[...]
>The problem with this discussion is that it operates
>according to a liberal conception of rights in which
>individuals are bearers of rights that somehow exist
>prior to and independent of society. This is what
>Schaap meant when he argued for a notion of rights
>that recognizes that rights are inextricably
>intertwined with responsibilities. Once you operate
>w/ the rights/responsibilities model, then it is much
>easier to see how a mother's rights trump those of the
>unborn child: the unborn child is not yet a member of
>society and thus has no rights.
But why shouldn't this argument apply to, say, slaves in a society recognizing slavery? Slaves are not members of society and thus have no rights. Or women in a patriarchal society, for that matter: a productive man's rights trump those of a humble housewife, yes?
Enzo