"How Tempting is Corruption? - More Bad News About
Economists"
BY: BJORN FRANK
University of Hohenheim
GUNTHER G. SCHULZE
University of Konstanz
SSRN Electronic Document Delivery:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=100968
Paper ID: Working Paper Number: 164/1998
Date: April 1998
Contact: Gunther G. Schulze
E-Mail: MAILTO:guenther.schulze at uni-konstanz.de
Postal: University of Konstanz, Department of
Economics, P.O. Box 5560 D 141, 78434 Konstanz
Germany
Phone: ++49-7531-882920
Fax: ++49-7531-883765
Co-Auth: MAILTO:bjfrank at uni-hohenheim.de
In this paper, we report on an experiment on corruption
which investigates various determinants of corruptibility.
We find that economics students are significantly more
corrupt than others, which is due to self-selection rather
than indoctrination. Moreover, our results vary with gender.
Also, agents are no less corrupt if rewarded in addition
to, and independently of, a possible bribe. Our experiment
isolates the influence of self-interest on cooperation from
other influences such as risk attitude and expectations
regarding the behavior of others.
JEL Classification: A2, C9