I found this extended Stratfor analysis very interesting. I would love to hear what our resident war games experts have to say about it. Also what they might have to say about Stratfor -- who they are and what they're worth, etc. Their main fault seems to be their authentically bureaucratic prose. That and that even their testimonials are anonymous.
This is part III of a three part analysis. Part I can be skipped and Part II, about the strategy of both sides, can be summed up in two paragraphs. NATO strategy, like US strategy, prides itself on great high tech weapons and intelligence of where everything is located. It is also very casualty adverse. We like unpopulated open spaces where we can obliterate the massed foe. We hate places where we can't see or shoot very far. Urban centers are therefore our bete noire. Moutainous terrain isn't our favorite.
The Serbs have had the same strategic plan since the 1940's. Assume the invader is coming from Hungary to Belgrade, and assume he has overwhelmingly superior force. Stall him as long as possible with armor while the infantry retreats to the mountainous center of the country. Then fight a harrassing war from there until the international situation is more favorable in a few years time. Their plan assumes they will lose the armor and Belgrade and most of the country. All they want is that it should take as long as possible, and ditto for the war as a whole.
[For the full report of Parts I and II, see http://www.strafor.com/ crisis/kosovo/special36.htm]
The Strafor conclusions: the way things stand now, we could take part of Kosovo, but we couldn't take all of it -- or rather, it would be safer and easier to take all of Yugoslavia -- and then to take Kosovo -- than to occupy all of Kosovo without taking Yugoslavia. And taking Yugoslavia under current political conditions presents logistical problems that aid the Serb strategy of extending the war and make it a bad idea militarily.
Analysis of Ground Warfare Option - Part III
14 Apr 99 - 1727 GMT
Case 1: NATO Stages a Limited Ground Attack into Kosovo-The Battle of
Pagarusa
Circumstances:
Unable or unwilling to mount a full-scale invasion of Kosovo or
Yugoslavia or unable to wait until a sufficient build-up is in place,
NATO decides to mount a limited attack into a region of Kosovo. The
mission has two goals. The first is to inflict a punishing blow
against the Serbian forces, demonstrating NATO's ability and
willingness to wage effective war on the ground against Serbia. The
second is to secure a portion of Kosovo to create a safe haven for
returning refugees, either as an international protectorate or as an
independent Kosovo Albanian republic. Such a republic would also serve
as a rallying point for Albanians to keep them in the region rather
than migrating to Western Europe, and threaten Serbia with loss of
sovereignty.
Geography:
There are currently NATO forces in Macedonia and Albania. The
definition of Case 1 is its limited nature. It must be a direct
cross-border movement into terrain that is vulnerable to seizure and
yet is later defensible. Macedonia has made it clear, thus far that it
is unwilling to use its territory for attacks on Serbia. Moreover,
Greece has asserted that NATO may not use the port of Thessaloniki to
support a ground attack on Serbia. Given these constraints and the
limited nature of Case 1, the only practical
attack is into Kosovo from Albania. Part of this operation might be an
attack on Montenegro, but that would again expand the operation beyond
its constraints. A critical issue is how to build up an attack force
in Albania, which has no significant port facilities. In a sense, this
is the major limiting factor on any attack from Albania. Getting
forces in and supporting them in offensive operations will stress
Albanian infrastructure tremendously, thereby limiting the offensive
force structure.
Terrain:
The Kosovo-Albanian border is about 60 miles long. It is extremely
rugged terrain, with steep hills and mountains running the entire
length. The entire frontier, on both sides, is covered with mountains
in excess of 6,000 feet. There are, therefore, no major roads
traversing the mountains along the northern half of the frontier. The
south is somewhat less mountainous and more developed and has two
major roads.
The major road runs from Shkodara in Albania to Prizjen in Kosovo. The
road runs along the Drini I Bardhe's valley, crossing the frontier at
Vrbnica. The road runs between two low ridges to the town of Prinzren
and from there, along the southeastern portion of the Pagarusa Valley.
A second road splits off the first at Kukesi, crosses a bridge over
the Liq I Fierzes, then passes through extremely mountainous terrain,
crossing the frontier near the Kosovo town of Zub. Another arm of this
road runs from Baram Curri to Zogaj, but crossing the border at the
same point as the Kukesi-Zub Road. This crossing leads to the town of
Dakovica at the northern end of the Pagarusa Valley. In short, there
is one mountain road crossing the border and one valley road. Other
than that there are only mountain trails. The roads are a little over
ten miles apart. These two roads are the only ground attack options
from Albania into Kosovo.
