This assumes that we can discern a person's real motives so that we can evaluate the linkage between motives and actions. I know that seems straightforward, but it's a philosophical mare's nest. We can't rely on a person's own account of their motives; the account may be distorted by social pressure, memory distortion, or mendacity. We can't observe their behavior to discern motives; that assumes what we are trying to demonstrate (the alignment of motive and action). We can't rely on the assessment of experts; the predictive validity of psychologist's assessments of motives is in general dismal.
After grappling with this for some years, I came around to Wittgenstein's position: asking "what is that person's real motive?" and making imputations about motives are moves in a language game. There is no referent to the term "motive"; in fact, we talk about people's motives whether or not they "have" them, and that motive-talk has real social effects. The important political question is thus "how do we use motive-talk in our society?" and not "are real motives linked to one's action?"
MIles