Brenner's argument does change over time, but I think a lot of the objections to
Brenner rest on quick simplifications of his argument...
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But his theory is only novel in that it makes some pretty
unsubstantiated claims: increased competition leading to a 'long
downturn', and bubblenomics as a temporary relief that leads to
further undermining of capitalism. With out these large claims I
don't see why all the hype about Brenner. In his more nuanced form he
simply states the obvious and what everyone else has said.
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Wren again:
So, my claim that squeezing labor tighter can only succeed in the short-to-medium run is simply an argument that in the long run increases in productivity have to come through more intensive use of labor-saving capital and through technical change. There's nothing particularly Brenneresque or even Marxist about this argument, and I don't see why it should be controversial.
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But when exactly did these investments in labor-saving capital and technical change to increase productivity stop? Isn't financialization and the increased mobility of capital actually one of these? Why separate between labor squeezing and labor-saving? Are they really all that distinct, or more accurately, don't they feed off of each other? I don't particularly like theories that rest on distinct eras of capitalism: labor-saving productivity faze followed by a labor squeezing faze etc. I think left analysis has always relied on distinct eras too its detriment.
On the role of finance on production, no one said financial intermediation always increases productivity and is never parasitic, nor did I state that they always work together smoothly. I do think that it is a lot harder to parcel finances impacts, both positive and negative, out then most claim though.
Brad