This is an earlier post I sent you Paula that dealt also with the euro problem. (see underlined section)
Henry
Paula: You asked for views on the Asian Crises on an earlier post. Here is mine.
A good part of the responsibility of the Asian financial crises is attributable to international banks not facing up to their lender liability, a legal concept holding lenders liable for damages if they knowingly lend beyond any borrower's capacity to handle the loan. It is convenient for Western creditors to point fingers at Asian crony capitalism and lack of transparency, but such practices, albeit undesirable, are not unique to Asia and were certainly not unknown to lenders when the bad loans were made. Having been permanent cultural features in many part of the world, including Asia, such practices cannot be the direct cause of the region?s sudden financial collapse, any more than its economic success of recent past. Recognizing belatedly the need to avoid political backlash in the region, IMF rescue packages are nevertheless still slow in focusing on correcting the structural defects of the unregulated globalization of financial markets and they appear to continue to be devious vehicles for wholesale foreign control of wounded Asian economies. Many economists have been critical of IMF "off the shelf" rescue approaches for having exacerbated the financial crises in Asia. Moreover, the austerity measures demanded by IMF economists who have been insensitive to local political realities, hace turned the economic turmoil into detonators of political instability throughout the region.
A fundamental problem in world trade finance is the excessive weight foreign exchange markets assign to the size of a country?s foreign exchange reserves as indicator of economic health and credit worthiness, despite general recognition by economists that the validity of this yardstick ended with the age of mercantilism a century ago. Yet, despite claims of scientific determinism, financial markets are not free of political bias. And this residual focus on foreign exchange reserves is not applied evenly to all economies. Curiously, the United States, the world's largest debtor nation (carrying US$20,000 of national debt per capita), with two-thirds of all US currency being held overseas, with chronic budget deficits until this year and a history of volatile fluctuations in the floating exchange rates of its currency, is considered the safest haven from economic turmoil because of its perceived political stability and the size of its domestic economy. On the opposite end, Hong Kong, with its huge foreign exchange reserves, perennial budgetary surpluses and zero sovereign debt, has repeatedly seen its solidly-backed currency under relentless attack in a market artificially fixed by a peg to the US dollar. Hong Kong's currency board mechanism is itself an open admission of no confidence in its own currency. With a currency board mechanism, Hong Kong pledges to exchange HK dollars at a fixed rate to the U.S. dollar and holds 110% equivalent US dollars in reserve for each HK dollar in circulation. This currency peg requires local interest rates to track U.S. rates, plus a country risk premium which is determined in part by the market's view of the economic viability of the peg rate. The Hong Kong government also holds most of its surpluses in US dollar-denominated instruments. These arrangements represent a loud and clear declaration that the US dollar is a sounder currency than the Hong Kong dollar. One can expect such a discriminatory attitude from the former British colonial government, but one is at a loss to understand why a new Hong Kong SAR under Chinese sovereignty would feel the need to hang on to such a self-defacing political posture. Hong Kong should be reminded that the U.S. dollar, despite unjustified perceptions of its soundness, is only as solid as the true state of the U.S. economy at any given time. The U.S. economy at present looks good. This is due to a decade of ruthless restructuring that improved corporate competitiveness, particularly in the service sector. The globalization of the U.S. finance sector also contributed to the growth of the U.S. economy through the export of capital and inflation to the developing countries. Cross border sales and purchases of equity and bonds by American investors have risen from 9% of GDP in 1980 to 164% in 1996. But uncertainties loom large as the injurious impacts from the Asian crises, which are mere symptoms of a structurally