On 2011-06-30, at 10:11 AM, brad wrote:
> On the
> nature of the period vs. the leadership of the movement: I would just
> say that our only ability to change history rests on the latter.
> Therefore it is only logical that we focus on and tinker with it since
> we have no recourse on the former (or we only have recourse on the
> former through the latter).
True enough, though I would add that both are intimately linked; the art of leadership lies precisely in the abiity to correctly assess the nature of the period - ie. the relationship of forces, and the combativity of the masses in light of that relationship. Failure to accurately estimate the situation can be catastrophic - in both instances, from either underestimating or overestimating the will and capacity of the masses to bring their struggle to a successful conclusion, from being too pessimistic and timid or too optimistic and heedless, from, in the Marxist lexicon, making either "right opportunist" or "left adventurist" errors. Abortive revolutions which were drowned in blood because they lacked majority support - Hungary 1918 and Germany 1919 come immediately to mind - or, on a smaller scale, classic strikes which the workers couldn't sustain over an extended period are examples of the latter; the capitulation to patriotic pressure of the social democratic leaderships at the onset of World War I or, more arguably, Chile under Allende may be cited as examples of the former. So can many trade union struggles which could have yielded more but for the customary caution of conservative officials who discouraged further action, for reasons more complex than that they had simply gone over to the side of the bourgeoisie.
Making the correct assessment of the relationship of forces affecting movement, union, party, or class is never easy, the outcome evident only in retrospect, and rarely reliable from outside of these struggles. The contemporary far left, because it is largely isolated from such struggle, is generally not conscious of these considerations, dogmatically views the masses as always inherently more willing and able to bring these struggles to a successful conclusion than their treacherous leadership will permit, and consequently often comports itself in sectarian fashion towards them. This is evident where the far left has participated in mass struggles and more often than lost in open debate with the leadership when it has substituted its own wishful thinking for the mood of the majority.
That being said, leadership can be decisive at certain moments, and I've argued that the Obama administration misread the popular mood and relationship of political forces following the 2008 election. It it could have used the momentum generated by the election to reform the financial, housing, healthcare, and energy sectors and US foreign policy in line with the expectations of the broad mass of the population and well within the constraints imposed on it by the capitalist system. The (electorally) catastrophic consequences for the administration of its timidity and resulting policy errors seemed to me to be glaringly evident in the midterms. But Charles and Julio and others who are closer to these struggles and whose opinions I value, have argued otherwise with reference to the relationship of forces, and I'm continually having to weigh their observations on this issue against my own "certainties" - an entirely useful exercise, though some inclined to flippantly dismiss opposing viewpoints would not agree.