Of gods and vampires: an introduction to psychoanalysis

kenneth.mackendrick at utoronto.ca kenneth.mackendrick at utoronto.ca
Mon Oct 4 15:38:24 PDT 1999


On Mon, 04 Oct 1999 16:51:34 -0400 kelley <kcwalker at syr.edu> wrote:


> > It's a scandal I say, an absolute scandal.


> utter nonsense. calling hab on the carpet for all this is absurd. why?
> because as any first yr. phil of social sciences student knows, *all*
> theoretical frameworks rest on presuppositions. ripping apart a theory on
> that basis is redick.

You don't find it annoying that Habermas uses his PC argument to shut people up? As Jay Bernstein notes, the presence of a PC isn't a sign of irrationality, it's a sign of a standpoint. Habermas has a tendency to try to liquidate all forms of mythological thinking with the exception of his (ie. postmetaphysical thinking *is* still transcendental).


> also, don't you have to deal with karl otto apel here...?

No. Apel simply has a stronger, transcendental version of Habermas's argument. Apel argues that one can develop a universalist ethic out of the idea of PC's. Habermas argues that a PC simply marks a confusion of discursive boundaries. Problem is, discourse itself is constituted by a confusion of boundaries. That's what language is - if one follows Lacan (and I do) - all communication is miscommunication. Misunderstanding makes discourse possible... not understanding. Which is why dialectics is appropriately negative, not positive. Habermas's quasi-transcendental ideal, undistorted communication, is not a presupposition of discourse because not all discourse is oriented by an attempt to understand. Do you really agree with Habermas here? - that a critical social theory can have a completely [discursively] rational justification? (rational meaning consensual validity). Does it all really come down to a legitimation crisis?


> > The idea of "the subject presumed to know" is a rather
Lacanian idea - so I'd wager that you'd have a tough time dismantling Lacan from within without inadvertently verifying the very thing you wish to critique).


> so uuuum is that like a performative contradiction you're
accusing yoshie of?

Yes, in the sense that PC's are unavoidable and therefore philosophically trivial. I'll readily admit that my standpoint isn't open to consensual and universal means of justification or verification. No, I can't justify my validity claims unconditionally. And I hardly think I disqualify myself from a "rational lifeworld" by having a perspective. In any event, Habermas's later work seems to be slighty aware of this problem - which is why he's ditched (U) in favour of a principle of democracy - which is almost identical to Benhabib's formulation of discourse ethics as a communicative ethics - with an emphasis on ongoing dialogue vs. consensus.

and... other comments...


> > let's say a reporter is at the scene of an
>accident. Does the reporter "objectively" describe the
>accident from their perspective, leaving themself out? Or
>do they describe the accident with their body in the
>picture? In either case - the reporter in question must
>accomplish an impossible act. Either to suppress themself
>from the scene, or stand outside of themself. Hence, the
>dilemma of the Real.


>ohmifuckingodken. a claim like this presupposes a
unitary, stable "self" or "ego" and a freaking vulgar notion of 'objectivity". i love you madly but where on earth do you get this stuff from. is this from zizek? zizek, trained in sociology zizek, says this?

jesus

Dear Jesus (this is a critique of the unitary, stable, "self" or "ego" not an affirmation of it),

Zizek, not trained in sociology Zizek, mentions this only is passing. I'm borrowing the problem from B. Russell today - the paradoxes of set theory. Lacan uses the paradox to show that the supposed set of all signifiers can never be complete.... which Lacan also borrows from Godel's incompleteness theorems... to illustrate the aporias of the prescence of "kinks" in the symbolic order.... which moves us into structure vs. cause... and the automatic functioning of a signifying chain... and the processes necessary to fill the gap... which points to the supposition of the subject and illustrates why the subject is not the subject of the statement... but you know all of this because you've read THE DEFINITIVE MONSTEROUS LACAN Part 4.

ken



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