flawed global financial architecture, begin to hit the U.S. economy. While the US dollar is currently strong, a downward correction is a high possibility within the next three years. While short-term fundamentals favor the US dollar, long term fundamentals are increasingly negative. U.S. trade and current account deficits are likely to each US$250-300 billion in 1998. Net debtor position of the U.S. will exceed US$1.5 trillion. Whenever foreign-held dollar reserves are sold, an equivalent of U.S. owned assets are liquidated immediately at market price. If the amount sold is large enough, it will cause a recession or even depression in the U.S., as in 1929-32, which the post-war Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was designed to prevent from occurring again. In 1995, after the Federal Reserve started to hike interest rates in 1994 and sharply curtailed its own purchase of Treasury bills, triggering the Mexico peso crisis and a subsequent U.S. slowdown, the Bank of Japan initiated a program to buy $100 billion of US treasuries. China bought $80 billion. Hong Kong and Singapore bought $22 billion each. Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines bought $30 billion. The Asian purchase totaled $260 billion from 1994 to 1997, the entire increase in foreign-held U.S. dollar reserves. These recycled dollars pushed up stock prices in America. A sharp correction of the stock market accompanied by an abrupt slowdown of the US economy is a matter of when and not if. Also, the new euro will pose a direct challenge to the US dollar as the preferred currency for international trade. The financial world is in the process of shifting from a dollar-centered system to a bipolar dollar-euro system. Just like the post-war corrections in U.S. markets in 1971-73, 1978-79, 1985-87, which critically stalled the U.S. economy because the contributing currency overvaluations were permitted to go too far and for too long, the next correction will have equally severe economic consequences. This means that just when the Asian economies are working themselves out from the damages of the current crises, the U.S. economy may stall and the US dollar may fall in value. Like all economies who peg the currency to the US dollar, Hong Kong will then be forced to suffer an untimely devaluation of its currency by virtue of its peg to the US dollar, causing HK dollar denominated assets to deflate in trade terms and an erosion of purchasing power. Thus Hong Kong, along with others who maintain a currency peg, by surrendering to the U.S. Federal Reserve Board its ability to independently move interest rates to macro-manage its economy, or to allow market forces to adjust its exchange rate as the global environment changes, will be incessantly trapped with an out of phase monetary regime with regard to its economic needs by virtue of its currency peg to the U.S. dollar. An overvalued currency is suicidal even for a rich country in times of economic contraction. Five years after the 1929 crash, Franklin D. Roosevelt was forced in 1934 to eased monetary policy through a 59% devaluation of the US dollar against gold. Conversely, an undervalued currency is injurious to the economy in times of recovery or expansion. During 14 years of currency peg, Hong Kong experienced significant asset inflation caused by negative local interest rates, as the U.S. dollar fell against other currencies through market forces, notably the Japanese Yen and the German Mark. But Hong Kong gained compensatory price competitiveness from such currency devaluations. As the U.S. dollar rose abruptly in the course of the Asian crises, Hong Kong?s bubble economy burst. Events have shown the argument that the peg to the US dollar produces currency stability for Hong Kong to be not valid in practice on a global basis. It is not valid even in theory, because the target of its peg, the US dollar, is a free-floating currency. Defending the peg has the effect of transferring wealth from the people of Hong Kong to the local borrowers of foreign currency loans. Abandoning the currency board mechanism is a separate issue from devaluation of the HK dollar. De-linking only means that the HKMA will become a true central bank, free to manage HK?s monetary policy to suit the needs of Hong Kong, by setting interest rates and liquidity independent of other government policies. Market conditions will then set the proper value of the HK dollar in response to the monetary policy and economic fundamentals of Hong Kong.
