[WS:] But this assumes that the military was the main driving force toward fascist power grab, as for example it was the case of Chile. I do not think, however, that you can make the same argument for Italy and Germany (Spain may be closer to Chile, though.). In these two countries, the military was more of an accessory for fascists in their power grab rather than the vanguard of fascism. It merely allowed fascists to neutralize their opposition. So the more accurate assertion would be that German militaristic figures would have remained anti-democratic, traditionalists etc. in the absence of the successful National Socialist party rather than a successful Bolshevik Revolution.
Keep it in mind that the NS in Germany took the anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevist route until 1928 and did not get very far on it. However, from 1928 they changed their strategy and focused on economic issues, renouncing Western European economic solutions and instead proposing large scale government programs. And it is their economic ideas not anti-Bolshevist diatribes that won them popular support in the early 1930s. My source on this is Anheier, Neidhardt & Vortkamp, "Konjunkturen der NS-Bewegung. Aktivitäten der Münchner NSDAP, 1925-30?" [Cycles of the Nazi Movement]. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 50 (4):619-643.
In sum, the support of the military should be conceptualized as a necessary (or perhaps enabling) but not a sufficient condition for the success of a revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary movement - at least in Russia, Italy and Germany. I think that Latin America (and probably Spain) are different, largely because the military play a rather different role in those societies, more of a an avenue for political climbers due to the rather closed nature of their elites.
Wojtek