OK Henry, fess up. For months I've been asking who these STRATFOR guys are, and now a large part of your post is quoting them verbatum, but with no quotes. Do you work for STRATFOR by any chance?
Well, while we're discussing the STRATFOR 1999 predictions, I've been meaning to post this bit and ask the economists what they think, not of the predictions, but of the analysis of Japan's malaise being rooted in their ability to abort the business cycle.(perchance is that ability related to all those US dollars they have and are owed?) Is it my poor memory, or is this based on Marx's Crisis Theory? And were not Japan's actions just another way of handling surplus labor. Instead of a welfare state, I mean.
And while I'm at it, I've posted STATFOR's report on the coup that is supposedly behind the confrontations in the no-fly zone.
Isn't it nuts. we're going to stay tuff in Iraq. We're going to spend more money in case we have to get tough in like, Iraq and Bosnia.(oooohhh).
And by the way. The troops are going home now.
are so negative. The essence of the Asian crisis, as we have
>said many times, is to be found in the appallingly low rate of
>return on capital that Asian economies have experienced. This
>low rate of return is rooted in the ability of Asian governments
>to abort the business cycle through export-generated growth and
>high savings rates. Because interest rates were kept
>artificially low, businesses that had no business surviving
>actually expanded. They grew in spite of the fact that they were
>only minimally profitable, if at all. These businesses soaked up
>available credit, while continuing to erode financially. In the
>end, they could not even repay their loans.
>
>Global Intelligence Update
>Red Alert
>January 5, 1999
>
>Answers emerge about Iraqi defiance of "no-fly" zones
>
>Summary:
>
>* Iraqi defiance of no-fly zones may be more than just saber-
>rattling and brinkmanship. Evidence has surfaced that U.S. air
>cover was to have shielded an Iraqi army coup attempt.
>
>Analysis:
>
>Saddam Hussein chaired a meeting of Iraq's leadership on January
>4, devoted to reviewing the status of the Iraqi army in the
>aftermath of Operation Desert Fox, the U.S. and British air
>strikes on Iraq in December. After the meeting, Saddam vowed to
>continue to resist allied patrols of "no-fly" zones in northern
>and southern Iraq. This is a reassertion of similar commitments
>made by Iraq last week to shoot down any enemy plane entering its
>airspace, which culminated in at least two incidents in which
>allied planes were fired upon by Iraqi missile batteries in the
>no-fly zones. Many have speculated that this is simply another
>tactic by the Baghdad regime to engage the U.S. in a protracted
>campaign of confrontation aimed at forcing a reduction or
>elimination of economic sanctions against Iraq. However, it
>appears now that Iraqi defiance of the no-fly zones was in
>response to the protection those zones provided to forces hostile
>to, and preparing to confront, the Iraqi regime.
>
>The London-based "Al-Hayat" newspaper reported on January 1 that
>allied air cover was a driving force behind a failed coup by some
>commanders of the Iraqi 3rd Army Corps in southern Iraq during
>Desert Fox. The newspaper stated that senior commanders of the
>3rd Iraqi Army Corps stationed around the southern Iraqi city of
>Basra were "preparing military action against the regime during
>the U.S. missile strikes," while U.S. forces tied down the
>Republican Guards, Special Security Services, and Saddam's
>personal guard in the area.
>
>In addition, the rebellious forces reportedly had the support of
>a neighboring Arab state. A Ba'ath party official, who declined
>to give his identity, said that the units were prompted into
>action by the fact that they were "deployed under U.S.-British
>air cover and air support, as well as under ground and logistical
>support from an Arab state neighboring Iraq." If "neighboring"
>Iraq means bordering Iraq, that would suggest that either Jordan,
>Syria, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia were involved in the coup plot as
>well. Kuwait, which hosts U.S. forces and is only 50 kilometers
>from Basra, would appear to be the most likely party.
