COLOMBIA: Shades of Vietnam By Adam Thomson in Bogota
Chewing gum and wearing wrap-around mirrored sunglasses, the sunburnt US army officer looks distinctly out of place against the ochre soil, mango trees and lush mountains of Tolemaida, Colombia's largest military base.
Hands on hips, and sporting the badges of the airborne division, he parades through the seething heat along a line of young Colombian soldiers who pepper a row of distant targets with their automatic rifles.
On the other side of the base, in the shade of a small tree, one of the officer's colleagues is instructing a group of Colombians in the art of explosives and personal satellite guidance systems. Another conducts a simulation of a mortar attack.
All three are part of a 47-man team of US army officers whose task during the coming months is to train a new anti-narcotics battalion of the Colombian army, about 60 per cent of which is funded by US taxpayers' contributions. The training and funding of the battalion is the latest offensive in the war against drugs in Colombia, the world's largest producer of cocaine and an important producer of heroine.
It is also a clear sign of the US's increasing involvement in the country's 35-year armed conflict with insurgent groups: when it begins operations in December, the battalion's first mission will be to enter the southern jungle province of Putumayo and destroy a plethora of cocaine-producing laboratories, virtually guaranteeing open combat with the heavily armed leftwing guerrillas who protect them.
Guerrillas - particularly the largest group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) - as well as rightwing paramilitary units are deeply involved in the thriving drugs industry. They tax growers and intermediaries, and they guard laboratories for money or a cut of production.
Aware of the symbiotic relationship between rebels and drugs, the US government has traditionally been cautious to ensure its anti-narcotics aid does not end up funding counter insurgency operations. As a result, most has gone to the National Police, who carry out eradication programmes in many of the country's drug-producing areas, but do not openly engage rebel groups in combat.
Now, though, analysts say this caution is beginning to wane. Since March, for example, US authorities have been providing Colombia's armed forces with military intelligence about the movement of rebel troops in drug-producing areas. And a growing proportion of the $300m budget this year is being spent on the army rather than on the police.
"We have switched from 90 per cent police aid to a real commitment with the Colombian military, and the rules of engagement [with the guerrillas] are clearly changing," said Adam Isacson of the Centre for International Policy, a Washington-based non-governmental organisation.
Indeed, speaking before a September 21 Senate caucus on international narcotics control, Randy Beers, the US assistant secretary for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, openly recognised the need to work more closely with the Colombian army in areas such as Putumayo in order to counter the heavy Farc presence there.
"We do recognise that, given the extensive links between Colombia's guerrilla groups and the narcotics trade, counter-narcotics forces will come into contact with the guerrillas, and must be provided with the means to defend themselves and carry out their mission."
The answer has been to back the new anti-narcotics battalion, the first of three which will all be fully operational by 2001. Once they are deployed, however, the fear is that the battalion's role will not just be purely defensive. According to the Colombian army, the US funding only covers non-lethal aid. Yet about $50m of the 1999 $58m presidential drawdown - an additional source of aid in the form of military hardware from the US arsenal - is set to equip the battalion with 18 UH1N armed helicopters, some ammunition and weapons.
Increasing funding to the army not only raises questions about it becoming inexorably caught up in Colombia's armed conflict, but also siphons money to an organisation which, like its guerrilla adversaries, has been widely associated with human rights abuses.
Despite the concern, US anti-narcotics aid to the army in the future seems almost inevitable. Republican Senators Paul Coverdell and Michael DeWine recently introduced legislation in Congress which plans to raise US aid to Colombia to about $1.6bn over the next three years. Of that, approximately 90 per cent would be police and military aid.
"What is worrying is that, as we are stepping up our involvement in Colombia, there is no benchmark for when we feel the goal has been reached and we can go home," said Mr Isacson. "Drawing a parallel to Vietnam in 1963 is very tempting."
Barry McCaffrey, the US drug tsar, told the FT in London that the US faced a problem in "separating the drugs money from the peace process", in other words in ensuring that anti-narcotics aid was not simply being used to fight guerrillas.
But he insisted that there was a "zero possibility" of the US military being dragged into directly intervening in the area.
However, he confirmed that current policy involved providing the Colombian armed forces with "training, intelligence, equipment, and advisers when it is appropriate."
"Colombia has a huge problem as the dominant producing nation. .. the government there has lost control of half the country. .. vital US interests are at stake in the region," he said.
Mr McCaffrey, a retired general who directs the US Office of National Drug Control Policy, is hoping that the European Union will boost its crop replacement aid to Colombia alongside intelligence and law enforcement co-operation.
Additional reporting by Jimmy Burns in London