Protest is a necessary - but insufficient - condition for achieving political objectives. Increased black voting power, for example, correlated to black gains as African-American elected officials played an important role in improving public services in black communities. Protests are successful because business owners and ruling elites fear disruptions will cause economic harm. So-called out-groups (mainstream social science terms can be a hoot sometimes) *must* use protest but the temporal and episodic character of such politics means that other more permanent types of mobilization must must also be developed.
Blacks became increasingly militant in late 1960s as concerns shifted from civil rights struggle to economic opportunities. Conflict between 'reform and revolution' often revealed submerged class *and* generational diivisions. That former 'won out' is not surprising given dominent US political patterns. But does this have to be an either/or situation? Is contrast between 'street' and 'suite' politics a false dichotomy?
African-American electoral success has been important because black politicians, whether 'accomodationist' or 'confrontational' - more mainstream social science (mss) lingo - are more responsive to black complaints about hiring discrimination, police brutality, street paving, recreational services, minority contracting, local political appointment, etc. Of course, focus on such success can obscure fundamental dilemmas. Democratic clubhouse politicans such as Tom Bradley (LA), Wilson Goode (Philly) and David Dinkins (NYC) are not going to inspire much enthusiasm.
Expriences of Detroit's 'accomodationist' Coleman Young who transformed himself from radical to GM lackey (Charles B. may disagree with latter characterization) and Gary's 'confrontational' Richard Hatcher suggest to some that former-type ccomplishes more because their ability to politically survive. The combative mayor will, these same folks argue, alienate local interests and eventually lose even core constituency support. But questions arise about who benefits from accomodationist approach and what 'organic' roots to neighborhoods and commnities do such mayors have.
Harold Washington's brief time as Chicago mayor in the mid-1980s remains important because what emerged was a potentially powerful dialectical relationship between politician and movement. Politicos in downtown 'suites' were emboldened by activsts in neighorhood 'streets.' Political mobilization and organization operating 'outside of government' yet linked 'organically' to it worked to embolden policymakers. Results, admittedly limited (but achieved in face of white-dominated city council and under scrutiny of white local media), included some shifting power and resources to neighborhoods (including creating neighborhood coops), fostering further mobilization of previously inactive folks (neighborhood orgs could review all city economic development programs and submit economic assistance proposals), and attempting some redistribution towards lower-income individuals/groups (considered a no-no for municipal gov't because spending on the poor requires higher local taxes that are unattractive to potential investors).
Washington's untimely death re-opened bitter struggle among various political factions (including between activists). And 'he' may not have succeeded anyway given the competitive character of the 'global city' that literally responds to dictates of global capital markets *and/or* dominance of the urban 'growth machine.' But minority 'incorporation' (still more mss) without popular mobilization will certainly result in much 'business as usual' that serves predominantly white downtown business interests. Michael Hoover