ken wrote:
> >pre-political ethics
> how on earth can a pre-political ethics in the form of rights be thought to
exist.
If human beings are defined by their rights, these rights do not come from human beings, they come from some sort of pre-human ethics. Here's how it goes - a Lacanian and a Habermasian...
So what comes first, the human or the rights?
Well, humans come first.
But what does it mean to be human?
It means having these rights!
So before rights there were no humans.
Yes! Before rights we were barbarians. Now we are civilized.
Humans have rights.
But where do these rights come from?
From the idealized content of presuppositions that arise in each
and every linguistic act.
So only people who speak have these rights?
No, they can be extended to other human beings as well. It has to
do with human potential, not language use per ce.
So where does language come from?
From the attempt to come to an agreement about something
consensually.
So language finds its origin in the encounter between to people who accord each other these rights automatically, prior to the conversation?
Yes. These idealizations are unavoidable.
So we should strive to make a society which reflects how people use langauge?
Yes. In Germany, everyone should learn German, because it is
the dominate discourse and only through learning German can
someone actually participate as a full human being.
Full human being?
Yes, someone who recognizes that once in language one is
decentered. Rather than deferring to the authority of another, you
rejoin the other in argumentation - using reasons, decentrement.
So rights arise from speech, and speech from the coordination of human action. Where does the coordination of human action come from?
It is the defining characteristic of what it means to be human.
Rights, right?
Yes.
These are natural then?
It cannot be otherwise. Language is a safety net, it protects us
from alienation.
So nature has a built in utopian perspective?
Yes. Biological evolution has secured the reproduction of the
species in the form of language - in the form of social
reproduction.
But how do you know your interpretation of language is correct?
We're having this conversation arent' we?
But this is an ad hoc justification, no? It retroactively imposes meaning on human existence.
Yes. It is reconstructed.
So it is imaginary? Because you have identified in nature...
No, it is not imaginary. It is true.
How do you know your interpretation isn't distorted?
Because it can be confirmed by science.
Like, in the conversation that we are having right now.
Yes.
So would you say that ethics existed before human beings arrived on the scene?
Yes, in a sense. Animals communicate, to lesser degrees. They
arrange, in a simplistic way, their life in agreement with each
other.
So ethics is prepolitical?
Yes. The idealization is present in the beginning, in the very
origin of organic life and its chaotic interaction.
So human rights, in a sense, started with the Big Bang.
I wouldn't say that, but in a way, I can't disagree with you.
So what you are saying is that life couldn't be otherwise. Life, which starts with the Big Bang, generated its own form of reproduction... this reproduction finds it ultimate expression in western democracy.
More or less.
So the entire universe culminates with the signing of a constitution of universal human rights.
Yes.
Are we then at the end of history?
No, that would be silly.
But you would say that the substance of human rights accurately characterizes what it means to be human.
Yes, human beings are defined by these rights. Rights capture
the substance of human beings. And these are open to debate.
So the subject is substance.
Yes.
The subject is defined by their content.
Yes.
In effect, the subject is defined by the process of subjectification.
Yes.
And what if this content varies?
It will vary, each locality will have have its own claims, but the
substance I am pointing to here is the universal substance of
humankind.
So we have moral obligations to one another based on the fact of our nature?
Yes.
And this can't be questioned?
It can be questioned, but it cannot be contradicted.
Why not?
Because asking the question presupposes the truth of what I am
saying.
A performative contradiction.
Yes.
But isn't this itself a paradox?
What do you mean?
I mean, you have identified the universal substance of human beings with recourse to the presuppositions of language. In other words, you have used language to demonstrate what language is.
Yes.
But this is tautological. In effect, you haven't identified the substance of human beings, you've identified the grammar of langauge.
But human beings are linguistic creatures.
Yes, but human beings aren't words. Language can equally be seen not as the substance of human beings rather, the appearance of human beings. You are confusing substance with appearance.
And what do you propose a human being is then, if not language?
Nothing. Behind the veil of language there is nothing, no substance.
So human beings do not exist?
There is no human being outside of language. But language is not identical with its object, language is the appearance, not the essence.
So human beings do exist.
Human beings exist in language, which is substance, but human beings are not, in the final say, defined completely by language.
What are you saying? What is the essence of a human being?
Language is the attempt by a human being to come to terms with the impossibiliy of its own representation. What you call performative contradictions are not the end of dialogue, they mark the beginning - the necessay and the impossible moment of communication. The human being is essentially no thing. The appearance is what rushes in to fill the void.
How do you know this?
I don't. I think I exist. But I am not where I think. Every act of self-reflection is a radical decentrement, a performative act of alientation.
But this is what I'm saying - that subjects must be decentred!
There is a difference. I'm saying that this decentrement is the form of reflection. You are saying that decentrement is the content of reflection.
But form and content are not separate!
Agreed. In my Lacanian reading, the form (substance) hides the content (void). In your Habermasian reading, the content (substance) is identical with the form (language).
So how do you know who is right?
I would say that you're analysis of language falls prey to the illusion of transparency, which is why you proceed retroactively. You think the form can illuminate the content from within, which is why you end up in a tautology. My point is that the form says nothing, and that the retroactive imposition of meaning does not illuminate the substance, rather it alters the form again (ie. social change!). __________________
Hopefully this will address a few of your concerns.
ken