I also think that the way that it turned out was by no means means a foregone conclusion. The Employee Free Choice Act could have passed and become law. It was close. If Franken had won Minnesota by a bigger margin, so that his election was not tied up for months, if the Democrats had a 60 seat majority right away, maybe it would have. If the EFCA had passed and become law the U.S. would be very different today. And that is just one example of a key reform that could have happened in 2009 but didn't.
I also think that reforms were accomplished that matter. I think the passage of the Affordable Care Act was a reform that mattered. I personally know people who got health insurance due to the passage of the Affordable Care Act who did not have it before. I think the fact that it was a "kludge," as Krugman said, in particular the delay of its full implementation, and the turning back by Lieberman (also something that could have been avoided if he had been defeated by Lamont in 2006) of the proposed provision of letting older Americans buy into Medicare, combined with the Supreme Court decision that limited the impact of Medicaid expansion, combined with the fact that Democrats did not do as good a job as they could have in telling the story of what the ACA accomplished, limited its positive political impact. These are all contingent things; each one of them could have gone the other way.
Robert Naiman Policy Director Just Foreign Policy www.justforeignpolicy.org naiman at justforeignpolicy.org (202) 448-2898 x1
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Nov 7, 2014, at 10:36 AM, Robert Naiman <naiman at justforeignpolicy.org>
> wrote:
>
> > I agree with you that bourgeois democracy is a major obstacle to quick,
> decisive, revolutionary change.
> >
> > On the other hand, it makes smaller reforms a lot easier, and it makes
> bigger reforms, although slower, more stable.
>
> This assumes, Robert, that bolder moves by the Obama administration in the
> various sectors I mentioned, when it were possible, would have constituted
> “revolutionary change”. Most Keynesian economists and not a few more
> conservative ones think stronger fiscal measures would have produced a more
> robust and sustainable capitalist recovery. This would necessarily have
> involved improving the welfare and purchasing power of the American working
> class via mortgage relief, strengthening union organizing rights, public
> works spending, a higher minimum wage, and more affordable single payer
> healthcare.
>
> None of these reform measures, though admittedly bold, can be described as
> revolutionary both given the context and in that they don’t fundamentally
> alter the structure of capitalist power or property. In fact, their effect
> would be to place capitalism on a more solid foundation at a time when it
> is tottering or hamstrung, as at present, by “secular stagnation”.
>
> You have no idea how much it pains me to be dispensing such sound free
> advice to the system’s guardians.:)
>
>
> > On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 9:22 AM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Nov 7, 2014, at 8:48 AM, Robert Naiman <naiman at justforeignpolicy.org>
> wrote:
> >
> > > There's two different issues here, which are related but separable.
> One is: do we think that the idea of Greece leaving the zero is or should
> be a dead letter politically; the other is whether the idea of Syriza
> leading a charge to leave the Euro is a dead letter now and was ever a live
> proposition.
> > >
> > > I think the idea of Greece leaving the Euro is a dead letter
> politically. I think the idea should have gotten a better hearing than it
> did; I think that Greece would have been better off in the long run if it
> had left the Euro rather than accept the imposed austerity, and I think it
> would have gotten a better deal if had been more widely believed that it
> had a plausible alternative. But as a practical political matter I don't
> think this was ever close. A substantial part of the Greek left, including
> many in Syriza, were never willing to seriously countenance this as an
> option, because they saw leaving the Euro as "leaving Europe," which they
> were not willing to consider. Now, however plausible it was before, it is
> much less plausible now, because the widespread perception is that Greece
> has already suffered a great deal to stay in the Euro, it might as well
> receive the benefits. The economy is returning to growth; an exit from the
> troika is in sight. This is the widespread view in Greece now.
> > >
> > > Even now I personally would agree that Greece would be better off
> economically in terms of its future growth path if it reclaimed its
> macroeconomic sovereignty and forced a deep restructuring of its external
> debt. But I see no realistic prospect of getting a majority of the Greek
> electorate to agree, not even a majority of Syriza voters.
> >
> > Yes, you’re right. Syriza would have had to have explained and
> campaigned for the need for an exit from the time it became a political
> force and particularly when public shock and anger at EU-IMF imposed
> austerity was at its height a couple of years ago. These conjunctures -
> when economic crisis and a widespread public demand for change converge -
> and the opportunities they present for bold measures are fleeting. You
> could say the Obama administration muffed a similar opportunity in the
> period in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 election when bolder measures
> than it subsequently undertook to resolve the crisis in jobs, housing, the
> banking system, infrastructure, climate change, and healthcare would have
> been welcomed by the broad coalition which swept the Democrats into the
> White House and control of both Houses, including older angry white working
> class males who later abandoned it for the tea party. Now I know Carrol
> believes Obama and the Democratic politicians and tacticians are
> “courageous” and “brilliant”, but he and they don’t seem to take into
> account that the consequences of political timidity at such moments can be
> far more damaging to a party than unorthodox policies and confrontation
> with the entrenched conservative defenders of the status quo, and damaging
> to the health of the capitalist economy to boot. That’s precisely how
> events have unfolded for the Democrats and the US economy.
> >
> > The same fate could befall Syriza, notwithstanding that it is an
> insurgent party much closer to the masses and has a program and leadership
> more genuinely committed to social change than the Democrats, one of the
> twin political pillars of American capitalism. Instead of promoting an exit
> from the euro, Syriza has campaigned for a restructuring of Greece’s
> foreign debt. It is too late to reverse course, barring a further sharp
> decline in Greek living standards. However, having chosen this course,
> there’s no reason to expect Syriza will be able to have any more success
> obtaining significant debt relief than the Samaras government - precisely
> because the lacks the leverage which it might have been able to use if it
> hadn’t clearly ruled out an exit from the euro.