Taiwan and Singapore both devalued their currencies early in the currency turmoil in 1997, by approximately 18%. Timely devaluation gave both these governments more flexibility in dealing with the impact from the crises in the region. As a result, the economies of Taiwan and Singapore are less adversely impacted by contagion. China is impacted less directly and immediately because its economy is not open, but Chinese export will be adversely affected. Hong Kong, being open and liquid with a fixed currency peg, is experiencing the beginning of an inevitable meltdown that will continue until the peg is abandoned. China has orchestrated public pronouncements from high places in praise of Hong Kong's recent technical success in defending the peg during the early waves of assaults on the overvalued Hong Kong dollar. Such praise, though well intentioned, is premature. Such praise is based on misplaced national pride and questionable economic judgement. The peg, unjustifiable by its exorbitant economic cost, is an open admission of national financial insecurity. Chinese leaders should bear in mind that misplaced political postures that defy economic reality will only result in more otherwise avoidable economic damage to Hong Kong and eventually to China. Complacency and wishful thinking have no place at this critical time of serious danger. By nw, it is clear that the Asian financial crises are not mere passing storms or cyclical phases. They are the opening acts of a historic restructuring of the global economic system in which the stakes are very high. Economic globalization requires enlightened nationalism to keep it fair and just. As Lenin insightfully hypothesized, Western imperialism provided the escape valve that postponed the deterministic evolution of capitalism into socialism as predicted by Marx. The collapse of Western imperialism, brought about by the rise of nationalism, heralded the advent of a wave of socialist economies after World War II in newly independent former colonies and semi-colonial territories, without the historical prerequisite of having first gone through capitalism. The historical relationship between capitalism and socialism is that capitalism is efficient in creating wealth and socialism is necessary for sharing the wealth that capitalism creates in order for society to be more just and stable. As such, the ripe candidates for socialist systems are the industrialized nations that have already benefited from the productive efficiency of capitalism, not the poor countries that have been ravaged by a century of Western imperialism. There is no economic benefit in socializing poverty. Most reasonable thinkers now accept that capitalism and socialism are not concepts adverse to each other, but are complimentary approaches to keep society prosperous and just. Each nation, according to its historical conditions, must seek the proper mix of these approaches to fit its own developmental needs. Indiscriminate global imposition of Western market criteria is not workable or desirable. After the demise of political imperialism, capitalism manages to gain another new lease on life through the transformation of the newly setup socialist planned economies into capitalist market economies via the expansion of world trade. Some political economists view unbalanced and unregulated world trade as a new form of economic imperialism, benign in appearance, rationalized under the laws of modern economics that hold sacred the principle of maximizing return on capital and the operational dynamics of free markets that favors the strong and perpetually condemns the weak. These concepts give the West an inherently unfair advantage against the capital-starved and ill-equipped third world. The international division of labor as currently constituted in globalization has been driven by wage competition between countries with a race to the bottom effect. Countries also compete to reduce taxes, welfare benefits, environmental protection and trade regulations in the name of efficiency in a global market economy. Technology, lowering the cost of communication and managing complexity, now allows central control of highly decentralized operations worldwide. Trade and foreign investment have preempted economic development and aid as the main paths for undeveloped nations to modernize and to prosper.
Yet globalization of trade and finance has its critics in both developed and developing countries, but for different reasons. In theory, free international movement of capital through integrated financial markets in a global economy allows efficient allocation of funds towards investments of highest productivity. But truly free markets do not exist in the real world, and even if they do, they operate under narrowly single-dimensional rules and historical biases, all of which aim toward maximizing return on capital without due regard for local social, political or environmental consequences or individual national aspirations. Moreover, global financial market pressures tend to supplant the traditional roles local political leaders and government institutions play in formulating macroeconomic policies that safeguard individual national interests. Despite all the noise the United State makes about the benefits of world trade, US export of $564.7 billion (FOB) constitutes only 7.6% of its GDP of $7.6 trillion (1996) and US import of $771 billion (CIF) constitutes 10.1% of GDP. Export to all of Asia amounts to only 2.4% of its GDP of which Japan constitutes 1%. Thus the U.S. can sustain a strong bargaining position in setting the terms of trade on a take it or leave it basis. Excessive reliance on world trade may not be in a country?s best national interest, simply because national governments are forced to surrender their power to manage their economy to world market forces, or international trade institutions and agreements. It is an argument put forward not only by the developing nations, but also by isolationists in America, with sufficient public support to deprive President Clinton of his "fast track" authority to settle trade