On Wed, 17 Aug 2011, SA wrote:
> On Eisenhower - he was certainly the ideal candidate for the SACEUR job
> in 1951, but if he hadn't been available they would have found someone
> else and I don't see why NATO wouldn't have survived his absence...
My impression is the opposite. IIRC, the only thing the NATO council of ministers agreed on at that point was that Eisenhower be the head, and if he hadn't accepted, it might well have gone kaput. My impression is further that everything more concrete after that point was due to his initiative. It wasn't clear at first whether it was going to have any substance at all, or just be a rubber stamping legitimation device, like the OAS. Not only was there no agreement, there was very strong and principled opposition from the French, Belgians, etc. who didn't want to arm Germany, and the Taft Republicans, who didn't want to station any troops. It was he who decided that it had to be a dedicated 40 division army, and that therefore the German troops had to be part of it, and got everyone to accept it. The Europeans then almost revolved when he left to run for President. They were naturally assuaged when he won, but then he had to conquer the Taft Republicans. (And if he hadn't run, it might possibly have been Taft who became president. He certainly would have been the Republican nominee.) He had to win them over in the teeth of them trying to not only stop NATO but stop the president from ever making such a treaty again, in the form of the Bricker Amendment. Whether Adlai could have won them over, or commanded the respect of all the key Europeans, seems very questionable.
But perhaps here too you have more up to date sources. I'm all ears.
Michael