[lbo-talk] [Pen-l] Syriza's Tsipras offers reassurances

Robert Naiman naiman at justforeignpolicy.org
Fri Nov 7 05:48:23 PST 2014


There's two different issues here, which are related but separable. One is: do we think that the idea of Greece leaving the zero is or should be a dead letter politically; the other is whether the idea of Syriza leading a charge to leave the Euro is a dead letter now and was ever a live proposition.

I think the idea of Greece leaving the Euro is a dead letter politically. I think the idea should have gotten a better hearing than it did; I think that Greece would have been better off in the long run if it had left the Euro rather than accept the imposed austerity, and I think it would have gotten a better deal if had been more widely believed that it had a plausible alternative. But as a practical political matter I don't think this was ever close. A substantial part of the Greek left, including many in Syriza, were never willing to seriously countenance this as an option, because they saw leaving the Euro as "leaving Europe," which they were not willing to consider. Now, however plausible it was before, it is much less plausible now, because the widespread perception is that Greece has already suffered a great deal to stay in the Euro, it might as well receive the benefits. The economy is returning to growth; an exit from the troika is in sight. This is the widespread view in Greece now.

Even now I personally would agree that Greece would be better off economically in terms of its future growth path if it reclaimed its macroeconomic sovereignty and forced a deep restructuring of its external debt. But I see no realistic prospect of getting a majority of the Greek electorate to agree, not even a majority of Syriza voters.

Robert Naiman Policy Director Just Foreign Policy www.justforeignpolicy.org naiman at justforeignpolicy.org (202) 448-2898 x1

On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com> wrote:


> I agree with the electoral constraints on Syriza identified by Robert and
> Richard, but, unless I’m misunderstanding, I don’t think the substantive
> matter of leaving the euro is as open and shut a case as is being suggested
> if were ever to come to that. The idea wouldn’t be canvassed as seriously
> as it has been since the onset of the crisis, not only in Greece but also
> in other peripheral countries like Italy and Spain, and not only on the
> left but across the entire political spectrum. Perhaps I’ve missed it, but
> I haven’t seen anything in Lapavitsas to suggest he favours “a form of
> austerity which depends on a massive increase in the rate of exploitation.”
> To the contrary, he has argued that the economy will continue to stagnate
> and living standards will continue to worsen if Greece remains inside the
> eurozone. Of course, his view has been predicated on a deepening of the
> crisis, and there are recent suggestions from politicians and economists
> that the Greek economy has already bottomed out - wishful thinking, in my
> view, given the dismal prospects for the eurozone as a whole.
>
> If in fact the economy continues to stagnate or deteriorates even further,
> it seems clear an external devaluation through adoption of a new drachma
> would be preferable to the vicious internal devaluation that workers in
> Greece have been subjected to thusfar. You could probably make the same
> case for the working class in Spain, Italy, and other countries on the
> European periphery who have been on the receiving end of equally harsh
> treatment. In Greece’s case, leaving the eurozone would very likely enhance
> it’s export competitiveness and boost its service sector, as foreign
> students, tourists, and those seeking cheaper medical care sought to
> benefit from the exchange rate advantage which would be conferred on the
> country’s schools, hospitals, hotels and other attractions. While there
> would be initial turmoil and disruption, Lapavitsas and others have
> suggested that the effects would be temporary if the adoption of a
> sovereign currency were accompanied by a debt default, currency controls,
> nationalization of the banking sector, and a vast public works program.
>
> This is the theory at any rate, and it is really impossible to say whether
> it would be proved correct or disastrous in practice. That would depend on
> the condition of the world economy, the prevailing relationship of forces
> both inside Greece, and in particular the policy of Germany, the ECB, the
> IMF and the country’s other major creditors outside of it. Richard expects
> they would “want to make an example out of such a state”, but it’s worth
> recalling that when a Grexit was first mooted as a serious possibility in
> 2012, the big power brokers favoured, not gunboats, but a process of
> negotiation leading an orderly exit as being in the best interest of the
> eurozone. I don’t think we’ll ever get the chance to put the theory to the
> test, however, because even should Syriza manage to form the next
> government, its leadership and the majority of its supporters are, as has
> been noted, presently opposed to withdrawal from the eurozone and it will
> almost certainly have to govern in coalition with another party(s) to its
> right. But if events should somehow propel it and an increasing share of
> the Greek population to consider an exit, I wouldn’t reject that
> proposition as economically or politically unviable out of hand.
>
>
> On Nov 6, 2014, at 12:28 PM, Lenin's Tomb <leninstombblog at googlemail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > In fairness, the Syriza Left had won, prior to the party’s electoral
> surge, support for the slogan of ‘not one sacrifice for the euro’. But
> that slogan was quietly dropped before the May 2012 election, and never
> revived. And in fact, given the choice between accepting a degree of
> austerity or leaving the eurozone, most Syria members appear to prefer the
> former. This is unsurprising. The only serious proposal for a Grexit
> coming from the Left is Costas Lapavitsas’s. It’s a good programme, but
> essentially it is itself a form of austerity which depends on a massive
> increase in the rate of exploitation in order to get the country up and
> running again outside the eurozone - it would be a heavily punished economy
> too, as the EU would want to make an example out of such a state. It’s a
> tough sell.
> >
> >
> >> On 6 Nov 2014, at 17:16, Robert Naiman <naiman at justforeignpolicy.org>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> Syriza was *never* going to leave the Eurozone. It was always pro-Euro.
> It
> >> always claimed that Greece could have gotten a better deal from Europe,
> and
> >> it always said that if it were in power, it would negotiate a better
> deal.
> >>
> >> Also, if Syriza doesn't work to moderate its image - which is as much
> due
> >> to the distortions of opponents as to its own past rhetoric - it has no
> >> chance of winning the election and taking power. A key talking point
> >> against Syriza is the current "Syriza premium" on Greek debt. If
> Syriza's
> >> line were "set Greece's creditors on fire" its chances of winning the
> next
> >> election would be zero.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
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