Max, I would take issue with the elite part of your statement. Although income inequality persisted under cental planning, wage structure was remarkably flat by Western standards. The major predictors of income inequality were industry and sex (the latter being the function of feminization of certain occupations)-- wheras the effects of eduction and managerial position on wages were quite minor (cf. Domanski, Labor Market Segmenation and Income dermination in Poland in: _Sociological Quarterly, 1988, 29(1):47-62 and Domanski, Dynamics of Labor Market Segmentation in Poland, 1981-87), _Social Forces_ 1990, 69(2):423-438).
Of course one can argue that official wage structure did not reflect all the perks and benefits received by the elite - but that can be easliy countered that any possible effect of these perks were compensated by the effects of gray economy - which according to some estimates reached about 12% (sic!) of the GDP in Poland. The central feature of Polish (and Soviet-style in general) corruption under state socialism was that it was remarkably democratic, cutting across all social classes - as opposed to, say, the US corruption with is mainly the privilege of the elite.
I thus think that a more accurate description would be that under central planning, the surplus was devoted to investment and exponentially growing transaction costs -- which themseleves were a fuction of two elements, the particular feature of Soviet-style planning system known as "taut planning" (i.e. planners trying to squeeze out hidden by plant mangement surpluses), and more importantly the *transitory* nature of central planning.
The idea of Eastern Europe 'exporting' revolution or their economic system is a myth invented by US propaganda. In fact, central planning was from the start a system of constant changes implemented to "catch up" with more developed countries (often by imitation of more developed countries, cf. Gerschenkron's work on relative backwardness) and to deal with contingencies of that development (cf. Chavance, _The Transformation of Communist Systems_, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.). The problem it created was that diffrent types of control mechanisms - some more characteristic of the "command economy" while other - of the "market economy" - coexisted at the same time - and each one adding its own transaction costs (for the theoretical work on transaction costs of markets versus corporate organizations see Williamson, _Markets and Hierarchies_, New York: The Free Press, 1975 and Granovetter, Economic Action and and Social Structure in: _American Journal of Sociology_, 1985, 91:481-510).
We can think of the inefficiencies created by "taut planning" as the transaction cost due to the planning mechanism. Then you have various costs related to procurement of scarce goods or finding markets for surplus under the rules of limited enterprise self management (these were the market-related transaction costs). Finally you had transaction costs due to informal economy running amok - these included hoarding of scarce goods, corruption, embezzlement and productivity loss.
BTW, the transaction cost approach can be seen as a textbook example of marxian dialectics at work. Central planning offered superior to markets mechanisms of reducing transaction costs in the initial phase of development (e.g. the three-year plan in Poland (1947-49) which was an indisputable success. It is the subsequent planning periods that fell short, so solutions were takes to tinkler withthe problem, and these solutioins were adding their own transaction costs over time, under the whole edifice collapsed under its own weight.
>But if we abstract from the disposition of the surplus
>in this sense and assume, for the sake of argument,
>that under a capitalist and a Soviet/PRC-type regime
>the wage rates are comparable, just what is it that
>distinguishes (and commends) the latter over the
>former, from a socialist standpoint? I'd say it
>depends on democratic institutions. Lacking any,
>the Soviet system and the PRC are just capitalism
>with a bureaucratic face.
Again, I'd contest that argument, at least in its premise part. IMHO, political democracy is mostly window-dressing, a legitimation myth if you will. Most centrally planned economies had and electoral system, and for example Poland had more political parties in the diet that the US: specifically 3 plus the Catholic "parlimentary club" (not exactly a party) - compared to two in the US. If you compare that on the per-capita basis - you will find that Poland was much democratic than the US. Some may argue that there were no real diffrences between these three political parties and all of them were appendages to the ruling elite. To which I reply - how is that different from the US?
However, I agree with your conclusion that developed countries were somewhat better for workers than central planning, but for a different reason.
I think a more meaningful basis for a comparison can be found in
theoretical work of Karl Marx on the mechanism of surplus appropriation.
The key to that mechanims is labour time - in short workers work longer
than necessary to reproduce the value of their labour power - and the
surplus is being appropariated by the owners of the means of production.
>From that standpoint, the reduction of worktime is thus an indicator of
progress.
If you compare Eastern Europe to the developed countries on that dimension, yoiu fill find that in the latter work time was about 6 to 8 hours per week shorter than in EE. Not a big difference, to be sure, but I do not subscribe to the idea that central planning was that much different form the develped economies.
The key importance of the labour time factor can be demostrated, inter alia, by the fierce opposition of business elites to to any attempts to reduce official duration of working weeks (cf. France).
>Hence, without awarding any blue ribbons to
>capitalism, the jingoism on behalf of USSR/PRC is largely
>a fetishism of state ownership of capital, not very
>good Marxism from my vantage point. Marginally more equal
>income distributions in the formerly socialist countries
>were offset by higher absolute incomes for many workers
>in capitalist countries.
Agreed.
>
>The socialist cause rests mostly on what is to come,
>not on what has already transpired.
Ditto.
wojtek