Here are some points I would think we could agree on, though we probably won't:
1. Obviously the prime actors, partly over-lapping, are NATO and the EU, with the U.S. clearly the preeminent actor in NATO. Their joint interest in Europe is stability, which means among other things dampening separatist insurgencies. Such insurgencies engender violence, atrocities and refugees, all of which belie the image of the EU as an evolving, civilized single market, and of NATO as a guarantor of peace and security.
2. NATO does not need to stoke nationalism in the Balkans. Nationalism is a fact. Yugoslavia is already rent asunder, perhaps in part due to NATO/IMF machinations. There is no conceivable profit in creating another little piece. There is no military significance to an enclave like Kosova, in light of the proximity of other EU and NATO countries. Why would NATO need to "move east," when it already includes Greece and Turkey? Likewise, the economic significance of a mining complex to world capitalism is trivial. Why shake up a whole region, just to seize an economic asset? Who in the world is so powerful as to propel NATO to shake up the region for the sake of making a gift of this bonbon (the mine)? If anything, the mine explains Milo's behavior better than NATO's.
3. Although the old Yugoslavia economy was interesting from a socialist standpoint, as far as foreign policy goes Tito was a NATO client. Milo is just a hump who makes Tito look like Lenin. He's simply a successor client who has gotten out of hand by butchering people and driving them from their homes en masse, destabilizing the region. The debate among elites about whether to classify him as a war criminal is a debate about whether to permanently cashier him from client-status, in favor of some successor personality in Serbia.
4. The bombing of Yugoslavia does not contradict the client status at all. Noriega was a U.S. client, and now his ass is in a Florida pokey. Saddam was a client at one point (got U.S. support against Iran), until he attacked another U.S. client. Even so, Bush could have destroyed Saddam's regime utterly but declined to do so. Until Milo is declared persona never grata -- e.g., accused of being a war criminal -- he's still got a chance to get back in the good graces of NATO. As many have mentioned, the bombing solidifies Milo's grip on his country, but it also exerts pressure -- ineffectual, thus far -- to change his policy of butchering and deporting Muslims. At the same time, the failure to put in ground troops, or the talk of a UN protectorate, assures Milo et al. that in the end Kosova will stay a part of Serbia.
5. NATO never supported self-determination for Kosova, and still doesn't. That's why they let Milo prosecute his counter-insurgency up to a point. That's why there were no provisions for NATO ground troops. That's why they don't want Pakistani troops, notwithstanding it is a U.S. client too, helping Kosova. They don't want an independent Muslim political formation to develop out of their control.
6. Because NATO has not supported an independent Kosova, it has not supported the KLA as a legitimate political force. That explains the racist propaganda from mainstream media linking the KLA with drug-running and an "international Albanian Mafia." It would also explain a motive for exaggerating tales of Muslim atrocities against Serbs. (I do not doubt such atrocities have taken place.) The moral of the story is, all these people hate each other so much, they need the UN to step in and run things indefinitely, ergo no self-determination for Kosova, nor perhaps for Serbia.
7. Why might US/UK special forces units be supporting and working with the KLA? First to liquidate the Serbian death squads inside Kosova who are embarrassing NATO and the EU; this also hurts Milo's most rabid Serbian political competitors to his right. Second, to get enough information on the KLA to liquidate it, when it has outlived its usefulness. ("Hold your friends close, your enemies closer.")
8. What's the right demand for the left? Support self-determination for Kosova. This is not helped by bombing Serbian civilians, as many have acknowledged. It would be helped by military and diplomatic action that caused Serbian paramilitary and military to withdraw from Kosova. The NATO alternative of bombing Serbian civilians won't help Kosova. In general, NATO can be expected to be of only limited help for Kosova. I'd say the task for the left is not dissimilar to how it might support any liberation struggle. The difference this time is that the U.S. and EU are not directly and overtly aligned against the struggle, but for assorted non-humanitarian reasons may do things to advance it. But it's still a liberation struggle. JD noted it is not founded on a class-based rift, and I rashly agreed. It is founded of course on something much more fundamental -- the right of a people to survive. One can hardly expect class politics to develop in such a context.
9. Why not simply say, stop bombing? Because that leaves the Muslims hanging out to dry. Better to focus on doing something -- using military force to protect Muslims inside Kosova -- rather than on not doing something. Though not bombing Serbian civilians follows from protecting Muslims.
10. What do you say to Muslims as to their proper path? Pledge allegiance to a democratic, secular Serbia? Where is that place? Support Serbia's demand for an end to bombing? How does that help them? Will Milo then be shamed into refraining from brutality? Why deprives Muslims of the right to fight for their independence, other than the misfortune to have as their enemy a ruler who aggravates the U.S. and EU?
mbs