-----Original Message----- From: J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. <rosserjb at jmu.edu> To: pen-l at galaxy.csuchico.edu <pen-l at galaxy.csuchico.edu> Date: Tuesday, April 13, 1999 1:43 PM Subject: [PEN-L:5230] Re: What's My Line
>Max,
> I think that you have gone overboard here on
>your Muslim trip. I guess it was going to that demo
>in Lafayette Square that put you over the deep end.
> If you want to support Albanian Kosovar nationalism,
>then get it right. Only about 70% of the ethnic Albanians
>are Muslim. About 20% are Orthodox and another 10%
>are Roman Catholic (plus, as His Excellency has noted,
>there are Muslim Serbs, the Goranci). One of the buildings
>torched by the MUP in Pec was the Albanian Catholic
>cathedral. Hmmm. What is to be the position of all
>these non-Muslim Albanian Kosovars in your Muslim republic?
> So, I would suggest that you think a bit more carefully
>about what you support. As the old curse goes, you might
>get what you ask for....
>Barkley Rosser
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Max Sawicky <sawicky at epinet.org>
>To: Pen-L <pen-l at galaxy.csuchico.edu>; Lbo-Talk <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com>
>Date: Monday, April 12, 1999 9:48 PM
>Subject: [PEN-L:5188] What's My Line
>
>
>>Pacifism or revolutionary defeatism, while plausible doctrines in their
own
>>right, ill-serve the folks taking the very worst from aggressors. In this
>>case those are the Kosovars. These doctrines ill-served the diverse
>victims
>>of the Holocaust, though in the 1940's the practitioners of pacifism and
>>rev-def were at considerable personal risk, hence heroic. By contrast,
>>general cynicism makes anti-imperialism easy today.
>>
>>Here are some points I would think we could agree on, though we probably
>>won't:
>>
>>1. Obviously the prime actors, partly over-lapping, are NATO and the EU,
>>with the U.S. clearly the preeminent actor in NATO. Their joint interest
>in
>>Europe is stability, which means among other things dampening separatist
>>insurgencies. Such insurgencies engender violence, atrocities and
>refugees,
>>all of which belie the image of the EU as an evolving, civilized single
>>market, and of NATO as a guarantor of peace and security.
>>
>>2. NATO does not need to stoke nationalism in the Balkans. Nationalism
is
>>a fact. Yugoslavia is already rent asunder, perhaps in part due to
>NATO/IMF
>>machinations. There is no conceivable profit in creating another little
>>piece. There is no military significance to an enclave like Kosova, in
>>light of the proximity of other EU and NATO countries. Why would NATO
need
>>to "move east," when it already includes Greece and Turkey? Likewise, the
>>economic significance of a mining complex to world capitalism is trivial.
>>Why shake up a whole region, just to seize an economic asset? Who in the
>>world is so powerful as to propel NATO to shake up the region for the sake
>>of making a gift of this bonbon (the mine)? If anything, the mine
explains
>>Milo's behavior better than NATO's.
>>
>>3. Although the old Yugoslavia economy was interesting from a socialist
>>standpoint, as far as foreign policy goes Tito was a NATO client. Milo is
>>just a hump who makes Tito look like Lenin. He's simply a successor
client
>>who has gotten out of hand by butchering people and driving them from
their
>>homes en masse, destabilizing the region. The debate among elites about
>>whether to classify him as a war criminal is a debate about whether to
>>permanently cashier him from client-status, in favor of some successor
>>personality in Serbia.
>>
>>4. The bombing of Yugoslavia does not contradict the client status at
all.
>>Noriega was a U.S. client, and now his ass is in a Florida pokey. Saddam
>>was a client at one point (got U.S. support against Iran), until he
>attacked
>>another U.S. client. Even so, Bush could have destroyed Saddam's regime
>>utterly but declined to do so. Until Milo is declared persona never
>>grata -- e.g., accused of being a war criminal -- he's still got a chance
>to
>>get back in the good graces of NATO. As many have mentioned, the bombing
>>solidifies Milo's grip on his country, but it also exerts pressure --
>>ineffectual, thus far -- to change his policy of butchering and deporting
>>Muslims. At the same time, the failure to put in ground troops, or the
>talk
>>of a UN protectorate, assures Milo et al. that in the end Kosova will stay
>a
>>part of Serbia.
>>
>>5. NATO never supported self-determination for Kosova, and still doesn't.
>>That's why they let Milo prosecute his counter-insurgency up to a point.
>>That's why there were no provisions for NATO ground troops. That's why
>they
>>don't want Pakistani troops, notwithstanding it is a U.S. client too,
>>helping Kosova. They don't want an independent Muslim political formation
>>to develop out of their control.
>>
>>6. Because NATO has not supported an independent Kosova, it has not
>>supported the KLA as a legitimate political force. That explains the
>racist
>>propaganda from mainstream media linking the KLA with drug-running and an
>>"international Albanian Mafia." It would also explain a motive for
>>exaggerating tales of Muslim atrocities against Serbs. (I do not doubt
>such
>>atrocities have taken place.) The moral of the story is, all these people
>>hate each other so much, they need the UN to step in and run things
>>indefinitely, ergo no self-determination for Kosova, nor perhaps for
>Serbia.
>>
>>7. Why might US/UK special forces units be supporting and working with
the
>>KLA? First to liquidate the Serbian death squads inside Kosova who are
>>embarrassing NATO and the EU; this also hurts Milo's most rabid Serbian
>>political competitors to his right. Second, to get enough information on
>>the KLA to liquidate it, when it has outlived its usefulness. ("Hold your
>>friends close, your enemies closer.")
>>
>>8. What's the right demand for the left? Support self-determination for
>>Kosova. This is not helped by bombing Serbian civilians, as many have
>>acknowledged. It would be helped by military and diplomatic action that
>>caused Serbian paramilitary and military to withdraw from Kosova. The
NATO
>>alternative of bombing Serbian civilians won't help Kosova. In general,
>>NATO can be expected to be of only limited help for Kosova. I'd say the
>>task for the left is not dissimilar to how it might support any liberation
>>struggle. The difference this time is that the U.S. and EU are not
>directly
>>and overtly aligned against the struggle, but for assorted
non-humanitarian
>>reasons may do things to advance it. But it's still a liberation
struggle.
>>JD noted it is not founded on a class-based rift, and I rashly agreed. It
>>is founded of course on something much more fundamental -- the right of a
>>people to survive. One can hardly expect class politics to develop in
such
>>a context.
>>
>>9. Why not simply say, stop bombing? Because that leaves the Muslims
>>hanging out to dry. Better to focus on doing something -- using military
>>force to protect Muslims inside Kosova -- rather than on not doing
>>something. Though not bombing Serbian civilians follows from protecting
>>Muslims.
>>
>>10. What do you say to Muslims as to their proper path? Pledge
allegiance
>>to a democratic, secular Serbia? Where is that place? Support Serbia's
>>demand for an end to bombing? How does that help them? Will Milo then be
>>shamed into refraining from brutality? Why deprives Muslims of the right
>to
>>fight for their independence, other than the misfortune to have as their
>>enemy a ruler who aggravates the U.S. and EU?
>>
>>mbs
>>
>>
>
>