The Marriage Tax: Going, going, gone . . .

[Max Sawicky]

> >    ....  With no penalty, more savings from
> >sharing accrue, so with no penalty there is
> >more incentive to marry somebody with higher
> >income.  Since men have higher incomes, they
> >will less often choose as a spouse  someone with
> >lower income.  There will be less income mixing
> >within marriage, less class mobility in society.
> >I think that's bad, though clearly marriage
> >should not be considered the only avenue of
> >upward income mobility for women.
> 
> I find this unconvincing.  First, it is true that marriages are based
> somewhat on income similarities, but I think this is due to social
> circles generally being so shaped, not on calculations that might
> drive people to search outside these circles.  Since the tax change is
> not affecting the class makeup of social circles, I don't see any
> reason for less income mixing within marriage.


> 
> Second, even if your calculus of marital choice were correct, it
> doesn't seem to me that the income changes from the tax changes would
> be either very great or terribly salient to people considering
> marriage; I would like to see the salience of partner's income
> compared to other characteristics, and more importantly the salience
> of tax laws as they affect choice.

I fully agree that the behavioral effects may
be weak or non-existent.  I'm more interested
in whether or not the tax structure itself
is gender-biased in a way that is vulnerable
to criticisms of unfairness.  That tends to be
the issue that dominates public debate.  I'm happy
to let empirical researchers argue about the other
stuff.

Max