>
>Despite U.S. air cover and ground support from the "neighboring
>Arab state," the attempted coup by 3rd Corps officers evidently
>failed. The same Ba'ath official told Al-Hayat that a move by "a
>group within the army with the aim of breaching security" was
>"encircled and its elements were eliminated". Nine
>"infiltrators" were arrested for their roles as intermediaries
>between the intelligence services of the neighboring Arab state
>and the Iraqi coup plotters. Also two, presumably brigade-level,
>commanders of the 3rd corps, Brigadier General Ali Ma'ruf al-
>Sa'idi and Lieutenant Colonel Sabah Dhiyab al-Khalidi, were
>arrested and executed by special order of the Ba'ath party
>regional commander, Al Hasan al-Majid, who had been appointed
>just prior to the U.S. led strikes.
>
>While the 3rd Corp's coup attempt apparently failed (perhaps
>uncovered even before Desert Fox, judging by the Ba'ath party and
>military shuffling that occurred) it still provided a good reason
>for Iraq to challenge the no-fly zones. If one coup plot could
>form under U.S. air cover, others could follow. The imposition
>of the no-fly zones in 1991 and 1992 to protect Iraq's Kurdish
>and Shiite Moslem populations left Saddam with only the
>Republican Guard and the other Iraqi security services to counter
>any adventurous regular army commander. Previously, he could call
>upon his air force to halt the advance of Iraqi tanks rolling on
>Baghdad.
>
>After U.S. missiles wiped out the command infrastructure of the
>Republican Guard and other special security forces, Saddam's
>control was reduced to nearly zero. With no check in place, the
>3rd Corps attempted to exploit the situation. Further impetus
>may have been provided by the fact that, while U.S. warplanes
>were bombarding other Iraqi military targets, other aircraft were
>reportedly tasked with dropping thousands of propaganda leaflets
>over Iraqi troop positions around Basra (the same units belonging
>to the 3rd Corps), warning them against any retaliatory moves
>against Kuwait. The leaflets instructed Iraqi soldiers to "stay
>where you are, stay put, do not threaten anyone and you won't be
>hurt." More than a simple warning, these leaflets may have been
>an explicit signal or at least a reassuring nudge to 3rd Corps
>commanders that the U.S. was on their side.
>
>In the December 22 Global Intelligence Update, we outlined
>evidence indicating a strong potential for a coup attempt in Iraq
>(http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/122298.asp). We predicted
>that any attempt would most likely emerge from the Shi'ite
>population centers in southern Iraq, to which at least two
>Republican Guard divisions had been relocated. Indeed, the Ba'ath
>official cited by Al-Hayat mentioned that, "the Iraqi government
>distributed a special memorandum on the security situation in
>Baghdad and other Iraqi cities in respect to "scattered incidents
>carried out by some suspect elements during the days of U.S.-
>British aggression". This appears to confirm the reports of the
>Shi'ite uprisings that we mentioned in that GIU. However, there
>was apparently more underway than sporadic sabotage in Najaf, and
>U.S. air strikes and air cover in the no-fly zones were clearly
>involved.
>
>With the no-fly zones now explicitly connected to U.S. efforts to
>overthrow Saddam, the Iraqi leader's decision to defy those zones
>is undoubtedly more than just part of a tit for tat with the U.S.
>It is critical to Saddam's efforts to quell whatever other coup
>attempts and insurrections may be forming in the absence of
>strong internal security forces. Saddam still directly controls
>the air defense forces and small Iraqi air force, even though he
>delegated authority for the rest of Iraq's armed forces,
>immediately prior to Desert Fox, to his most trusted aids.
>Presumably, he regards the air force as his final line of defense
>against another attempted coup. However, this is possible only
>if he can use his missiles to diminish the presence of allied air
>power over Iraqi territory. Otherwise, the superiority of allied
>air power renders the Iraqi air force useless. This may be the
>logic behind the Iraqi missile challenge to the no-fly zones.
