> Your signature line refers to Reason and Democracy. Reason is an
> Enlightenment term referring to rationality or removal of sentiment, and
> religious dogma from the affairs of the secular state. Isn't that some
> sort of ancestor of Positivism?
Short snotty reply: So? Judaism is some sort of ancestor of Christianity. What's that supposed to prove?
Hopefully more civilized and useful answer:
If reason can't be used on itself, it's not much more than a religion, now is it?
This is precisely the problem that many Enlightenment thinkers fell into. It's quite understandable, of course, since they were breaking with a tradition of certainty and universal authority that they'd promote the virtues of reason in much the same terms. However, not everyone did that, even in the beginning.
Positivism is a remnant of that attitude, which often figures in constructions of "reason" which define Marxism (and critical theory more generally) as apriori "irrational" or "meaningless". (B.F. Skinner went so far as to define "mind" out of existence!)
There's another approach to reason that's far more reasonable, far less arbitary, and far more provisional, in keeping with our true condition as lowly creatures, whose occassional glimpses into the mind of God are far more often mistaken than not. This approach is pragmatism -- not in the grimy Beltway sense, but in the Pierce -- James -- Dewey tradition.
Its immediate relevance in the field of journalism can be found in a brief but insightful book, *Good News, Bad News: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest* by Jeremy Iggers / Westview Press (1998).
Iggers criticizes the entire enterprise of "journalism ethics" as basically a sham (he's diplomatic about it, though), gives some historical background, and argues that the posivitist-influenced ethical framework dating back to Lippman needs to be scrapped in favor of a pragmatist framework.
Quoting from my own review for Intellectual Capital:
"The crucial period came after World War I, when the experience of wartime propaganda undermined an earlier naive faith in 'the facts'. Walter Lippmann articulated a more sophisticated approach, both mimicking scientific objectivity and elevating the importance of expert sources, in the process devaluing the role of the public, and creating an appealing, but philosophically shaky distinction between fact and opinion. His influence on the press was pervasive, but not uncontested. In opposition, John Dewey argued from the pragmatist tradition which sees knowledge as an ongoing creation involving a multitude of perspectives--a far more accurate picture of how science really works, and one that--unlike Lippmann's--can be generalized to include the public as active participants."
While not overtly a leftist, Iggers maps out a kind of liberal position which allows for influence and dialogue from the Left, recalling exactly why Dewey remains such a threatening figure even to this day, even as Lipmann remains such a reassuring one.
-- Paul Rosenberg Reason and Democracy rad at gte.net
"Let's put the information BACK into the information age!"