> At 08:58 15/09/99 -0400, you wrote:
> >The following is from Lou's marxism list. I'll pass this on without any
> >comments. Yoshie
>
>
> "To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a
> war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complicated
> than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse
> beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilize the conflict of interests (even though
> temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with
> possible (even though temporary, unstable, vacillating and conditional)
> allies- is this not ridiculous in the extreme?"
>
> Lenin "Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, Chapter 8 No Compromises?
>
> Thanks to Yoshie for forwarding this from Lou's Marxism list, because Lou
> has declared it absolutely impossible to carry on a discussion on that list
> if people refer to what Lenin said.
Chris, I think considering this quote of Lenin's - and Lenin's 'No Compromises?' in general - is very interesting and useful. As you of course know, Lenin in this part of 'Left Wing Communism' was not just confronting the 'No Compromise' position, but trying to elaborate when, and why, we should accept compromises - and when not. To quote Vlad:
"Naive and quite inexperienced people imagine that the permissibility of compromise in general is sufficient to obliterate any distinction between opportunism, against which we are waging, and must wage, an unremitting struggle, and revolutionary Marxism., or communism. But if such people do not yet know that in nature and in society all distinctions are fluid and up to a certain point conventional, nothing can help them but lengthy training, education, enlightenment, and political and everyday experience. In the practical questions that arise in the politics of any particular or specific historical moment, it is important to single out those which display the principal type of intolerable and treacherous compromises, such as embody an opportunism that is fatal to the revolutionary class, and to exert all efforts to explain them and combat them."
Anyway, here's part of the paragraph after the one you comment on:
"After the first socialist revolution of the proletariat, and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in some country, the proletariat of that country remains for a long time weaker than the bourgeoisie, simply because of the latter's extensive international links, and also because o f the spontaneous and continuous restoration and regeneration of capitalism and the bourgeoisie by the small commodity producers of the country which has overthrown the bourgeoisie. The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional."
So, how does this description differ from our current situation? The point I would make is that Lenin here is talking of the actions, and compromises, required of the proletariat. He is talking of the limitations that the working class will encounter as it struggles to develop a new kind of society (i.e. as it struggles to 'maintain and develop hegemony'). Lenin is describing the action of an *actor* upon the stage of history.
As Carrol and Yoshie have repeatedly pointed out, we are in no sense actors at this stage. When we consent to support imperialist armed forces (necessarily Australian in this context), we in no sense develop the working class as a (collective) actor. We should consider these questions not as abstract theoretical questions (and I would argue that it is pretty clear that C and Y, despite opponents' claims to the contrary, have not considered these questions in an abstract theoretical fashion), but as a guide to action. We should identify the actors involved in the current situation, and assess what our interventions may be, and what the results of these interventions might be.
The actors involved at present are clearly the Indonesia armed forces and government (in its various factions), the US-allied block (in its factions) and the indigenous East Timorese factions (mainly the CNRT). It seems clear to me that a withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces from East Timor, and a cessation of aid to the pro-Indonesian militias would result in a situation clearly in favour of the CNRT. The result of an East Timorese victory would be a clear victory against the rhetoric of the 'necessity' of US-allied intervention. The result of a settlement on the basis of Australian intervention is almost certainly going to be a victory for the imperialist 'humanitarian intervenion' excuse, and is going to have very serious negative effects in the future.
(note, btw, that the tendency of independence movements to 'beg' imperialism to intervene - as we have seen both in the case of Kosovo, and in the case of East Timor - is clearly related to the organisation of power worldwide, and furthur 'humanitarian' interventions will merely strengthen those tendencies in independence movements everywhere which look the the US and allies for aid).
So, is it possible for 'left' forces to put the removal of Indonesian armed forces from East Timor on the agenda? To me, it seems at least at least a possibility - already the UK's 'Independent' has run articles explaining to its readers clearly that the Indonesian armed forces are the force behind the militias. The demand of strong action against East Timor has been prepared (at least in the UK) by a long history of pro-East Timorese activism. A flow of continous information from Indonesia and East Timor could feed into activism to ensure that movements worldwide are responsive to the situation. Any activity undertaken by such a campaign would play the part not only of resolving favourably the question of East Timor, but also develop the confidence of people involved outside of East Timor - helping to build the confidence that is necessary for people to see that their place is on the center stage of history - not merely watching from the wings.
Is it inevitable that such a campaign would work? No, of course not. But the alternative is not, as Lenin said to 'utilize the conflicts of interest', but rather to wait on the sidelines and hope that somehow the 'conflicts of interests' will of themselves generate the basis for future action (a vain hope, in my mind).
Peter P.S. apologies for writing another long post. I hope it was not too long-winded. -- Peter van Heusden : pvanheus at hgmp.mrc.ac.uk : PGP key available 'the ruthless criticism of everything existing' - Karl Marx 'Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will' - Antonio Gramsci