On the other hand, it makes smaller reforms a lot easier, and it makes bigger reforms, although slower, more stable.
On net, I prefer bourgeois democracy.
As Eugene Debs said (from memory): "I would not lead you into the promised land, because if I could lead you into it, someone else could lead you out of it."
Robert Naiman Policy Director Just Foreign Policy www.justforeignpolicy.org naiman at justforeignpolicy.org (202) 448-2898 x1
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 9:22 AM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Nov 7, 2014, at 8:48 AM, Robert Naiman <naiman at justforeignpolicy.org>
> wrote:
>
> > There's two different issues here, which are related but separable. One
> is: do we think that the idea of Greece leaving the zero is or should be a
> dead letter politically; the other is whether the idea of Syriza leading a
> charge to leave the Euro is a dead letter now and was ever a live
> proposition.
> >
> > I think the idea of Greece leaving the Euro is a dead letter
> politically. I think the idea should have gotten a better hearing than it
> did; I think that Greece would have been better off in the long run if it
> had left the Euro rather than accept the imposed austerity, and I think it
> would have gotten a better deal if had been more widely believed that it
> had a plausible alternative. But as a practical political matter I don't
> think this was ever close. A substantial part of the Greek left, including
> many in Syriza, were never willing to seriously countenance this as an
> option, because they saw leaving the Euro as "leaving Europe," which they
> were not willing to consider. Now, however plausible it was before, it is
> much less plausible now, because the widespread perception is that Greece
> has already suffered a great deal to stay in the Euro, it might as well
> receive the benefits. The economy is returning to growth; an exit from the
> troika is in sight. This is the widespread view in Greece now.
> >
> > Even now I personally would agree that Greece would be better off
> economically in terms of its future growth path if it reclaimed its
> macroeconomic sovereignty and forced a deep restructuring of its external
> debt. But I see no realistic prospect of getting a majority of the Greek
> electorate to agree, not even a majority of Syriza voters.
>
> Yes, you’re right. Syriza would have had to have explained and campaigned
> for the need for an exit from the time it became a political force and
> particularly when public shock and anger at EU-IMF imposed austerity was at
> its height a couple of years ago. These conjunctures - when economic crisis
> and a widespread public demand for change converge - and the opportunities
> they present for bold measures are fleeting. You could say the Obama
> administration muffed a similar opportunity in the period in the immediate
> aftermath of the 2008 election when bolder measures than it subsequently
> undertook to resolve the crisis in jobs, housing, the banking system,
> infrastructure, climate change, and healthcare would have been welcomed by
> the broad coalition which swept the Democrats into the White House and
> control of both Houses, including older angry white working class males who
> later abandoned it for the tea party. Now I know Carrol believes Obama and
> the Democratic politicians and tacticians are “courageous” and “brilliant”,
> but he and they don’t seem to take into account that the consequences of
> political timidity at such moments can be far more damaging to a party than
> unorthodox policies and confrontation with the entrenched conservative
> defenders of the status quo, and damaging to the health of the capitalist
> economy to boot. That’s precisely how events have unfolded for the
> Democrats and the US economy.
>
> The same fate could befall Syriza, notwithstanding that it is an insurgent
> party much closer to the masses and has a program and leadership more
> genuinely committed to social change than the Democrats, one of the twin
> political pillars of American capitalism. Instead of promoting an exit from
> the euro, Syriza has campaigned for a restructuring of Greece’s foreign
> debt. It is too late to reverse course, barring a further sharp decline in
> Greek living standards. However, having chosen this course, there’s no
> reason to expect Syriza will be able to have any more success obtaining
> significant debt relief than the Samaras government - precisely because the
> lacks the leverage which it might have been able to use if it hadn’t
> clearly ruled out an exit from the euro.
>
> That’s the perverse genius of the electoral system. It takes mass
> discontent and channels it into the safer channels of the electoral system.
> It creates the illusion that change can be won by the simple act of voting
> rather than engaging in sustained struggle which can subject organizations
> and activists to risk. One wonders why the bourgeoisie resisted the
> extension of the universal franchise for so long. Rather than serving as a
> springboard for the peaceful replacement of the capitalist system, as the
> bourgeoisie feared and social democratic and trade union leaders hoped, it
> served to stabilize capitalism and allow for reforms which stimulated its
> growth for an extended period until very recently. It forced even the
> Communists and other parties to the left of the social democrats, in their
> quest to win votes and form governments, to progressively modify the
> anti-capitalist elements of their programs the closer they neared power. I
> don’t see how things will turn out differently for Syriza or other attempts
> to displace the traditional liberal and conservative governing parties if
> global capitalism is again able to recover from the recurrent crises which
> afflict it.