disputes. In contrast, Hong Kong export of $197.2 billion constitutes 121% of its GDP of $163.6 billion (1996), and HK import of $217 billion constitutes 130% of its GDP. It is obvious that a rupture in world trade will impact Hong Kong differently than the U.S. While Hong Kong has no viable alternative to total dependence on trade, it should bear in mind that it is now part of China, and that Hong Kong's national interest is part and partial of that of China where the issue of trade policy in relation to national independence has not been definitive resolved. When capital is mobile, governments are able to enjoy the benefits of fixed exchange rate stability only if they are willing to forego the empowerment of managing the economy through the setting of domestic interest rates and the supply and liquidity of money. This means when global capital flow into a country, local interest rate will fall, sometimes to negative rates, distorting the orderly development of the affected economy. For example, beginning in the mid-1980's, Hong Kong's currency board mechanism created persistent negative local interest rates, causing abnormal investment flows into the property sector, resulting in unrealistic price inflation that became a major problem in the current downturn. Conversely, when investors begin to pull out of a country or sell its currency, local interest will have to rise to counter the flow in order to maintain the exchange rate peg. This invariably weakens the banking and financial system, eventually causing bank failures and institutional bankruptcies. This happened to Hong Kong in October 1997, with disastrous long-term consequences that are yet to unfold fully. Hong Kong will be plagued by excessively high interest rates until the currency board mechanism is abandoned or until the US dollar falls. There will be no sustainable long-term economic recovery for Hong Kong until the HK Monetary Authority regains its power to set monetary policies. Pegging a currency's exchange rate to another currency does not automatically make an economy more stable. If domestic economic policies are inconsistent with the chosen exchange rate, a fixed rate can itself lead to instability. Small economies with less sophisticated financial markets face greater risk from opening to international capital. Sudden capital flight can create economic havoc, as in the European currencies crises of 1992-93, in Mexico in 1994 and in Thailand in July 1997. In the last quarter of 1997, institutional panic caused an abrupt drop of private capital flow, in excess of US$100 billion, to the five most affected countries: South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. South Korea alone saw its capital flow drop by US$50 billion as compared to 1996. It is projected that the region will experience a net outflow of US$9.4 billion in 1998, after a net outflow of capital of US$12.1 billion in 1997. And contagion effects can hit countries in an economic region and eventually the entire global system. As the economies of the lending nations contract, banks will withdraw urgently needed funds from other healthy economies where liquid markets still operate, thus forcing the healthy economies to collapse. This happened to the Hong Kong market in October 1997. It will happen again and again before recovery is in sight. The threat of Japanese banks retrieving capital from other countries, including the U.S., is very real. There are clear signs that Japan is entering a prolonged phase of serious deflation. When that happens, U.S. interest rates will skyrocket, sending Hong Kong rates beyond reach, foreclosing all hopes of a steady recovery. One way for a country to deal with currency risks is through sensible macroeconomic management by adopting sound monetary and fiscal policies. By maintaining the fixed peg of its currency to the US dollar through a currency board mechanism, Hong Kong, and other economies that maintain a peg, closes theirselves on this option of monetary autonomy. The second way is make sure banks are well regulated and capitalized. In this area, Hong Kong claims to have a well regulated banking system although the financial sector in Hong Kong consists of large numbers of non-deposit taking institutions that are only minimally regulated by the HKMA. The third way is to restrict the opening to international capital flow. As an international financial center, this is not a viable option for Hong Kong. Yet as part of China, Hong Kong has a responsibility to coordinate with China, its largest trading partner (36.3%), to effectuate a capital flow regime that best serve the national interest. For Hong Kong, as an autonomous part of China, serious open debates are needed to focus on the role Hong Kong should play, in close coordination with its sovereign motherland, in the coming historic restructuring of the global political economy that has been triggered by the regional financial crises in Asia. As a start, the undeniable fact that the currency peg is conceptually obsolete and functionally injurious must be faced squarely and immediately. No independent government should permanently set its policy for monetary stability by relying blindly on the currency of a distant land that has a fundamentally different socioeconomic and political system. American interest rates are set by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board to reflect the fluctuating needs of the American economy, and not for Hong Kong's benefit. The peg worked for Hong Kong in the last 14 years because British colonial Hong Kong was an outpost of the American sphere of influence during the Cold War, and as such, was part of the American economic system. That geopolitical context has changed since July 1, 1997. Hong Kong's leaders need to acknowledge this fundamental change in order to lead Hong Kong into a self-determining future in which the people of Hong Kong can prosper by controlling their own destiny and by casting their lot and keeping their faith with their brothers in the rest of Asia.
Henry C.K Liu
pms wrote:
> Please some questions to clarify my thoughts.
