> Maybe it is a surprise to you, but no 'military intervention' by
> imperialists was ever undertaken for the purpose of saving some oppressed
> people's lives, nor will be in the future, for all their rhetoric --
> period. If they invade another country, that's because they see either a
> chance or need or both for asserting their direct control over a given
> situation (as opposed to indirect control), the result of which is not
> pretty, even for people in whose name such an 'intervention' is conducted.
Given what I have said, it's odd that you would think I might be surprised by a generalized description, such as the one you give, of imperialist motives.
But your description is much too narrow and rigid; capital's motives are often more subtle and complicated than you allow for. Not everything capital does has an immediate economic motive or promises an immediate economic benefit. Indeed, if capital were really as clumsy and crude as you describe it would not be such a formidable foe.
An example is humanitarianism itself. In a particular situation, capital, or some branch of it, may deem it a good idea to try to fool the world into thinking of it as the defender of human rights, to pave the way for future "humanitarian" interventions when its interests are more clearly and directly threatened.
Certainly that is part of what is happening now in East Timor. East Timor has been dismantled and the radical movement crushed. The threat to capital is gone for now, but not the opportunity to pick up points for being humanitarian by sending in a few thousand troops. Not that there can't still be benefits, if, for example it serves to rescue the rebels in the mountains (if they are savable). But this is not capital's purpose for sending the boys in, of course. Australian leftists in particular should be calling for that now.
So I repeat: the intervention we now see is not the kind I have given even the slightest nod to. The only intervention that could have mattered was a combination of attacks on Indonesian capital and sufficient force in place before the vote to allow for the possibility of independence. There was, of course, no reason for the Indonesian military (or their US and Oz partners) to agree to any such thing, because they had already decided to destroy ET as a viable society, starting with its radical element. But it's important to make this point by arguing for actions that at the time could prevent the massacre. Such arguments would establish the basis for a clearer understanding of the situation.
Given the impending massacre, what sense does it make to ignore the effect on the movement there and argue against all intervention, period, with your hands over your eyes? One thing about you and Carrol, though, Yoshie, is you haven't taken to disparaging the worth of the ET movement, as have so many others who have argued against all interventions. But I am having a helluva time finding any role for the East Timorese to play in your analysis. In particular I am still waiting for one of you to offer the countervailing benefit you see that your nonintervention principle has gained to offset the loss of the East Timorese radicals.
I read you and Carrol as giving far too much attention, and credit, to capital and too little to the East Timorese. There is no room in your analysis for the subtleties of using capital against itself, for separating short run and long run considerations, or for simple survival of an opposition in crisis to fight another day. In fact, once you understand imperialist motives, a nonintervention principle such as you and Carrol advocate is worse than useless; it is counterproductive because it denies the flexibility necessary to consider and act on these very points, among others.
Roger