> >
> > That’s the perverse genius of the electoral system. It takes mass
> discontent and channels it into the safer channels of the electoral system.
> It creates the illusion that change can be won by the simple act of voting
> rather than engaging in sustained struggle which can subject organizations
> and activists to risk. One wonders why the bourgeoisie resisted the
> extension of the universal franchise for so long. Rather than serving as a
> springboard for the peaceful replacement of the capitalist system, as the
> bourgeoisie feared and social democratic and trade union leaders hoped, it
> served to stabilize capitalism and allow for reforms which stimulated its
> growth for an extended period until very recently. It forced even the
> Communists and other parties to the left of the social democrats, in their
> quest to win votes and form governments, to progressively modify the
> anti-capitalist elements of their programs the closer they neared power. I
> don’t see how things will turn out differently for Syriza or other attempts
> to displace the traditional liberal and conservative governing parties if
> global capitalism is again able to recover from the recurrent crises which
> afflict it.
> >
> >
> >
> > > Robert Naiman
> > > Policy Director
> > > Just Foreign Policy
> > > www.justforeignpolicy.org
> > > naiman at justforeignpolicy.org
> > > (202) 448-2898 x1
> > >
> > > On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Marv Gandall <marvgand2 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > I agree with the electoral constraints on Syriza identified by Robert
> and Richard, but, unless I’m misunderstanding, I don’t think the
> substantive matter of leaving the euro is as open and shut a case as is
> being suggested if were ever to come to that. The idea wouldn’t be
> canvassed as seriously as it has been since the onset of the crisis, not
> only in Greece but also in other peripheral countries like Italy and Spain,
> and not only on the left but across the entire political spectrum. Perhaps
> I’ve missed it, but I haven’t seen anything in Lapavitsas to suggest he
> favours “a form of austerity which depends on a massive increase in the
> rate of exploitation.” To the contrary, he has argued that the economy will
> continue to stagnate and living standards will continue to worsen if Greece
> remains inside the eurozone. Of course, his view has been predicated on a
> deepening of the crisis, and there are recent suggestions from politicians
> and economists that the Greek economy has already bottomed out - wishful
> thinking, in my view, given the dismal prospects for the eurozone as a
> whole.
> > >
> > > If in fact the economy continues to stagnate or deteriorates even
> further, it seems clear an external devaluation through adoption of a new
> drachma would be preferable to the vicious internal devaluation that
> workers in Greece have been subjected to thusfar. You could probably make
> the same case for the working class in Spain, Italy, and other countries on
> the European periphery who have been on the receiving end of equally harsh
> treatment. In Greece’s case, leaving the eurozone would very likely enhance
> it’s export competitiveness and boost its service sector, as foreign
> students, tourists, and those seeking cheaper medical care sought to
> benefit from the exchange rate advantage which would be conferred on the
> country’s schools, hospitals, hotels and other attractions. While there
> would be initial turmoil and disruption, Lapavitsas and others have
> suggested that the effects would be temporary if the adoption of a
> sovereign currency were accompanied by a debt default, currency controls,
> nationalization of the banking sector, and a vast public works program.
> > >
> > > This is the theory at any rate, and it is really impossible to say
> whether it would be proved correct or disastrous in practice. That would
> depend on the condition of the world economy, the prevailing relationship
> of forces both inside Greece, and in particular the policy of Germany, the
> ECB, the IMF and the country’s other major creditors outside of it. Richard
> expects they would “want to make an example out of such a state”, but it’s
> worth recalling that when a Grexit was first mooted as a serious
> possibility in 2012, the big power brokers favoured, not gunboats, but a
> process of negotiation leading an orderly exit as being in the best
> interest of the eurozone. I don’t think we’ll ever get the chance to put
> the theory to the test, however, because even should Syriza manage to form
> the next government, its leadership and the majority of its supporters are,
> as has been noted, presently opposed to withdrawal from the eurozone and it
> will almost certainly have to govern in coalition with another party(s) to
> its right. But if events should somehow propel it and an increasing share
> of the Greek population to consider an exit, I wouldn’t reject that
> proposition as economically or politically unviable out of hand.
> > >
> > >
> > > On Nov 6, 2014, at 12:28 PM, Lenin's Tomb <
> leninstombblog at googlemail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > In fairness, the Syriza Left had won, prior to the party’s electoral
> surge, support for the slogan of ‘not one sacrifice for the euro’. But
> that slogan was quietly dropped before the May 2012 election, and never
> revived. And in fact, given the choice between accepting a degree of
> austerity or leaving the eurozone, most Syria members appear to prefer the
> former. This is unsurprising. The only serious proposal for a Grexit
> coming from the Left is Costas Lapavitsas’s. It’s a good programme, but
> essentially it is itself a form of austerity which depends on a massive
> increase in the rate of exploitation in order to get the country up and
> running again outside the eurozone - it would be a heavily punished economy
> too, as the EU would want to make an example out of such a state. It’s a
> tough sell.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> On 6 Nov 2014, at 17:16, Robert Naiman <
> naiman at justforeignpolicy.org> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> Syriza was *never* going to leave the Eurozone. It was always
> pro-Euro. It
> > > >> always claimed that Greece could have gotten a better deal from
> Europe, and
> > > >> it always said that if it were in power, it would negotiate a
> better deal.
> > > >>
> > > >> Also, if Syriza doesn't work to moderate its image - which is as
> much due
> > > >> to the distortions of opponents as to its own past rhetoric - it
> has no
> > > >> chance of winning the election and taking power. A key talking point
> > > >> against Syriza is the current "Syriza premium" on Greek debt. If
> Syriza's
> > > >> line were "set Greece's creditors on fire" its chances of winning
> the next
> > > >> election would be zero.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
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