Gates and Monopolies

Richard Marens parvus at u.washington.edu
Thu May 21 10:42:22 PDT 1998


On Thu, 21 May 1998, Doug Henwood wrote:


> Richard Marens wrote:
>
> >Incidentally Doug, is that why you don't like Korten? Because he makes
> >populist attacks MNCs rather then dealing with the ruling class behind
> >them, a class that given modern portfolio theory, could live quite well
> >sucking rents from hundreds of formally distinct medium-sized
> >corporations?
>
> For many reasons, which are detailed at
> <http://www.panix.com/~dhenwood/Globalization.html>. Some of which: his
> opposition to "globalization," as if it were new, and as if
> internationalism itself were evil. For his paeans to the beauty of the
> Smithian free market, a lovely virgin that "corporations" have deflowered.
> For his simple-minded, essentially petit bourgeois attack on "the
> corporation," without any attention paid to the class processes behind it,
> or the geniune advantages gained by organizing production on a large scale.
> Because of his idiotic idea that all we need is a revolution in
> consciousness, and that, under the proper enlightening influences, the big
> bourgeoisie will do the right thing. Not that he'd ever use the phrase "big
> bourgeoisie," because he proudly says he's never read Marx. It shows.
>
> Doug

Just asking. I've never read him myself, but I developed a soft-spot in my heart for him since he delivered a speech (that I didn't actually hear) that pissed people off at the last Academy of Management Meeting. An enemy of my enemy etc...

Does anyone know the work of William Lazonick? He started his career in places like the RRPE and more recently champions something you might call "neo-managerialism", the idea that big stable corporations with silent shareholders were actually less socially destructive (he would put it in a more positive light) then the present corporate regime that operates under so-called shareholder rights. In other words, CEOs as generals leading an army of white collar employees and in a relative truce relationship with the blue collar, did less damage than top management as "agents" of shareholders (being shareholders themselves). Admittedly, this is largely descriptive and ignores the underlying macro-constraints.



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