>
>
>
> > Robert Naiman
> > Policy Director
> > Just Foreign Policy
> > www.justforeignpolicy.org
> > naiman at justforeignpolicy.org
> > (202) 448-2898 x1
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > I agree with the electoral constraints on Syriza identified by Robert
> and Richard, but, unless I’m misunderstanding, I don’t think the
> substantive matter of leaving the euro is as open and shut a case as is
> being suggested if were ever to come to that. The idea wouldn’t be
> canvassed as seriously as it has been since the onset of the crisis, not
> only in Greece but also in other peripheral countries like Italy and Spain,
> and not only on the left but across the entire political spectrum. Perhaps
> I’ve missed it, but I haven’t seen anything in Lapavitsas to suggest he
> favours “a form of austerity which depends on a massive increase in the
> rate of exploitation.” To the contrary, he has argued that the economy will
> continue to stagnate and living standards will continue to worsen if Greece
> remains inside the eurozone. Of course, his view has been predicated on a
> deepening of the crisis, and there are recent suggestions from politicians
> and economists that the Greek economy has already bottomed out - wishful
> thinking, in my view, given the dismal prospects for the eurozone as a
> whole.
> >
> > If in fact the economy continues to stagnate or deteriorates even
> further, it seems clear an external devaluation through adoption of a new
> drachma would be preferable to the vicious internal devaluation that
> workers in Greece have been subjected to thusfar. You could probably make
> the same case for the working class in Spain, Italy, and other countries on
> the European periphery who have been on the receiving end of equally harsh
> treatment. In Greece’s case, leaving the eurozone would very likely enhance
> it’s export competitiveness and boost its service sector, as foreign
> students, tourists, and those seeking cheaper medical care sought to
> benefit from the exchange rate advantage which would be conferred on the
> country’s schools, hospitals, hotels and other attractions. While there
> would be initial turmoil and disruption, Lapavitsas and others have
> suggested that the effects would be temporary if the adoption of a
> sovereign currency were accompanied by a debt default, currency controls,
> nationalization of the banking sector, and a vast public works program.
> >
> > This is the theory at any rate, and it is really impossible to say
> whether it would be proved correct or disastrous in practice. That would
> depend on the condition of the world economy, the prevailing relationship
> of forces both inside Greece, and in particular the policy of Germany, the
> ECB, the IMF and the country’s other major creditors outside of it. Richard
> expects they would “want to make an example out of such a state”, but it’s
> worth recalling that when a Grexit was first mooted as a serious
> possibility in 2012, the big power brokers favoured, not gunboats, but a
> process of negotiation leading an orderly exit as being in the best
> interest of the eurozone. I don’t think we’ll ever get the chance to put
> the theory to the test, however, because even should Syriza manage to form
> the next government, its leadership and the majority of its supporters are,
> as has been noted, presently opposed to withdrawal from the eurozone and it
> will almost certainly have to govern in coalition with another party(s) to
> its right. But if events should somehow propel it and an increasing share
> of the Greek population to consider an exit, I wouldn’t reject that
> proposition as economically or politically unviable out of hand.
> >
> >
> > On Nov 6, 2014, at 12:28 PM, Lenin's Tomb <leninstombblog at googlemail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > In fairness, the Syriza Left had won, prior to the party’s electoral
> surge, support for the slogan of ‘not one sacrifice for the euro’. But
> that slogan was quietly dropped before the May 2012 election, and never
> revived. And in fact, given the choice between accepting a degree of
> austerity or leaving the eurozone, most Syria members appear to prefer the
> former. This is unsurprising. The only serious proposal for a Grexit
> coming from the Left is Costas Lapavitsas’s. It’s a good programme, but
> essentially it is itself a form of austerity which depends on a massive
> increase in the rate of exploitation in order to get the country up and
> running again outside the eurozone - it would be a heavily punished economy
> too, as the EU would want to make an example out of such a state. It’s a
> tough sell.
> > >
> > >
> > >> On 6 Nov 2014, at 17:16, Robert Naiman <naiman at justforeignpolicy.org>
> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Syriza was *never* going to leave the Eurozone. It was always
> pro-Euro. It
> > >> always claimed that Greece could have gotten a better deal from
> Europe, and
> > >> it always said that if it were in power, it would negotiate a better
> deal.
> > >>
> > >> Also, if Syriza doesn't work to moderate its image - which is as much
> due
> > >> to the distortions of opponents as to its own past rhetoric - it has
> no
> > >> chance of winning the election and taking power. A key talking point
> > >> against Syriza is the current "Syriza premium" on Greek debt. If
> Syriza's
> > >> line were "set Greece's creditors on fire" its chances of winning the
> next
> > >> election would be zero.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >
> > >
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