This means that the only practical, limited ground attack option under
Case 1 is an assault on the Pagarusa Valley. The valley runs parallel
to the border, about eight miles along both roads. It then curves
northeastward. Inside of Kosovo, a road runs along the base of the
hills along the valley's southern edge, rising into the hills north of
Dakovica. That road runs southeast to Prinzen. The valley is ringed on
all sides by steep ridges and hills, but there are numerous good roads
running north into Kosovo from the valley.
Operations:
We recorded the latest Serbian deployment of any reliability about
April 13th. The valley contained the 549th Motorized Brigade and the
52nd Light Air Defense Artillery-Rocket Regiment. Obviously this order
of battle has shifted of late both because of reinforcements and
because of intense NATO air attacks in the region. It is interesting
to note that the alleged Serbian attack on Kremica on 13 April did not
take advantage of either road, but passed through rugged mountain
terrain.
This is will be an essential characteristic of Case 1. NATO forces
will be heavily road dependent because of the inherent characteristic
of their operations. Serb forces deliberately demonstrated that they
are not. This will pose a critical dilemma to NATO forces at all
stages of the operation. Clearly, NATO is currently engaged in air
operations in this region that is designed to open a Case 1 ground
attack option. However, as the Kremica engagement shows, the ability
of NATO to destroy armor and artillery using air strikes and Apache
helicopters does not completely close off Serbian operational
possibilities, so long as light infantry remains intact.
The prerequisite to taking the valley will be the seizure of the
mountains on the northwest and southeast side of the valley. Running
from Zvegan to the border, with Pec at the base, the Prokletije and
Mokra Gora ridges run over 8,000 feet in places. In the southeast, the
ridges run over 6,000 feet. Light infantry forces armed with mortars,
and infantry packed rockets will be in a position to fire into the
valley below. An M74 120-mm mortar is designed as a mountain weapon,
capable of being towed on a two-wheeled cart. With rocket assist
propulsion (RAP) projectiles, it has a range of about six miles,
bringing most of the valley into easy range. Even the Serb's M69B
81-mm mortar has a range of three miles. Therefore, the valley cannot
be taken and held unless the ridges are cleared.
Obviously, this is not a mission for a mechanized force. Nor is it
something that can be achieved using air power alone. Indeed, close
air support on this terrain is both difficult and dangerous, as man
portable anti-air systems are widely available among Serb infantry
units. NATO cannot get involved in a light infantry vs. light infantry
battle in which it loses all advantage to the defender fully familiar
with his terrain. This is NATO's main dilemma and one that is not
clearly or easily soluble except for introducing a large, mixed forced
able to carry out multiple missions simultaneously, thereby disrupting
and overwhelming resistance.
Without getting into force mix or sequencing, this option obviously
means an extended build-up. The problem is that NATO, even in the
limited Pagarusa operation, faces four missions:
1. Defending Albania from incursion by Serb infantry at points other
than NATO's attack points. This is also necessary as a defense of
lines of supply.
2. Seizing the ridges around the Pagarusa valley.
3. Seizing the valley floor.
4. Holding the Pagarusa against ongoing Serb infantry and artillery
harassment.
Given the size of the valley, the multiplicity of missions, and the
mix of forces required it is obvious that this mission requires a
multi-divisional force to implement. Given that it has taken two weeks
to transship 24 Apache helicopters to Albania, it would appear that
Albania's infrastructure, if it could support multi-divisional forces
at all, would require a build-up period of at least two months for the
shipment of manpower, equipment, and above all, supplies, ranging from
petroleum to food. This logistics operation would run concurrently
with refugee operations.
Case 2: NATO Invades Kosovo
Circumstances:
Deciding to enforce the Rambouillet Accords unilaterally and
simultaneously return the Albanian refugees to their homes, NATO
decides to invade and seize the Province of Kosovo, defend it from
Serb counterattack and make it either an independent republic or a
province of Albania.
Geography:
Kosovo is surrounded by three countries: Albania, Macedonia and
Yugoslavia. Both Montenegro and Serbia border Kosovo. A direct attack
from Albania alone is extremely difficult to contemplate. Expanding
the conquest of the Pagarusa Valley into a general attack creates a
logistical dependency on two roads that are vulnerable to harassment
and intermittent interdiction by Serbian Special Forces and artillery
fire. Moreover, it is not clear that the two roads have sufficient
capacity to maintain lines of supply for extended offensive combat by
multi-divisional NATO forces operating at substantial distance from
base. Finally, Albania lacks the port facilities needed to stage a
substantial invasion of Kosovo.
