Charles A. Kupchan, a National Security Council aide during
President Clinton's first term, wrote in a column published Sunday
that while air attacks might damage the Yugoslav forces, only
ground troops could expel them from Kosovo and then patrol the
province's borders to make sure they did not return.
Writing in The Times, Kupchan said Clinton made a
"fundamental miscalculation" in failing to deploy a sizable ground
force before beginning the military campaign. "There is good reason
to believe air power alone will not do the trick," he wrote.
Gauging Public Opinion in U.S.
The introduction of ground troops could quickly change the
domestic politics of the military campaign.
Though polls suggest that the operation has the support of a
majority of Americans, public opinion analysts say that feelings on
the subject aren't strong and that even a relatively small number of
casualties could quickly shift views of whether U.S. forces should
be in a place that, as Clinton has said, most citizens might have
trouble finding on a map.
The U.S. intervention in Somalia won general support when
President Bush began it in 1992 to counter the effects of a famine.
But the public turned against the move when 18 Army Rangers
were killed in a shootout in the capital, Mogadishu, in 1993.
Poland, one of NATO's three new members, has already
offered to contribute ground troops to the Kosovo effort, U.S.
officials said.
But NATO officials said they have no plans to follow their aerial
bombardment with ground forces. Javier Solana, the alliance's
secretary-general, said, "This is the position that all 19 [NATO
members] maintain until this moment." Appearing on "This Week,"
he acknowledged, "I don't know how things are going to evolve."
Defense Secretary William S. Cohen has been saying that
NATO has neither any "plan" nor any "intention" to bring in ground
forces. On Friday, however, he said on ABC-TV's "Nightline":
"Whether there is any recalculation another time, that remains to be
seen."
Though they appear to be hedging, Pentagon officials argue that
NATO wouldn't necessarily save time by trying to sweep through
Kosovo with ground troops to rescue ethnic Albanians.
There are only about a dozen roads leading into the province
and, like Kosovo's bridges, they are heavily mined and strongly
defended. The Yugoslav army is now well positioned at high points
on the terrain.
For an invasion, NATO would need time to build up forces,
more time for a long bombardment of Yugoslav army positions and
more time still to advance across the terrain.
Some Say Ground Forces Overdue
Many analysts believe that it is simply too early to give up on an
air campaign. Some assert that Milosevic might be more reluctant to
lose troops and equipment than is readily apparent because of his
need to protect himself from neighboring countries that claim pieces
of Yugoslav territory.
With Macedonia, Bulgaria and Albania all coveting Yugoslav
real estate, "he can't risk losing control of his borders," said Loren
Thompson, an analyst at the Lexington Institute, a conservative
research organization.
Other analysts take the view that NATO should have mobilized
ground forces weeks ago--and that it is now too late.
In its effort to avoid casualties, NATO has "hobbled itself with a
single-dimension" air campaign, said Richard Dunn, a military
analyst and retired Army colonel. "You leave yourself open to
disaster."
-- Gregory P. Nowell Associate Professor Department of Political Science, Milne 100 State University of New York 135 Western Ave. Albany, New York 12222
Fax 518-442-5298