This goes back to an old argument between Charles and me over whether or not the Theses on Feuerbach expressed a pragmatist epistemology -- for that is the epistemology Charles is appealing to here. "Practice makes perfect" may or may not be true in itself, but it can't ground an epistemology.
^^^^^ CB: Why not ? "Practice makes perfect" is a nice example of the reflection of this first principle of epistemology or theory of knowledge in traditional working class wording. Another is "necessity is the mother of invention". Marx says it most focusedly in Thesis 2, but it is also the essence of the Theses 1 and 11, and a couple of the others. This principle is the rational kernel of Pragmatism, the Anglo-American social democratic philosophers. Pragmatism is the best American philo. Better than Self-Reliance. Today's American Left really should revive Pragmatism. and refresh as an "patriotic" American left philosophy.
Thesis 2 The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.
Carrol:
The relevant epistemological perspective is to be found, for example, in Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition. Her perspective on actin is anti-pragmatist but does ground thought in action. She also makes very clear that grounding thought in action far from being a rejection oftheory is the very basis for understanding how crucial theory is to action.
^^^^ CB; I said this very thing in the essay I just sent to Ferenc Molnar here on the list.
For, in the First Thesis above it is the philosophical subject with self-determination and power that is the key and only actor, the only changer of the world. The error of leaving philosophy dormant seems to be that in focussing o the activism of Marx's materialism, in focussing on changing the world, it is assumed that PHILOSOPHICAL interpretation and contemplation of the world are to be dropped or that very little time should be spent in them by activists. This may "derive" from the 11th Thesis which says 'Philosophers have interpreted the world in a number of ways; the thing is to change it." Yet, this does not say stop interpreting the world and try to change it. And the First Thesis' active subject (objects are not actors) key for change , only source of change, is only understood as a philosophical subject. Thus, for revolutionary activity , we still need philosophical consciousness and especially in activists and militants, professional revolutionaries.
I won't try to develop this here, but the main weakness of the FHP paper on activism is that they themselves are anti-theory: that is, they are unable to grasp the nature (and necessity) of theory in political practice.
My first response to their paper was highly favorable since as a (loose) generalization their thesis is of the utmost importance. One of my endlessly frustrating experiences for 45 years has been precisely that of attempting (with only occasional success) to impress fellow activists with the importance of theory. But FHP fail to see the importance of meta-theory, of theorizing theory, and thus fall into the error of worshiping their own spontaneity. (Ollman's chapter on ethical values in _Alienation_ is of some importance here. Also Ian's posts on error theory.) I'll try to revise and expand this in later posts.
Carrol