Indeed, the key problem of any invasion of Kosovo is logistical.
Albania is separated from both Bosnia and Croatia by the Montenegran
republic of Yugoslavia. That means that land transport by rail or road
into Albania is impossible without the prior conquest of Montenegro or
the expulsion of the Yugoslav Second Army from Montenegro by internal
unrest. We regard that outcome as extremely unlikely. Thus, it is
impossible to move European-based NATO forces into position to attack
Kosovo by land. This makes the Italian ports useless for a Kosovo
invasion. The only alternative is access to the Greek port of
Thessaloniki. The Greek government, however, has made it clear that it
will not permit the use of Thessaloniki in support of a ground war
against Serbia.
An additional consideration is the matter of Macedonia. An attack from
Albania alone is unlikely to succeed. An attack supported from
Macedonia has a better chance of success by permitting two fronts.
However, the Macedonian government is adamantly opposed to the use of
its soil for mounting an invasion of Kosovo, particularly one which
might leave the Serb government intact and looking for revenge. The
Macedonians are caught between Serbia and Greece, neither of which
would look kindly on Macedonian participation in an invasion of
Kosovo.
Finally, even an attack from both Albania and Macedonia suffers from
the same core defect: too few roads through extremely bad terrain from
which to support a multidivisional force in offensive, potentially
high intensity conflict. In order to invade Kosovo, it is essential
that NATO first seize Montenegro. From Montenegro, an attack east into
Kosovo along a more robust road system is possible. That would allow a
three-pronged attack into Kosovo that might succeed.
However, we have already violated the principle of Case 2, by positing
a prior expansion of the war to Montenegro. Having seized Montenegro,
an overland route to Albania and Macedonia would exist. But that would
mean first a build-up in Croatia and Bosnia for an invasion of
Montenegro; the successful defeat of the Second Army; repair of
wrecked transport facilities; a build-up in Albania and possibly
Macedonia; and finally the invasion of Kosovo.
In all of these senses, we regard Case 2 as impractical.
* Case 2 presupposes a prior attack on Montenegro which violates the
logic of the case in the first place and massively complicates the
problem.
* There are no available port facilities for building up a
multidivisional force in Albania.
* An attack from Albania cannot be sustained logistically.
* Macedonia is unwilling to permit an attack from its soil and its
own cross- border road system is limited.
* There are no port facilities available for sustaining ground
combat from Macedonia unless the Greeks reverse their position.
Conclusion:
Geography makes an invasion of Kosovo impossible without an invasion
of Montenegro. That would mean that NATO would be engaged with both
the Serb Second and Third Armies. Under that circumstance, Case 2
would have become a general war with Yugoslavia rather than a limited
conflict on the order of the conquest of the Kuwaiti salient. Thus,
Case 2 forces us to consider Case 3, a general invasion of Yugoslavia.
Case 3: The Invasion of Yugoslavia
Circumstance:
NATO has determined that it must invade and occupy Yugoslavia. One
motivation might be that it is impossible to seize all of Kosovo
without engaging the entire Yugoslav Army. Another motivation might be
the sense that without the overthrow of the Milosevic government,
NATO's goals cannot be achieved. Therefore, NATO orders the invasion
and occupation of Serbia.
Geography:
Serbia can be attacked from all directions. On the surface, this would
appear to put it in a hopeless position. However, the situation is
more complex than it appears.
Five potential invasion routes exist:
1. From Hungary into Vojvodina toward the Danube
2. From Croatia and Bosnia east toward Belgrade through the Danube
and Sava Valleys.
3. Romania west through the Danube valley toward Belgrade
4. Albania-Macedonia north into Kosovo
5. Bulgaria toward Bor and Nis
It is important to note that even a simultaneous attack on all these
fronts, should it be mounted, would not undermine the core Serb
strategy. The area south of Belgrade, west of the Marava river, north
of Kosovo and east of Montenegro, around the towns of Kragujevac and
Krajlevo, is the redoubt in which Serbian resistance will form, even
assuming that Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina are lost. There is no
rapid entry into that region.
But there are deeper issues.
