I very much hope that the administration didn't want to destabilize Russia. Back in 1993, at least, the line among the people whom I hung out with was that the United Stase had an enormous security--never mind the humanitarian--interest in making Russia's transition as successful as possible: no one wanted to see a Weimar Russia.
Of course trying to make Russia's transition as successful as possible would have required Marshall Plan-scale aid--on the order of $70 billion a year. I tended to think that such aid should be focused on making sure that democratization worked, and that as far as economic reorganization was concerned that the Russians should try a bunch of different things and then keep doing the ones that seemed to work. Others thought differently: some seemed to think that halting hyperinflation and achieving macroeconomic stabilization was the one thing that had to be done first; others seemed to think that if you privatized industry you would create a politically-powerful class with a strong interest in rapid economic development--create a progressive bourgeoisie, as it were.
But the policy of attempting to avoid a Weimar Russia would seem to require not just a lot more aid, but also treating Russia as a great power--no sudden moves, genuine consultation on security issues, and so forth. I understand how the politics of the deficit wiped out any chances of Marshall Plan Mark II. I don't understand our policy of not treating Russia like the great military power it was and in all probability will be again.
But then I have never understood much of the thinking of those who have dominated the formation of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Truman administration. Acheson, Marshall and company I understand. Dulles, McNamara, Bundy, Kissinger, et cetera I do not...
Brad DeLong