Israel could strike them for that reason alone, which I imagine is something not lost on Tehran. In a way, it is to Iran's benefit to raise the temperature in this manner, because it shifts Israeli focus towards Syria. Certainly there will be military cooperation with Hizbullah, and I would imagine, reasons will be found to attack them on such grounds.
On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 4:19 PM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com> wrote:
> How would you foresee an Israel-Iran confrontation in Syria? I can't
> conceive of the Israelis, for example, using air power to support the
> rebellion, not least because of its uncertain political direction - the
> same hesitation bedevilling the Americans.
>
> On 2013-06-18, at 10:00 AM, joel schalit wrote:
>
> > My inclination is to believe that the Iranian deployment, in Syria, does
> > not diminish the possibility of an Iranian-Israeli fight. The Americans
> > might not, in my view, be able to restrain such an event from taking
> place,
> > even if it is restricted to Syrian territory. I say this, in full
> agreement
> > that Iran's new President is a moderating force.
> >
> > Joel
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 3:28 PM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> The Israelis, with grudging US support, have been talking about bombing
> >> Iran for a decade now in a vain bid to stop the development of its
> nuclear
> >> program. The election of the Western-educated Hassan Rohani makes that
> >> prospect all the more unlikely. Rohani was instrumental in negotiating
> the
> >> suspension of Iran's nuclear enrichment program under the reformist
> >> president Mohammed Khatami and has indicated his eagerness for renewed
> >> talks. More to the point, the US and its allies will not want to do
> >> anything to derail the revived movement of middle and working class
> >> Iranians against the current regime. The urban masses gave Rohani the
> >> presidency and for cultural and economic reasons are seeking improved
> >> relations with the West.
> >>
> >> Israel is always an unpredictable and troublesome wild card for the US,
> >> but it seems clear that the US defence and foreign policy establishment
> has
> >> reconciled itself to "containing" rather than preventing a nuclear-armed
> >> Iran. Hillary Clinton said as much last year. The reported dispatch of
> 4000
> >> Iranian troops to Syria plus Rohani's election will likely place more
> >> pressure on the Obama administration to negotiate a settlement of the
> >> conflict and stabilize the situation in the Middle East. Whether it can
> do
> >> so in light of the multiple interrelated class, religious, and ethnic
> >> conflicts in the region is another matter.
> >>
> >> The underlying historical factors encouraging the Americans to pursue a
> >> policy of peaceful coexistence with Islamist regimes and movements,
> along
> >> the same lines as they once did with the Communist regimes in USSR and
> >> China, are shrewdly summarized below:
> >>
> >>
> >> The west’s dominance of the Middle East is ending
> >> By Gideon Rachman
> >> Financial Times
> >> June 17 2013
> >>
> >> Those calling for deeper US involvement in the Syrian conflict are
> living
> >> in the past
> >>
> >> Should the west arm the Syrian rebels? That is the issue of the day in
> >> Washington, London and at the Group of Eight summit. But behind this
> debate
> >> lies a bigger question. Can western powers continue to shape the future
> of
> >> the Middle East as they have for the past century?
> >>
> >> The current, increasingly fragile borders of the Middle East are, to a
> >> large extent, the product of some lines on the map drawn by Britain and
> >> France in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. The era when Britain and
> >> France were the dominant outside powers ended definitively with the Suez
> >> crisis of 1956 – when the US pulled the plug on the two nations’
> >> intervention in Egypt. During the cold war, the US and the USSR were the
> >> big players. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, America
> stood
> >> alone as the great power in the Middle East: organising the coalition to
> >> defeat Saddam Hussein in 1991, protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf,
> >> containing Iran and attempting to broker a peace settlement between
> Israel
> >> and the Arab states.
> >>
> >> Those who are urging the US to get more deeply involved in the Syrian
> >> conflict now are living in the past. They assume that America can and
> >> should continue to dominate the politics of the Middle East. But four
> >> fundamental changes make it no longer realistic, or even desirable, for
> the
> >> US to dominate the region in the old way.
> >> These changes are the failures of the Afghan and Iraq wars; the Great
> >> Recession, the Arab spring and the prospect of US energy independence.
> >>
> >> Over the past decade, the US has learnt that while its military might
> can
> >> topple regimes in the greater Middle East very quickly, America and its
> >> allies are very bad at nation-building. A decade of involvement has left
> >> both Afghanistan and Iraq deeply unstable and wracked by conflict.
