rob wrote:
> Now we get this shit from Cosgrove about an intended national unity
> government WITH THESE VERY MILITIA LEADERS in it!!!
yes, the Australian presence has substantially boosted the likelihood of partitioning off the southern end of east timor, the status of the militia as legitimate political entities, etc.
Andy wrote:
>Yes of course everyone knew that bloodshed would be the result of a
pro-independence vote, the 78.5% who voted that way included i'm sure.<
of this, i'm not so sure. you'll recall the UN posters all round east timor assuring potential voters that the UN would protect them. ie., whilst various governments and intelligence agencies, the CNRT, and of course, the Indonesian govt and military knew that bloodshed would result, two things happened simultaneous with this knowledge: a) the UN spent a lot of time assuaging fears of bloodshed amongst the east timorese; b) the Australian govt, on behalf of the Indonesian govt, lobbied the UN to accept an _unarmed_ UN presence during the ballot for the ostensible reason that, as documents now make clear, it was deemed that 'reconciliation of the factions' would not be possible under such circumstances and was the priority. in short, whereas everyone knew of the scheme to massacre and destroy the east timorese economy, much effort, by those who knew, was put into convincing both the voters (and the rest of the world) otherwise.
lambs to the slaughter. i was literally sick after hearing a nun talk of the christ-like sacrifice of the east timorese at the end of the millenium. the evil of the indonesian military is readily admitted; the evil of this kind of desire for sacrificial spectacles i'd have to say is in a lunacy all its own, especially since it parades as concern.
> It always seemed to me that delays went against the independence forces
in favor of the militas. It would give milita time time to prepare, build
up weapons, etc. <
you mean delays in the ballot or delays in the intervention? it seems to me like the latter was already part of the plan. there was no 'delay' as such.
> As far as waiting a year or so I would see that as risking the military
consolidating it's power, the fall of habibie's gov and perhaps losing the
window of opportunity for the vote. What guarantee's would there be that a
vote delayed a year would take place at all? Or that the situation would
be any better?<
there are no gurantees, that's for sure. but what is also certain is that this was no window of opportunity. the indonesian govt and military decided to call the ballot at this time. it's important not to forget this. it aparently surpassed the expectations of the UN, Australia, Portugal and the CNRT. Until that point, eg, Australia had been arguing, along with Belo, for a transitional period of autonomy. as i said, it was a mouse-trap: it was the timing of a decision that Habibe knew was inevitable, but whose timing and thus context (the continuing dominance of the military in indonesian politics, the continuing force of things like kopassus within the military which had strong economic interests in ET, etc) allowed such a decision to be taken on their terms, with an outcome we all know, even if we forget that the way in which this decision for independance was taken presents the UN/IMF/Australia/Portugal as the saviours and agents instead of the those east timorese, indonesians and indeed even australians who have been struggling for over twenty years on this question.
in any event, the Habibe govt will fall, but more likely than not it will be to either a Megawati/Wiranto govt, or (less likely) one that is an alliance of the muslim parties and golkar. either of these have an interest in constraining the presence of the Soeharto family's interests, and it's these interests which provide the strong _economic_ connections between east timor and the indonesian military.
Angela _________