* The main line of attack would come from Hungary. However, Hungary
has no contiguous border with any other NATO country. A buildup in
Hungary would have to pass through either Austria or Slovakia.
Austria has historically avoided NATO issues and is terrified of
refugees. An invasion from Hungary would generate hundreds of
thousands or millions of Serb refugees who would pour into Hungary
and Romania. They would inevitably find their way to Vienna. Since
refugees are one of the hottest issues in Austrian politics,
Austria will not support any action that would generate more.
Slovakia remains interested in entering NATO. It is also a Slavic
country with factions that have close ties to Russia. Tremendous
Russian pressure would come to bear on Slovakia. We are not
convinced that a buildup in Hungary is possible.
* An alternative route of supplies for Hungary, and supporting
Bosnia and Croatia as well, would be Slovenia. However, Slovenia
has no ports. This would require the use of Italian ports. The
Italians are deeply uneasy about the air war. A ground war based
on Italian logistics could bring down the government. Moreover,
while the U.S. already maintains substantial forces in Tuzla in
Bosnia, that infrastructure is already strained and would have to
be reinforced dramatically before further forces are introduced.
The situation is even worse in Croatia.
* A buildup in Albania for a limited operation in Kosovo is
possible. However, the terrain and port facilities are such that
major additional logistical forces would have to be introduced and
these would compete with refugee support.
* Macedonia has declared that it would not permit its territory to
be used against Serbia. Moreover, it would be impossible to
conduct a major buildup in Macedonia without Greek permission to
use the port of Thessaloniki. The Greeks have indicated that they
would not permit this.
* If building up forces in Hungary is complex, introducing forces
into Romania and Bulgaria would be logistically, politically and
diplomatically nightmarish.
Operational Geography and Terrain: A thrust south from Hungary would
be designed to reach and breach the Danube river, capture Belgrade and
Novi Sad, and permit the rapid penetration of the interior by NATO
forces. The direct route is down the Tisa river valley, with the
eastern bank the most natural line of attack. There are several
problems with an attack down the east bank of the Tisa. First, the gap
between the river and the Romanian border at the Hungarian-Serbian
frontier is barely more than ten miles wide. Unless the Romanians gave
permission for NATO forces to enter their territory, the possibility
of being delayed at the border by minefields and Serb armor and
anti-tank infantry would be substantial. Moreover, as one proceeds
down the Tisa river on the east bank, the ground becomes marshy and
poses problems for Infantry Fighting Vehicles. Finally, the town of
Zrenjanin is strategically located on several roads and must be taken
to approach Belgrade from that direction.
The approach down the western bank is more promising, with flat land,
excellent roads and multiple approaches from the Tisa to the town of
Sombor. Moreover, the attack can be supported out of Vukovar in
Croatia. Such an attack will certainly annihilate Serb forces north of
the Danube. The problem is that the Danube river would not be
breached. The Danube, between the town of Novi Sad and the Croatian
border poses a particular problem. Apart from being a formidable
barrier in its own right, the southern bank of the Danube is elevated
and, at certain points, consists of cliffs. Thus, the defenders on the
south side of the Danube hold the high ground and can pour fire down
on bridging forces.
Morever, a general advance to the Danube would have to wheel east to
take the town of Novi Sad and then, if it intended to approach
Belgrade, would have to cross the Tisa river. Thus, A relatively small
Serb force between the Tisa and the Romanian border could both prevent
an attack on the east bank and then move into position as a blocking
force for cross-Tisa operations.
A solution might be an attack out of Croatia between the Danube and
Sava rivers, designed to take the Danubian heights from the rear. The
problem is that the terrain of such an advance passes through low
hills with limited roads. The advance could not keep up with the speed
of the armored thrust to the Danube. It would be an infantry force
completely out of synch with the armor.
All of this, of course brings us to the core question: Belgrade.
Belgrade is located at the confluence of the Sava and the Danube. It
is densely populated with extensive construction and substantial
suburbs. Worse, it rests on hills on the southern side of the Danube.
Attacking it directly is an impossibility. It poses the classic
problem of urban warfare to a mobile force. It is to be avoided at all
costs. But Belgrade cannot be avoided. Access to the road systems into
southern Serbia require that Belgrade be at least placed under siege
if not attacked directly.
There are two models for taking Belgrade. One is the Berlin model.