> Neither
> >> country is securely in the “western camp”.
> >> The result is that even the advocates of western intervention in Syria,
> >> such as Senator John McCain, proclaim that they are opposed to “boots on
> >> the ground”. Instead, they are pushing to supply weapons to the Syrian
> >> rebels – arguing that this is necessary to secure a more desirable
> >> political outcome.
> >>
> >> President Barack Obama has given some ground to the “arm the rebels”
> camp.
> >> But his reluctance and scepticism are evident – and amply justified. If
> a
> >> full-scale western occupation of both Iraq and Afghanistan was unable to
> >> secure a decent outcome, why does anybody believe that supplying a few
> >> light weapons to the Syrian rebels will be more effective?
> >>
> >> The Great Recession also means that the west’s capacity to “bear any
> >> burden” can no longer be taken for granted. European military spending
> is
> >> falling fast – and cuts in the Pentagon budget have begun. With the
> direct
> >> and indirect cost of the Iraq war estimated at $3tn and the US
> government
> >> borrowing 40 cents of every dollar that it spends, it is hardly
> surprising
> >> that Mr Obama is wary of taking on new commitments in the Middle East.
> >>
> >> The third new factor is the Arab spring. President Hosni Mubarak of
> Egypt
> >> was a long-time ally and client of the US. Nonetheless, Washington
> decided
> >> to let him fall in early 2011 – much to the disgust and alarm of other
> >> long-term American allies in the region, notably Saudi Arabia and
> Israel.
> >> But the Obama administration was right to drop Mr Mubarak. He could not
> >> have been propped up without risking a Syria-style bloodbath.
> >>
> >> More fundamentally, the US has recognised that, ultimately, the people
> of
> >> the Middle East are going to have to shape their own destinies. Many of
> the
> >> forces at work in the region – such as Islamism and Sunni-Shia
> sectarianism
> >> – are alarming to the west but they cannot be forever channelled or
> >> suppressed.
> >>
> >> Finally, the ability of the US to take a more hands-off attitude is
> >> greatly enhanced by the shale revolution in the US, which lessens
> American
> >> dependence on Middle Eastern oil.
> >>
> >> Accepting that western domination of the Middle East is coming to an
> end,
> >> however, should not be confused with saying that western nations will
> not
> >> defend their interests.
> >>
> >> The US has large military bases in the Gulf and, together with its
> allies,
> >> will still try to prevent the Middle East becoming dominated by a
> hostile
> >> power. Despite its role in Syria, Russia is not a plausible regional
> >> hegemon. But Iran worries the US; an attack on its nuclear programme
> >> remains an option, despite the encouraging result of this weekend’s
> >> presidential elections. Jihadist forces, linked to al-Qaeda, will also
> >> encounter western resistance – one reason why the Syrian opposition
> >> continues to be treated very warily. And the US and its European allies
> >> will remain deeply involved in regional diplomacy over Syria.
> >>
> >> Western humanitarian instincts will play a role too – as they did in the
> >> decision to support the Libyan rebellion. But, as Syria is
> demonstrating,
> >> there is a limit to what the west will take on. Even former Australian
> >> foreign minister Gareth Evans, the intellectual godfather of the
> doctrine
> >> of the “responsibility to protect” civilians, is warning against
> military
> >> intervention in Syria.
> >>
> >> Despite the US decision to begin to supply military assistance to the
> >> rebels, Mr Obama is obviously still wary of deep involvement in the
> Syrian
> >> conflict. More than some of his advisers and allies, he seems to
> appreciate
> >> the limited ability of outside powers to control the new order that it
> is
> >> emerging in the region. The era of direct colonialism in the Middle East
> >> ended decades ago. The era of informal empire is now also coming to a
> close.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ___________________________________
> >> http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/mailman/listinfo/lbo-talk
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > joel schalit
> > skype: jschalit
> > mobile: +49 160 98190521
> > email: jschalit at gmail.com
> > web: www.joelschalit.com
> > work: www.souciant.com
> > ___________________________________
> > http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/mailman/listinfo/lbo-talk
>
>
> ___________________________________
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>
-- joel schalit skype: jschalit mobile: +49 160 98190521 email: jschalit at gmail.com web: www.joelschalit.com work: www.souciant.com