>
>Even more pressing than a coup attempt from within his own
>military, Saddam still faces opposition from other groups within
>and outside of Iraq. With the support of the U.S., the various
>Kurdish factions in northern Iraq are reportedly uniting (though
>this process has been long-running and erratic at best). And, as
>we reported in our last GIU, the Shiites in southern Iraq are
>also attempting to exploit the current situation. Nevertheless,
>Iraq has the resources to quash uprisings by the Kurds or the
>Shiites, or even a coup initiated by one or another of the
>regular Iraqi army corps, and it is unlikely that these mutually
>antagonistic elements could launch a coordinated uprising.
>
>In our last GIU we indicated that Saddam had ordered a major
>restructuring of the Iraqi military under regional commands. On
>December 18, General Izzat Ibrahim, vice-chairman of Iraq's
>ruling Revolution Command Council and Commander in Chief of the
>Northern Iraq Regional Command, sent a letter to Saddam Hussein
>stating that "we have instructed the armed forces to restrict
>their mission to the protection of the borders of the homeland."
>This evidence suggests that Iraq's capability to thwart external
>aggression has been severely diminished. It is significant that
>the Turkish army continues applying pressure on Iraq by
>maintaining between 10,000 and 25,000 troops just inside the
>border of northern Iraq, ostensibly to fight off the remnants of
>the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels still left in Iraq.
>Iran, though attempting to enhance its influence with Arabic
>countries, is faced with a harsh economic crisis that may be
>partially solved through another military gambit directed at
>Iraq. What is unclear is whether the U.S. is willing to see Iraq
>dismembered as a byproduct of its desire to topple Saddam.
>
>Saddam managed to halt a coup attempt around Basra. We still do
>not know what other coup attempts were thwarted or what others
>are still in the works. What we do know is that Operation Desert
>Fox had a greater impact on Iraq's internal politics than
>previously thought. Iraq's move thus far has been to strike out
>at the no-fly zones. The U.S., while vowing to retaliate against
>Iraqi defiance, is countering with a draw down in forces. It is
>thereby playing down Baghdad's latest initiative, but at what
>cost to the internal opposition to Saddam's regime? The question
>is, what next?
>
>Saddam has decentralized authority over the Iraqi military
>thereby inviting each "feudal" military leader to check the power
>of the others. This stratagem may serve to thwart a coup, but it
>is not a particularly prudent national security policy. By
>dividing these forces regionally, they become a less coherent,
>less mobile, and less interactive fighting force. Saddam may be
>gambling with the fact that the political dynamics of neighboring
>states bar aggression against Iraqi territory. We are not so
>sure.
>
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>
>>Global Intelligence Update
>Red Alert
>January 4, 1999
>
>1999 Annual Forecast: A New and Dangerous World
>
>
>SUMMARY
>
>* Russia will begin the process of recreating old Soviet empire
>in 1999. The most important question of 1999: will Ukraine
>follow Belarus into federation with Russia?
>
>* Russia and China will be moving into a closer, primarily anti-
>American alliance in 1999.
>
>* Asian economies will not recover in 1999. Japan will see
>further deterioration. So will China. Singapore and South Korea
>will show the strongest tendency toward recovery.
>
>* China will try to contain discontent over economic policies by
>increasing repression not only on dissidents, but the urban
>unemployed and unhappy small business people. Tensions will
>rise.
>
>* Asia will attempt to protect itself from U.S. economic and
>political pressures. Asian economic institutions, like an Asian
>Monetary Fund, will emerge in 1999.
>
>* The Serbs, supported by the Russians, will test the United
>States in Kosovo. There is increasing danger of a simultaneous
>challenge from Serbia and Iraq, straining U.S. military
>capabilities dramatically.
>
>* The main question in Europe will be Germany's reaction to the
>new Russia. The Germans will try to avoid answering that
>question for most of the year.
>
>* Latin America appears ready to resume its economic expansion,
>beginning late in 1999.
>
>
>