On Fri, 30 Apr 1999, Enrique Diaz-Alvarez wrote:
> I don't think this is the case. The most likely explanation is that
> NATO/US wanted to make an example out of the Serbs, who have repeatedly
> given it the finger . . . [T]he Rambouillet agreement was made
> purposefully impossible to accept, and the "negotiations" were a
> charade to give NATO political cover.
I completely agree, Erik. This has become out modus operandi. We did exactly the same thing 4 years ago preceding the Dayton agreement. Why? Precisely so we could say that we bombed him and that's why he negotiated. Lord knows we've been repeating that over and over ever since, and everyone seems to believe us. That has become the lesson of Dayton. But in fact it isn't true. Sloba was dying for an agreement at that point. Even Carl Bildt and Richard Holbrooke admit that. If anything, it was the Bosnian Moslems who were balking at that point at signing an agreement. But we thought bombing and signing would make us look better than just signing. And we were absolutely right. It made us look both tough and indispensable. And it set a precedent for the future. Whereas if we'd just signed, people would say we'd "given in." And might presume that negotiations could happen without us running the show.
For that matter, we could have had the same damn agreement as Dayton three years earlier if we'd signed on to Vance-Owens, saving not only the bombing but three years of fighting and 10's of thousands of lives. Why did we turn that down, or, to be more precise, kill it with lukewarm support? Because it wasn't an American initiative. Or, to make that sound more reasonable, because we refused to put our reputation and resources behind a plan that we hadn't designed. But to say we will only put our full force behind plans we design -- and given the fact that we seem only able to design plans that give us unfettered control -- is another way of saying we will accept no meaningful no international constraints on our freedom of action. Which is to say, no meaningful international law. Add that to our unwillingness to appear like we are conceding anything, and the result boils down to our MO: to bomb and then impose agreements. This makes us look like a hero in the Greek sense, like an indispensable force of civilization fighting monsters. And each time we do it, we are consciously trying to set precedents that will allow us to do it again.
William Polk suggests in the February 18th New York Review of Books (www.nybooks.com/nyrev) that the same thing was true of the Gulf War. Saddam had thought, on reasonable grounds, that our ambassador had given him the Green light to invade Kuwait. He certainly had sounded her out, and we had had a pro-Iraq policy for 20 years. When the allied forces built up, he transmitted offers to withdraw if only he could save face. We didn't want that. We wanted to attack and then he could withdraw. It would set a good example. And it did: everyone remembers the Gulf War as a time when America successfully stood up to an aggressor. Whereas, if we'd agreed to have a conference on regional issues, allowing that maybe there were legitimate grievance here, albeit ones that shouldn't be settled by war . . . nah. Just not our style. But of course we had to put out the word that we were offering just that. Otherwise we would have looked like aggressors.
In this light the Rambouillet pseudo-agreement is just the most recent example what is by now a fairly consistent evolved strategy for building a post-cold war order that gives us complete freedom to intervene anywhere in the world while coopting international support and financial support. We propose, we bomb, we impose. Viewed as to actual strategic results, the policy might be judged an expensive failure. But so far as support for our intervention is concerned, it's been working like a charm. And the alternative that had arisen in the early 90's -- a sizeable armed international peacekeeping force under the aegis of the UN -- is so dead nobody remembers it was ever taken seriously. We came to a crossroads 10 years ago and came out with increased hegemony rather than increased multilateralism.
I don't think this strategy originally grew out of a clear set of principles. Rather it grew out of competition between bickering forces. But the one thing that all American factions agreed on -- and especially the humanitarian and military factions in America -- is that they chafed against international constraints. And the policy that has emerged is the result precisely of doing everything we can to avoid and minimize those constraints; to avoid giving any prestige to alternatives to the alternatives; to produce spectacular results, in the Debordian sense; and yet not to drive our allies away. The demonize-deliver ultimatum-and bomb routine is the resultant of avoiding every other feasible plan.
The fact that we do it when someone is ready to deal, or when we think there are ready to deal, should not be a surprise. It's only then that this plan has any chance of working. And even then it doesn't work that well. Except in the rah rah department. On that score, you've got to admit: from the Gulf War to Dayton to Kosovo has been one big success in getting our allies to cheer and sign on. The prestige of American imperialism has never been higher.
Michael
__________________________________________________________________________ Michael Pollak................New York City..............mpollak at panix.com