W, Thanks for the elaboration, but my point was different and, I think, simpler: that state ownership per se does not in principle preclude unduly low wages (due to excessive investment, bad investment, or high consumption by elites). In practice, state ownership does not appear to have been a major motive force for greater equality, and hardly effectual at all as far as democracy is concerned. I don't doubt that income distribution was somewhat more equal in the Warsaw Pact nations than in the West, tho I recall when teaching comparative systems (13 years ago[!]) that income distributions in the Nordic countries compared well with Eastern Europe, and of course in the other dimensions there was no comparison at all which favored really-existing communism.
> . . .
>
> I thus think that a more accurate description would be that
under central
planning, the surplus was devoted to investment and exponentially
growing
transaction costs -- which themseleves were a fuction of two
elements, the
particular feature of Soviet-style planning system known as "taut
planning"
(i.e. planners trying to squeeze out hidden by plant mangement
surpluses),
and more importantly the *transitory* nature of central planning.
>
This is well taken, but to transactions costs I would add simply deficient planning, owing to the inherent difficulty of the problems of planning.
> The idea of Eastern Europe 'exporting' revolution or their
economic system
> is a myth invented by US propaganda.
Sure, but did anybody say this? I don't recall.
> . . .
> >But if we abstract from the disposition of the surplus
> >in this sense and assume, for the sake of argument,
> >that under a capitalist and a Soviet/PRC-type regime
> >the wage rates are comparable, just what is it that
> >distinguishes (and commends) the latter over the
> >former, from a socialist standpoint? I'd say it
> >depends on democratic institutions. Lacking any,
> >the Soviet system and the PRC are just capitalism
> >with a bureaucratic face.
>
> Again, I'd contest that argument, at least in its premise part.
IMHO,
political democracy is mostly window-dressing, a legitimation
myth if you
will. >>
There is some quotient of such mythology in all democracies, especially I would say in underdeveloped nations. But I also think there is a solid core of democratic accomplishment in the industrial countries which implies clear advantages relative to any existing or recently existing communist state.
>> Most centrally planned economies had and electoral system, and
for
example Poland had more political parties in the diet that the
US: specifically 3 plus the Catholic "parlimentary club" (not
exactly a party)
- compared to two in the US. If you compare that on the
per-capita basis -
you will find that Poland was much democratic than the US. Some
may argue
that there were no real diffrences between these three political
parties
and all of them were appendages to the ruling elite. To which I
reply -
how is that different from the US? >
This is too long an argument for me to get into any deeper right now.
> I think a more meaningful basis for a comparison can be found
in
theoretical work of Karl Marx on the mechanism of surplus
appropriation.
The key to that mechanims is labour time - in short workers work
longer
than necessary to reproduce the value of their labour power - and
the
surplus is being appropariated by the owners of the means of
production.
>From that standpoint, the reduction of worktime is thus an
indicator of
progress. >
O.K.
> If you compare Eastern Europe to the developed countries on
that dimension, yoiu fill find that in the latter work time was
about 6 to 8 hours per week shorter than in EE. Not a big
difference, to be sure, but I do not subscribe to the idea that
central planning was that much different form the develped
economies. >
8 hrs a week strikes me as a hell of a big difference, but in any case this speaks to the dubious value of state ownership as an index of the well-being of the working class.
mbs