Had
>   this security, or something like it, been in place at every Wall Street
>   firm five years ago, there would have been no mortgage bubble, no
>   financial crisis, no deep and unsettling economic recession with nearly
>   10 percent unemployment, no need for the Troubled Asset Relief Program,
>   and no need for Dodd-Frank or Basel III.
>
>   Why? Because human beings do what they are rewarded to do -- especially
>   on Wall Street -- and if they are rewarded for taking prudent and
>   sensible risks, that's exactly what they will do.
>
> <end column>
>
> Michael
>
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>



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