I don't think that the view that there are many Marxist theories of crisis stands up. There is one Marxist theory of capital accumulation which argues that Capital, in its tendency to displace living labour relative to dead, undermines the basis of its own reproduction. In the first volume of Capital Marx looks at this process from the standpoint of the social crisis, with the accumulation of wealth and poverty at two opposite poles. In the third volume Marx shows how the same process of the displacement of living labour by dead as a proportion of the capital advanced undermines the ratio of surplus value to capital (rate of profit). In the second volume, Marx shows how the *realisation* of surplus value is possible on the basis of an expanded reproduction. In other words, vulme two argues that the origin of crisis is not to be found in the realm of exchange.
Beyond Capital, Marx was always careful to argue that the particulars of any given economic crisis ought to be explained in their own terms, ie that empirical investigation should not yield to a dogmatic theory.
As far as the specifics, I think the Brenner-Henwood debate is confused. At the moment it seems to revolve around positive or negative interpretations of the performance of the US economy. On that score neither is wholly right.
Brenner is right to say that the economy suffered a dramatic slowdown in the seventies, and that period still shapes the present. The periodised distinction between the long post-war boom and the period 1970 to today is convincing. Brenner's explanation for the slump though, is wrong. The slump was indeed a classical crisis of profitability, as Marx theorised it (and Brenner rejects).
Brenner is wrong, though, to insist that the slump is one continuous decay. Even in Britain (which is in a much worse state than the US) the slump was punctuated by periods of growth, in the late eighties, and again in the mid-nineties. In the US it would appear that the slumps of the early eighties and the early nineties were punctuated by real growth.
In particular the upturn from the mid-nineties seems to coincide with a substantial remaking of the US working class. Generational turnover has been high, with older workers effectively pushed out of the workforce altogether in the early nineties. Immigration was at its highest point since the turn of the century. Women are a much greater part of the workforce, approaching half of those employed. All of these changes suggest that the subjective source of capital accumulation has been radically transformed, and, presumably, the conditions of its exploitation have been similarly changed.
In general I support with Doug's reluctance to embrace catastrophist interpretations of the economy. But I wouldn't go so far as to say that the economy is booming. A lot of what passes for signs of growth, like the booming stock exchanges, have proved to be insubstantial, and in fact represent a failure of productive accumulation, rather than a positive sign. In Britain, the govt.'s promotion of 'Cultural Britain' makes a virtue out of what are in fact decadent trends in the economy, principally the booming luxury goods sector.
The flaw in Robert Brenner's article to me is that it's theory of crisis is un-nuanced. If overproduction leads to crisis then crisis would be continuous and uninterrupted. But that has not been the case.
I am not convinced that we are any closer to an empirical understanding of the contemporary state of the economy, nor am I convinced that the respective corners of 'pessimism' and 'optimism' will lead to a result.
Rather, we ought to be looking at how the ruling class has managed the crisis from the 1970s onwards. The role of international cooperation between national ruling classes seems to be the one major factor that prevented 1970 from turning into 1930. How, and at what cost, has the ruling class contained the slump is the question for me.
-- Jim heartfield