On Sep 26, 2014, at 5:25 PM, Robert Naiman <naiman at justforeignpolicy.org> wrote:
> If I'm the USG, I don't see these developments as a problem at all; maybe I see them as good.
>
> A key longstanding goal of the USG is to isolate and marginalize ISIL and Nusra from other Syrian rebel groups. This has been controversial among many rebel groups; past attempts by the USG to marginalize Nusra from other groups have met with strong resistance, leading some of these groups to affirm solidarity with Nusra instead.
>
> If Nusra gets closer to ISIL, it's harder for other rebel groups to resist the US campaign to force them to cut their ties to Nusra.
>
> From the US point of view, any flavor of Al Qaeda is pretty much the same; people that it's way OK to bomb. Whether Al Qaeda types become even more extreme Al Qaeda types is not on their list of things to worry about; indeed, it strengthens the USG cause, just like the beheadings and other horrible things done by ISIL, looped on TV, have strengthened the USG cause.
With what implications for the course of the uprising against the Assad regime and prospects for a negotiated settlement? The situation strikes me as extraordinarily fluid and confused with a lot of sorting out still to be done among the many players.