>
> 1) Do you think that one of the early forces driving the formation of EU
> was a serious discussion of the possibility of the current economic
> situatiion coming to pass.
>
> If so, it would probably be because left wing economists were never quite
> so marginilized, even when the conservatives were in power, no?
>
> And do you think that a broader segment of the population perhaps has an
> idea that capitalism is a man-made thing that effects their lives? And
> they read more things that are not crap?
>
> Do you think these things are true, maybe? Anti-communism is still rotting
> the country on a moral plane, and now we will be making a big payment for
> our blindness, perhaps?
>
> I might try my hand at writeing, you know, something. That maybe would be
> published, somewhere. So this is research. So please share your thoughts.
>
> Running late on the most gorgeous Thanksgiving day I can remember.
>
> smooches
> Paula
pms wrote:
> At 09:29 PM 12/29/98 -0500, you wrote:
> >Dear Doug and the LBOers,
> >
> >Anyone read Lester Thurow on the Euro in the January 11th edition of the
> >Nation. Anything tu-it.
> >
> >Your email pal,
> >Tom L.
> >
> >
>
> They also have an article by Thurow on Euro at http://www.commondreams.org/.
>
> Sounds right to me, maybe. I imagine some countries will be real happy not
> to have to rely on our money system. Not because it's not stable, but
> cause we piss them off. And was it here or in BW where I just read about
> the net outflow of money. So maybe it's not as stable as it used to be? I
> wish you econ guys would talk about this stuff.
>
> However I can't see countries rushing to keep their reserves in the Euro
> until it's been around awhile, but who knows, maybe they've been panting
> for the opportunity. Course, since US consumer demand is supposedly
> keeping the global economy afloat( which I'm not sure I buy )they might
> think twice. But the future possibilities for problems seems high. I mean
> if we've been top money-dog all this time, then a lot of the system must be
> set up to take advantage of that situation.
>
> Which brings me back to the question about oil. I was just thinking that
> the Big Cigars are faced with so many unfamiliar wild cards, they might be
> really worried about a further deterioration in oil prices and it's effect
> on Mexico, etc, .
>
> The domestic economy is being fueled by the consumer. The consumer is
> giddy with market profits. Earnings are already a problem, what will all
> these trading households do if there's more bad news from south of the
> border? It seems to me that a big market drop would be very dangerous at
> this time. Because consumption would come to a screeching halt. How many
> more people can refinance?
>
> Thurow mentioins possibility that int. rates would have to go up to compete
> with Euro, but aren't EU interest rates quite a bit lower than ours?
>
> As the IMF forcast concluded, it all depends on what US investors do when
> faced with increasingly perilous market conditions.
>
> *******************
>
> On that show I've mentioned, Sunday, PBS, Religion and Ethics, they had
> some lefty cleric talking about the fact that most ALL the churches, not
> just the Pope, would be calling for debt cancelation this year. That could
> get really interesting, no?
>
> **********************
> Just saw a cab-top ad for Camels: GO FOR THE TROPHY SMOKE with a picture of
> an old dude with sunglasses and a young blonde woman in a strapless gown.
> Wierd.
>
> ************************
> FREAKS
>
> Some earlier comments about the freaks on daytime talk shows got me ta
> thinking. For a long time now I've been telling people that these shows
> are put on so that the public will think the working class doesn't deserve
> a decent healthcare system.
>
> My friend Stella, who's interesting enough as it is, refused to go on Jerry
> Springer cause they wanted her to make stuff up. You'd think a gorgeous,
> clean and sober bi-sexual woman who works for the rights of sex workers and
> wears a dildo on stage fronting her lesbo band would be enough.
>
> Still I don't think these people are freaks, except maybe their ability to
> take it all on TV. It seems like it's the so-called respectable folks who
> are the real freaks. I thought that back in the "free-love" days, and I
> still do. I mean, I don't know anyone who's been into anything as sick as
> the Bill and Monica thing. Eating pizza and getting a blow job and sober
> at that. That's some cold shit.
>
> Man, I wish Roseanne Barr would get into some issues, besides suppporting
> Clinton. I want my Donahue.