On 2012-01-30, at 1:25 PM, Wojtek S wrote:
> Where we read:
> "The main opposition New Democracy Party, led by Antonis Samaras, had
> 30.5 percent support and the socialist Pasok party had 14 percent.
> Backing for both the Communist Party of Greece and the Coalition of
> the Radical Left was around 12 percent, the poll showed."
>
> [WS:] In other words, Center Right has more support that socialists,
> communists and and radical left combined. And this is after the
> austerity measures debacle.
Crises are characterized by mass confusion and electoral volatility, when governments which preside over austerity programs and are seen to be further contributing to the distress, lose power. This is the case whether the governments are centre-left or centre-right.
The Greeks have been the most buffeted by the economic crisis, and are predictably following the template.
It hardly seems a little more than two years ago, that the governing New Democracy Party was massacred at the polls by Pasok. The latter picked up 58 seats while the NDP dropped 61 in the 300-seat Greek parliamentary elections.
Now it is Pasok, which vacillated under conflicting pressure from its base and the Troika-backed bondholders, which is being held to account for failing to take decisive measures which Greeks of all political persuasions agreed are needed to resolve the crisis, even though they disagree sharply on whether the cure needs to come from the left or the right. We've seen a parallel swing in the US since the last presidential election.
In this context, opinion rolls are particularly unreliable, not only because public consciousness is constantly shifting in the desperate attempt to find a way out of the impasse, but because it is also deeply contradictory. Preferences for conservative parties and values coexist with stubborn support for the welfare state and associated tax and spending policies favoured by liberals and social democrats. Not for nothing have the right wing parties in the US and Europe been cautious about attacking social security, medicare, and other so-called "third rails" of electoral politics, and have instead tried to undermine them incrementally, by stealth, and with the consent of the centre-left parties.
The political opportunism of the major parties when in opposition is another characteristic of electoral politics which crises help to illuminate. The parties typically position themselves to the left while in opposition and quickly reverse themselves when in power. So with Pasok in 2009. So with the NDP in 2011, when it restored its standing by attacking Pasok for succumbing to the demands of German and other EU governments for greater austerity and pledging it would resist tougher measures (http://www.athensnews.gr/portal/8/50410). In fact, there is not a dime's worth of difference between Pasok and the NDP regarding compliance with EU, ECB, and IMF directives.
So polls which register the shifting political preferences of the electorate, as above, are not always a reliable indicator of a more consistent underlying sentiment for change. A major poll, conducted in May, on the first anniversary of the Greek bailout "showed deep disillusionment with the country’s political and economic model. More than half of the respondents (56%) said the country needed radical change, while a further 33% said it needed a revolution. Since 1999, the base year, there has been growing radicalization: fewer people believe that minor changes suffice and more people think a revolution is needed. Naturally, the call for revolution is mostly a communist call. Even so, the disillusionment and call for radical change cuts across parties and ideologies."
http://www.greekdefaultwatch.com/2011/05/greeks-will-support-major-change.html