There, Soviet forces with complete air superiority, superbly trained
infantry and armor, massed artillery, attacked a city defended by
untrained and poorly armed youngsters and old men. The Soviet Army
took 300,000 casualties in less than a week's fighting. The other
model is again drawn from the Soviets: the conquest of Budapest.
There, rather than entering the city, the Soviets surrounded it and
bombarded it with artillery and aircraft for six weeks until the city
capitulated.
In order to invest Belgrade, a force will have to move east along the
southern bank of the Sava river. That force would logically be the
10th Mountain Division that the U.S. currently has positioned at Tuzla
in Bosnia. Unfortunately, the logical route it would take passes
through Bjijelnjia, which is currently occupied by a Russian brigade.
Secondary routes are available but would extend operational time
dramatically.
With the fall of Belgrade, the real war would begin. NATO forces would
then face the need to move south into terrain populated by hills
ranging from 500 feet to more than 2000 feet in very narrow valleys,
heavy foliage in summer, poor roads and a hostile population.
The terrain argues against an attack on Serbia. A direct attack
designed to seize all of Kosovo is dependent on Greek cooperation. An
attack to seize a limited portion along the frontier does not require
more than Albanian cooperation and will probably not be heavily
resisted by the Serbs.
An attack designed to conquer Serbia is possible. However, it presents
massive problems of strategic geography and operational terrain that
have made it an extremely daunting task. Moreover, given Serbian
operational principles, the main thrust of the attack north of the
Danube plays directly into Serbian hands by given them time to retreat
into the south. Since no rapid penetration and seizure of the area
south of the Sava is possible except with a massive occupation force
prepared to accept substantial casualties, the geography and terrain
presents the first and most significant challenge to any attack.
Forces Required:
The first phase of the operation would require primarily armored and
mechanized forces. Given that the screening force north of the Danube
would have been heavily damaged by NATO air strikes, the movement from
Hungary to the Danube could be executed efficiently. Given the
frontage and follow-on missions anticipated, this would still require
at least two armored divisions. The strike from Croatia would require
a third division, while the attack out of Bosnia would require an
infantry division, preferably mountain.
This four division force would needed to be rotated into reserve for
maintenance and replenishment while Belgrade was placed under seize by
suitable forces, heavily weighted toward artillery designed to reduce
resistance in Belgrade. Thus, a reasonable assumption would be that
the conquest of northern Yugoslavia, including Belgrade and Novi Sad
would require five divisions plus support elements. In addition, if we
assume that a secondary thrust into Montenegro was planned, this would
consist of at least two divisions with a third in reserve.
Finally, and most importantly, forces would have to be made available
to enter Serbia south of the Danube, preferably before Belgrade
capitulated, in order to disrupt the withdrawal and deployment of Serb
forces into the central mountains. The preemptory establishment of
strategic fire bases throughout the area will require at least two
infantry divisions with heavy artillery and an air mobile division to
provide a mobile attack capability, in addition to light infantry to
engage the Serbs. We would calculate a four-division requirement.
Additionally, the equivalent of two divisions would have to be
deployed in defensive positions in Albania and Macedonia in order to
prevent Serb counteraction in those areas.
In short, we estimate that a force of twelve divisions with full
logistical and other support would be needed for a successful
invasion.
The build-up period for this invasion would require at least four
months, assuming that the Germans were prepared to carry the bulk of
armored operations out of Hungary. If the United States and the United
Kingdom were to assume this burden, the preparation time for the
invasion would expand to well over six months.
Conclusion
We have examined three cases of ground combat against Serbia by NATO.
Each of these cases provides extremely difficult battle problems.
* Case 1 is a multi-divisional thrust designed to seize a small part
of Kosovo. It poses severe logistical problems with an extremely
large force required to seize a very small portion of Kosovo. The
possibility of long-term combat and attrition is high. This is the
most doable of the options.
* Case 2, the direct invasion of Kosovo, is impossible due to
geographical realities compounded by terrain.
* Case 3, the invasion and conquest of Serbia, requires a massive
mobilization and deployment of NATO's resources and extended
combat. It opens the United States to vulnerabilities elsewhere in
the world, particularly in the Persian Gulf and Korea. It is not
clear that even a ten-division force could subdue the Serbs in
their redoubt. However, short of complete pacification, this is a
militarily viable option, allowing for resource expenditures,
extended duration, casualties and geopolitical complications with
Russia and elsewhere.
In our view, NATO does not have acceptable ground combat options
against Serbia.